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Abstract 
Unsafe food handling practices are implicated in many restaurant-associated foodborne 
disease outbreaks. Factors that contribute to unsafe food handling in restaurants include 
inadequate food safety knowledge, employees who perceive that safe food handling is not 
under their control, and restaurant cultures that do not prioritize food safety. The purpose 
of this study was to determine whether temporary restaurant closures were associated 
with reduced food handling violations after closure in restaurants from the Vancouver 
Coastal Health Authority and the Fraser Health Authority, in British Columbia, Canada. 
The theoretical foundations used were the health action process approach and the theory 
of planned behavior. Mixed-effects Poisson regression analyses showed that the typical 
restaurant had an estimated 16% increase in the average number of overall food handling 
violations per inspection after temporary closure, compared with before closure. 
Restaurant- and employee-related factors responsible for unsafe food handling practices 
likely result in the continuation of unsafe food handling practices, despite temporary 
restaurant closures. This study may contribute to positive social change by challenging 
the assumption that temporary restaurant closures motivate food handlers to improve 
their food handling practices. To protect the public’s health, additional interventions must 
follow temporary restaurant closures for reasons such as insanitary conditions and 
improper food handling. Suggested interventions include the provision of targeted 
learning resources to restaurant managers, the issuing of directives requiring food 
handlers to attend recognized food safety training courses, and environmental health 
managers requiring a reduction in problematic menu items.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
Restaurant inspections are in place to prevent foodborne illness and to license 
establishments (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2013). Environmental health 
officers (EHOs) enforce standards based on risk assessment and management principles 
and provide food safety information to the food service industry 
(Federal/Provincial/Territorial Food Safety Committee, 2016). In British Columbia, 
Canada, the Public Health Act gives EHOs inspection powers to monitor restaurants and 
confirm compliance with food safety regulations (British Columbia, 2008). Employees of 
health authorities with the required training qualifications, which include 2 years of 
training in environmental health and passing the Canadian Institute of Public Health 
Inspector’s certification exam, are designated as EHOs (British Columbia, 2008). EHOs 
conduct routine inspections of restaurants and assign them risk ratings of low, moderate, 
or high: high is based on a history of noncompliance, complex food preparation 
processes, and a lack of control over risks associated with the foods prepared. High-risk 
categorized restaurants are inspected more frequently (Almanza, 2014); routine 
inspections are typically scheduled three times a year (Cates et al., 2009). Furthermore, to 
protect the public from foodborne disease, an EHO may issue a temporary closure order 
when he/she believes there is a substantial public health risk (Almanza, 2014). EHOs use 
enforcement measures in cases where they believe a health hazard is likely or definitely 
going to occur (Lundén, 2013). 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether temporary restaurant closures 
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were associated with reductions in food handling violations postclosure in the groups 
under study. Restaurant closures have been presumed to be an effective mechanism for 
protecting the public from health hazards; however, no evidence supports the 
effectiveness of temporary restaurant closures in reducing critical violations in 
restaurants. In the Literature Review, I will discuss three possible reasons why restaurant 
employees do not discontinue unsafe food handling practices despite temporary 
restaurant closures: (a) lack of knowledge and understanding of safe food handling 
behaviors, (b) food handler perceptions of safe food handling as not being under their 
control, and (c) restaurant cultures in which food safety is not a priority. EHOs often 
debate the reasons why employees working in high-risk categorized restaurants exhibit 
such low levels of compliance with food safety regulations. Conventional wisdom holds 
that lack of compliance is primarily attributable to restaurant employees’ lack of 
knowledge and understanding of safe food handling practices. Supporting this viewpoint, 
restaurant managers self-reported in a study by Läikkö-Roto and Nevas (2014) that they 
did not always understand the required behavioral corrections and the reasons for them 
(36.5%). In addition, in Clayton, Clegg Smith, Neff, Pollack, and Ensminger’s (2015) 
study, several restaurant food handlers suggested unsafe food handling practices were 
related to inadequate knowledge and understanding; however, other employees disagreed. 
This illustrates that more information is needed about the association between food 
handlers’ food safety knowledge and inspection scores or numbers of critical violations. 
It is logical that food handlers’ lack of knowledge and understanding might 
indeed translate into unsafe food handling practices. A second viewpoint, however, is that 
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violations primarily happen in restaurant cultures in which food safety is not a priority. 
Several researchers’ findings support this claim. Waters et al. (2015) found increased 
odds (odds ratio [OR] range, 1.85–3.42) existed for holding temperature, personal 
hygiene, equipment cleanliness, cross contamination, and sanitizer violations, if the same 
violation had been cited in the previous routine inspection. Furthermore, Kettunen, 
Nevas, and Lundén (2015) observed that enforcement measures did not result in 
violations being completely corrected in 31.8% of cases, and enforcement measures had 
to be used recurrently for 15.7% of violations. In Clayton et al.’s (2015) study, 
respondents agreed that restaurant employees were unlikely to perform safe food 
handling practices consistently without management oversight. In this study, I found that, 
in the groups under study, temporary restaurant closures were not associated with overall 
reductions in food handling violations postclosure. My findings support the latter 
viewpoint that a positive restaurant food safety culture reduces food handling violations.  
As I found that the restaurant employees studied did not generally improve their 
food handling practices following temporary restaurant closures, I have concluded that 
EHOs should develop additional strategies to protect the public’s health. With this 
research, I have contributed to positive social change by using scholarship to encourage 
EHOs to think differently about temporary restaurant closures and how to strengthen food 
handlers’ intentions to perform safe food handling practices. Only a few researchers have 
investigated enforcement measure outcomes (see Kettunen et al., 2015). In this study, 
therefore, I contribute to this research gap. 
In this chapter, I will focus on introducing the study and highlighting why my 
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findings are relevant for EHOs. Major sections of this chapter include: the background, 
problem statement, purpose of the study, research questions, theoretical foundations, 
nature of the study, definitions, assumptions, scope and parameters, limitations, 
relevance, and summary. 
Background 
In this section, I will highlight potential outcomes of foodborne illness and food 
handling issues in restaurants. In Canada, foodborne transmission is the main route of 
transmission for Campylobacter spp., Clostridium perfringens, Escherichia coli subsp., 
and Salmonella spp. (Butler, Thomas, & Pintar, 2015). Foodborne pathogens most 
commonly cause acute gastroenteritis, although life threatening sequelae sometimes 
occur such as Guillain-Barré syndrome and hemolytic uremic syndrome (Scallan, 
Hoekstra, Mahon, Jones, & Griffin, 2015). Sockett et al. (2014) estimate there are 22,344 
verotoxigenic Escherichia coli 0157 cases annually in Canada, and this pathogen has 
played a role in a number of high profile outbreaks. In a 4-year Canadian study (1 
January 2001–31 December 2004), researchers counted 32,702 cases of Campylobacter 
spp., 5.1% of which required hospitalization; 3751 cases of enter hemorrhagic 
Escherichia coli, 3.9% of which required hospitalization; and 17,459 cases of Salmonella 
spp., 12.6% of which required hospitalization (Ruzante, Majowicz, Fazil, & Davidson, 
2011). Although foodborne illness is most often limited to vomiting and diarrhea, cases 
often result in hospitalizations and occasionally deaths can occur.  
In the United States, researchers have examined the human health burden of 
Campylobacter and non-typhoidal Salmonella. Scallan et al. (2015) estimated that 80% 
 
 
5 
of Campylobacter cases were foodborne, and that the resultant mean number of years 
lived with disability annually was 20,100 (8,800–36,100, 90% credible interval); the 
mean number of years of life lost annually due to mortality was 2,300 (200–6,800, 90% 
credible interval). In the same study, Scallan et al. estimated that 94% of non-typhoidal 
Salmonella was foodborne, and that the resultant mean number of years lived with 
disability annually was 24,300 (15,500–35,400, 90% credible interval), whereas the mean 
number of years of life lost annually due to mortality was 8,600 (430–25,700, 90% 
credible interval). However, when foods are handled safely, foodborne disease can often 
be prevented.  
Four research groups that conducted studies in restaurants located in the United 
States uncovered widespread unsafe food handling practices. Bogard, Fuller, Radke, 
Selman, and Smith (2013) observed, in their study of 385 restaurants, that food handlers 
did not wash their hands between handling raw ground beef and cooked ground beef or 
other ready-to-eat foods 62% of the time. Green Brown et al. (2012) noted that 36.2% of 
420 restaurant managers did not know their jurisdiction’s cooling regulations, and 63.8% 
of restaurants had no written cooling procedures put in place to minimize pathogen 
proliferation. Furthermore, Green Brown, Khargonekar, Bushnell, and the Environmental 
Health Specialists Network Working Group (2013) found that only 43% of managers, 
from 448 restaurants, knew the temperature to which raw chicken needs to be cooked for 
it to be safe to eat (165°F or 74°C). Last, following interviews with 426 managers, 
Norton et al. (2015) reported that 46.2% of restaurants had no written policies regarding 
ill food workers (i.e., an individual infected with any communicable disease transmittable 
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through food), despite the handling of food by an ill worker being a major cause of 
restaurant associated foodborne illness. The high number of known widespread unsafe 
food handling practices suggests that EHOs should prioritize restaurants for food safety 
communications and educational interventions. 
The gap in knowledge that I have addressed with this study is whether temporary 
restaurant closures are associated with reductions in food handling violations postclosure. 
Research has shown that restaurant associated foodborne disease can be prevented by 
improving restaurant employees’ food handling practices (Ghiselli, 2014). In looking at 
where food safety knowledge levels, working conditions, and restaurant food safety 
cultures are having a negative influence on food handling practices, I have considered 
whether additional strategies are needed following temporary restaurant closures to 
improve food handling behaviors. I will discuss potential strategies in Chapters 2 and 5. 
Problem Statement 
In this section, to frame the problem, I will review estimates of the numbers of 
individuals who experience foodborne illness annually and outline the known pathogens 
that cause the majority of foodborne illnesses. In North America, foodborne illnesses are 
a persistent public health problem, and confirmed cases likely represent only a small 
fraction of actual cases. In British Columbia, for every case of infectious gastrointestinal 
illness counted in the provincial statistics, it is estimated that 347 community cases occur 
(MacDougall et al., 2008). Using a modeling approach that accounts for underreporting 
and underdiagnosis, Thomas et al. (2013) estimated that, each year, a total of 4 million 
episodes of domestically acquired foodborne illness occur in Canada; approximately one 
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in eight Canadians experiences an episode of foodborne illness annually. Thomas and 
Murray (2014) estimated that Norovirus, Clostridium perfringens, Campylobacter, and 
nontyphoidal Salmonella are responsible for approximately 90% of the illnesses caused 
by known pathogens in Canada. 
Scallan, Griffin, Angulo, Tauxe, and Hoekstra (2011a) estimated that, each year, 
47.8 million episodes of domestically acquired foodborne illnesses occur in the United 
States. Preliminary data for 2014 from the United States’ Foodborne Diseases Active 
Surveillance Network, which monitors laboratory-confirmed infections caused by nine 
pathogens that are transmitted commonly through food to approximately 15% of the 
country’s population, shows 19,542 infections, 4,445 hospitalizations, and 71 deaths 
(Crim et al., 2015). Also in the United States, Scallan et al. (2011b) reported Norovirus, 
nontypoidal Salmonella spp., Clostridium perfringens, and Campylobacter spp. cause 
58% of illnesses caused by major pathogens.  
The average Canadian household spends 27% of food expenditures on foods 
purchased from restaurants (Statistics Canada, 2015), whereas the restaurant industry’s 
share of the food dollar in the United States is 47% (National Restaurant Association, 
2015). Although eating in restaurants and ordering food to go is commonplace, foods 
prepared by restaurant employees may not be as safe to eat as those prepared in the home. 
In fact, when individuals eat more frequently in restaurants, they are at increased risk for 
foodborne illness (Jones & Angulo, 2006). In the United States, foods prepared by 
restaurant employees were associated with 68% of the foodborne disease outbreaks that 
reportedly occurred from 1998–2008 (Gould, Rosenblum, Nicholas, Phan, & Jones, 
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2013). Of 295 investigated restaurant-associated outbreaks that occurred in 2006 and 
2007, Gould et al. found that an infected person handling foods (i.e., an individual 
infected with any communicable disease transmissible through food) was a contributing 
factor in 137 outbreaks, inadequate cold-holding temperature was a contributing factor in 
47 outbreaks, slow cooling was a contributing factor in 34 outbreaks, and allowing foods 
to remain at room temperature was a contributing factor in 25 outbreaks. These findings 
illustrate that foodborne disease is often preventable.  
Because restaurant employees often have inadequate food safety training, EHOs 
spend a great deal of time educating employees about safe food handling practices. 
However, food safety training does not always result in behavior change (Park, Kwak, & 
Chang, 2010), indicating that other factors may act as deterrents to performing safe food 
handling practices in work environments. Although researchers have studied the effects 
of food safety training on food handler behaviors, a gap in the research literature relates 
to both the effects of temporary restaurant closures on food handler behaviors and what 
strategies might be most effective in reducing food handling violations postclosure. In 
studying the literature, I identified lack of food handler knowledge, food handler 
perceptions of safe food handling as not being under their control, and restaurant cultures 
in which food safety is not a priority as three possible reasons why food handlers might 
not perform safe food handling practices despite temporary restaurant closures. As many 
factors may influence food handler behaviors, there was justification for looking into how 
effective temporary restaurant closures are in terms of motivating food handlers to 
perform safe food handling practices after restaurant reopenings.  
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Purpose of the Study 
I have designed this quantitative study to examine whether temporary restaurant 
closures may be associated with reductions in food handling violations postclosure. As I 
will discuss, I used data from two health authorities to conduct the research. There were 
eight possible categories of food handling violations: contamination, handwashing, food 
safety management, sanitizing, refrigeration, training, cooling, and thawing. I examined 
whether there were differences in the average overall numbers of documented food 
handling violations per inspection in temporarily closed restaurants before and after 
closures (HO1, HA1), and for the individual violation categories handwashing, sanitizing, 
refrigeration, and contamination (HO2, HA2). Next, I determined whether there were 
differences in the average overall numbers of food handling violations between any of the 
following four groups: restaurants that had been temporarily closed and those categorized 
as high, moderate, or low risk (HO3, HA3). In addition, I examined whether type of cuisine 
served (HO4, HA4), chain or independent status (HO5, HA5), or number of menu items (HO6, 
HA6) could be used to predict being categorized in the temporarily closed or not closed 
high-risk categorized groups. Each alternative hypothesis was tested against the 
corresponding null hypothesis at the usual statistical significance level of α = 0.05. I 
designed my methodology to examine the effect of temporary restaurant closures on food 
handling violations in two health authorities. Specifically, I designed the study to look at 
the prevalence of continued unsafe food handling practices postclosure, as a high rate of 
occurrence would provide evidence that additional interventions are needed in 
combination with temporary restaurant closures, such as food handler certification. 
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When EHOs rely solely on their personal experiences to determine the 
effectiveness of enforcement measures, they may over or under estimate effectiveness. It 
is, therefore, important to evaluate the effectiveness of policies and to determine whether 
enforcement measures result in significant improvements in food handling practices. 
With this study, I carried out the work of Walden University and contributed to positive 
social change by providing insight into some of the limitations of temporary restaurant 
closures. My findings indicate that additional interventions are advisable and should be 
put into practice following temporary restaurant closures, due to continued unsafe food 
handling practices postclosure. My results can be used by policy makers considering 
evidence that supports new and existing food safety intervention policies.  
Research Questions and Statistical Hypotheses 
In this study, I investigated six quantitative research questions (RQs). For ease of 
reference, I will refer to these questions as RQ1 through RQ6 throughout.  
Routine inspection reports contain information on the following food handling 
violations: contamination, handwashing, food safety management, sanitizing, 
refrigeration, training, cooling, and thawing. RQ1 and RQ2 concern food handling 
violations identified during routine inspections conducted before and after temporary 
restaurant closures, for restaurants located within the Fraser Health Authority and the 
Vancouver Coastal Health Authority. RQ4, RQ5, and RQ6 enabled me to investigate 
whether type of cuisine, type of ownership, and/or the number of menu items are factors 
that can help to predict whether a restaurant located within the Fraser Health Authority 
will be temporarily closed or categorized as high risk. 
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After Fraser Health Authority EHOs conduct routine inspections, they post 
restaurant risk ratings and inspection reports online, whereas only inspection reports are 
posted on the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority website. Because risk ratings are not 
available for restaurants located in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, I focused on 
restaurants located in the Fraser Health Authority for RQ3 through RQ6.  
My six quantitative RQs were as follows: 
RQ1 – Is there a difference in the average overall number of food handling 
violations per inspection documented before and after temporary closures, for restaurants 
located in the Fraser Health Authority and the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority? 
RQ2 – Is there a difference in the average number of specific food handling 
violations per inspection documented before and after temporary closures, for restaurants 
located in the Fraser Health Authority and the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority?  
RQ3 – Are there any differences in the average overall numbers of food handling 
violations between the following groups of restaurants monitored by the Fraser Health 
Authority: restaurants that experienced a temporary closure (Group A), restaurants that 
were categorized as high risk (Group B), restaurants that were categorized as moderate 
risk (Group C), and restaurants that were categorized as low risk (Group D)?  
RQ4 – Does the type of cuisine served in a restaurant predict it being categorized 
in the temporarily closed group (Group A) or the high-risk group (Group B), for 
restaurants located in the Fraser Health Authority? 
RQ5 – Does a restaurant being independent rather than being a chain predict it 
being categorized in the temporarily closed group (Group A) or the high-risk group 
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(Group B), for restaurants located in the Fraser Health Authority? 
RQ6 – Does the number of menu items offered by a restaurant predict it being 
categorized in the temporarily closed group (Group A) or the high-risk group (Group B), 
for restaurants located in the Fraser Health Authority? 
Details about RQ1 through RQ6 follow. For RQ1, I considered the following data 
for each restaurant in my sample: (a) the number of overall food handing violations 
before temporary closure, (b) the number of routine inspections before temporary closure, 
(c) the number of overall food handling violations after temporary closure, and (d) the 
number of routine inspections after temporary closure. Specifically, I determined the 
overall number of food violations listed in items (a) and (c) by counting all of the 
following food handling violations observed across inspections: contamination, 
handwashing, food safety management, sanitizing, refrigeration, training, cooling, hot 
holding, and thawing. 
For RQ2, I considered the following data for each restaurant in my sample: (a) the 
number of specific food handling violations before temporary closure, (b) the number of 
routine inspections before temporary closure, (c) the number of specific food handling 
violations after temporary closure, and (d) the number of routine inspections after 
temporary closure. For items (a) and (c), I considered in turn only selected specific food 
handling violations: handwashing, sanitizing, refrigeration, and contamination. 
To address RQ3, I used the risk ratings (low, moderate, high) and restaurant 
closures information posted on the Fraser Health Authority website to assign restaurants 
to Group A, B, C, or D. For each restaurant in my sample, I considered the number of 
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overall food violations documented. I determined the overall number of food violations 
by counting the same food handling violations listed in RQ1. 
For RQ4, I considered popular types of cuisine (East Asian, Japanese, North 
American/other, and South Asian). Type of cuisine served has been a variable of interest 
in several studies (Brown et al., 2014; Manes, Liu, & Dworkin, 2013; Panchal, Bonhote, 
& Dworkin, 2013; Panchal, Carli, & Dworkin, 2014). As some types of cuisine have 
dishes that require more preparation, I included this variable in my study. Similarly, 
independent or chain status has been a variable of interest in a number of studies (Brown 
et al., 2014; Kassa et al., 2010; Manes et al., 2013; Panchal et al., 2013; Panchal et al. 
2014; Roberts & Barrett, 2009). Chain restaurants are often required to follow company-
wide standardized operating procedures, which may reduce numbers of food handling 
violations; therefore, including this variable was appropriate. Although the explanatory 
variable number of menu items has not been examined by other scholars, it provides 
valuable insight, as preparing too many menu items in restaurant kitchens with limited 
physical space and equipment is problematic with regard to safe food handling.  
Each of the six quantitative questions generated two competing statistical 
hypotheses: a null hypothesis and an alternative hypothesis. Each alternative hypothesis 
was tested against the corresponding null hypothesis at the usual statistical significance 
level of α = 0.05. Information about the statistical test used for each set of hypotheses 
will be given in Chapter 3. Table 1 lists all six RQs and the associated null and alternative 
hypotheses.  
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Table 1 
Quantitative Research Questions of Interest and Corresponding Statistical Hypotheses 
Research 
question ID 
Research question 
description Null hypothesis 
Alternative 
hypothesis Target restaurants 
RQ1 Is there a 
difference in the 
average overall 
number of food 
handling violations 
per inspection 
documented before 
and after 
temporary 
closures? 
HO1- There is no 
difference in the 
average overall 
number of food 
handling violations 
per inspection 
documented before 
and after 
temporary 
closures.  
HA1- There is a 
difference in the 
average overall 
number of food 
handling violations 
per inspection 
documented before 
and after 
temporary 
closures. 
Restaurants located 
in the Fraser Health 
Authority and 
Vancouver Coastal 
Health Authority. 
RQ2 Is there a 
difference in the 
average number of 
individual food 
handling violations 
per inspection 
documented before 
and after 
temporary 
closures? 
HO2- There is no 
difference in the 
average number of 
individual food 
handling violations 
per inspection 
documented before 
and after 
temporary 
closures.  
HA2- There is a 
difference in the 
average number of 
individual food 
handling violations 
per inspection 
documented before 
and after 
temporary 
closures. 
Restaurants located 
in the Fraser Health 
Authority and 
Vancouver Coastal 
Health Authority. 
RQ3 Are there any 
differences in the 
average overall 
numbers of food 
handling violations 
between any of the 
following groups: 
Group A, B, C, D?  
HO3- There is no 
difference in the 
average overall 
number of food 
handling violations 
between the four 
restaurant groups: 
Group A, B, C, D.  
HA3-There is a 
difference in the 
average overall 
number of food 
handling violations 
between the four 
restaurant groups: 
Group A, B, C, D.  
Restaurants located 
in the Fraser Health 
Authority. 
    (table continues) 
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Research 
question ID 
Research question 
description Null hypothesis 
Alternative 
hypothesis Target restaurants 
RQ4 Does the type of 
cuisine served in a 
restaurant predict it 
being categorized 
in the temporarily 
closed group 
(Group A) or the 
high-risk group 
(Group B)? 
HO4- Type of 
cuisine served does 
not predict being 
categorized in the 
temporarily closed 
group (Group A) or 
the high-risk- 
group (Group B). 
HA4- Type of 
cuisine served does 
predict being 
categorized in the 
temporarily closed 
group (Group A) or 
the high-risk group 
(Group B). 
Restaurants located 
in the Fraser Health 
Authority.  
RQ5 Does a restaurant 
being independent 
rather than being a 
chain predict it 
being categorized 
in the temporarily 
closed group 
(Group A) or the 
high-risk group 
(Group B)? 
HO5- Being 
independent, rather 
than being a chain, 
does not predict 
being categorized 
in the temporarily 
closed group 
(Group A) or the 
high-risk- group 
(Group B). 
HA5- Being 
independent, rather 
than being a chain, 
does predict being 
categorized in the 
temporarily closed 
group (Group A) or 
the high-risk group 
(Group B). 
Restaurants located 
in the Fraser Health 
Authority. 
RQ6 Does the number 
of menu items 
offered by a 
restaurant predict it 
being categorized 
in the temporarily 
closed group 
(Group A) or the 
high-risk group 
(Group B)?  
HO6- Number of 
menu items offered 
by a restaurant 
does not predict 
being categorized 
in the temporarily 
closed group 
(Group A) or the 
high-risk group 
(Group B). 
HA6- Number of 
menu items offered 
by a restaurant 
does predict being 
categorized in the 
temporarily closed 
group (Group A) or 
the high-risk group 
(Group B). 
Restaurants located 
in the Fraser Health 
Authority. 
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Theoretical Foundations for the Study 
Food handler behaviors can be explained using the theory of planned behavior 
and the health action process approach. The theory of planned behavior originates from 
the theory of reasoned action, in which Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) proposed that a 
person’s intention is a function of attitude toward the behavior and subjective norm. In 
this theory, Ajzen and Fishbein assumed that most actions are under volitional control. 
However, many behaviors depend on resources, skills, and the cooperation of others 
(Ajzen, 1991). In the theory of planned behavior, Ajzen (1991) added the construct 
perceived behavioral control to capture the role of behavioral control in achievement. For 
example, in terms of my study, restaurant employees’ behaviors around using 
thermometers to check safe minimum cooking temperatures will be better predicted by 
the theory of planned behavior. Ajzen found the theory of planned behavior improved the 
prediction of both intentions and behaviors. 
Schwarzer (1992) asserted that the health action process approach is similar to 
protection motivation theory and also combines some features of the theory of reasoned 
action. In protection motivation theory, Rogers (1975) explained that a person’s 
intentions to adopt the recommended response are a function of appraised severity, 
expectancy of exposure, and belief in the efficacy of a coping response. In one 
application of protection motivation theory, Mullan, Allom, Sainsbury, and Monds 
(2016) found that self-efficacy, or a study participant’s belief that they could perform safe 
food handling practices easily, was most significant in influencing the individual’s 
motivations to perform safe food handling practices. Schwarzer (2008) clarified that the 
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health action process approach makes a distinction between an initial motivation phase, 
in which a person develops an intention to act, and a postintentional phase, in which 
individuals must develop self-regulatory skills and strategies to maintain behaviors. This 
distinction makes the health action process approach more suitable for predicting 
behaviors requiring perseverant efforts (i.e., performing proper handwashing during peak 
hours). These theoretical foundations relate to my approach in this study, in that I 
investigated whether temporary restaurant closures were associated with improvements in 
food handling behaviors postclosure in the groups under study.  
In making use of these theoretical foundations, I offer factors such as lack of food 
safety knowledge, food handlers’ perceptions of their ability to perform safe food 
handling practices as being outside of their control, and lack of management commitment 
to food safety as potential explanations for ongoing unsafe food handling practices 
despite temporary restaurant closures. The reasons why restaurant employees might 
discontinue performing safe food handling practices after short periods of compliance can 
also be better understood though the health action process approach. In this chapter, I 
touch on why food handlers might not perform safe food handling practices despite 
temporary restaurant closures. I then explore this subject in detail in the literature review, 
in Chapter 2. 
Nature of the Study 
I decided on a quantitative design, and I used publicly available data involving 
restaurants located in the Fraser Health Authority and the Vancouver Coastal Health 
Authority in British Columbia. Maps showing the health authority boundaries are 
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available in Appendix A. The explanatory variables were health authority and occasion 
(RQ1 and RQ2), group and year (RQ3), type of cuisine (RQ4), type of ownership (RQ5), 
and number of menu items (RQ6). The outcome variables were numbers of food handling 
violations (RQ1–RQ3) and group (RQ4–RQ6). A quantitative design was appropriate for 
examining the relationships between the explanatory variables and the outcome variables 
for RQ1 through RQ6. The research questions were developed from the problem 
statement. To answer RQ1 and RQ2, I used a mixed effects Poisson regression; to answer 
RQ3, I used a standard Poisson regression; and to answer RQ4 through RQ6, I used 
multinomial logistic regression. The research methodology is described further in 
Chapter 3. 
Definition of Terms 
Schwarzer’s Health Action Process Approach 
Action self-efficacy: Involves one’s confidence in being able to perform a 
behavior. 
Health action process approach: This framework distinguishes between pre-
intentional motivation processes that lead to behavioral intentions and post-intentional 
volition processes that lead to actual behaviors. Action self-efficacy, outcome 
expectancies, and risk perception influence intentions to act, and maintenance self-
efficacy and recovery self-efficacy lead to actual behaviors. 
Maintenance self-efficacy: Represents beliefs about one’s capability to deal with 
barriers that arise during the maintenance period. 
Outcome expectancies: When a person balances the pros and cons of certain 
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behavioral outcomes. 
Recovery self-efficacy: Refers to the experience of failure and recovery from 
setbacks. 
Risk perception: A contemplation process involving thoughts about consequences 
and competencies. 
Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior 
Attitude: How a person appraises the behavior in question. 
Intentions: Indications of how much effort a person is planning to exert to 
perform a behavior. 
Perceived behavioral control: Involves an individual’s perceived difficulty in 
terms of performing a behavior. 
Subjective norm: The perceived social pressure to perform a behavior. 
Theory of planned behavior: In this theory, individuals’ intentions to perform 
behaviors can be predicted from attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control; these intentions account for considerable variance in actual 
behavior. 
Other Definitions 
Chain restaurant: A restaurant owned or operated by the same company or 
individual, with two locations or more. 
Contamination: Foods may be contaminated by an infected food handler, by 
unclean work surfaces and utensils, by pests, or by other foods (Burton, 2014). 
Danger zone: Refers to the temperature range in which bacteria multiply rapidly, 
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between 4 and 60° Celsius (or between 40 and 140° Fahrenheit) (Burton, 2014). 
East Asian cuisine: Includes the cuisine of China, Cambodia, Indonesia, Korea, 
Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pacific Islands, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. 
Food handling violation: Refers to a nonconformance with applicable food safety 
regulations in one of the following categories: contamination, cooling, food safety 
management, handwashing, refrigeration, sanitizing, thawing, or manager training. 
Food safety culture: Refers to the shared attitudes and beliefs toward the food 
safety behaviors that are routinely demonstrated in food service establishments (Griffith, 
Livesey, & Clayton, 2010). 
Food safety knowledge: Refers to a restaurant employee’s level of awareness 
about safe food handling practices, as determined by scores on a survey.  
Foodborne illness: An illness caused by foodborne contamination; contamination 
can be either biological, chemical, or physical (Burton, 2014). 
Foodborne illness outbreak: An incident involving two or more persons 
experiencing a similar illness after ingesting a common food (U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, 2013). 
Habit: An impulse to act generated by a learned stimulus response association 
(Gardner, 2014). 
Handwashing: A cleaning procedure requiring rinsing hands under running water, 
applying soap, rubbing hands together to make a lather for at least 20 seconds, rinsing, 
and drying with a paper towel (Burton, 2014; Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention, 2015). 
High-risk category restaurant: In this category, the restaurant meets one or more 
of the following conditions: a history of non-compliance with food safety regulations, 
little or no emphasis on food safety, complex food preparation processes, inadequate 
standardized operating procedures, and/or inadequate food safety training of employees. 
Japanese cuisine: The cuisine of Japan.  
Manager: A restaurant employee with authority over the kitchen. 
North American/other cuisine: The cuisine of North America, Africa, France, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Greece, and Italy.  
Number of menu items: All dinner menu items including desserts, but excluding 
half orders, beverages, beer, and liquor. 
South Asian cuisine: Includes the cuisine of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.  
Temporary restaurant closure: A closure order issued when an EHO determines 
that conditions may lead, or have already lead, to a health hazard. 
Trained food handler: An individual with a certificate indicating he/she has 
successfully completed a nationally or locally recognized food safety training program. 
Type of cuisine served: Using menus, foods served were classified in this study as 
East Asian, Japanese, North American/other, or South Asian. 
Assumptions 
I made several assumptions, most notably that inspection reports can be used to 
capture restaurant employee behaviors related to food handling. Specifically, I assumed 
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that EHOs documented all food handling violations from restaurants in the groups under 
study. This assumption was necessary because I did not design the study to involve any 
additional data collection from EHOs. Last, I assumed there were only minor differences 
in the consistency of observations between inspectors, and that food service 
establishments were accurately classified as low, moderate, or high risk according to 
observed breakdowns in safe food handling practices and managerial control. 
Scope and Parameters 
For RQ1 and RQ2, I delimited the study to temporarily closed restaurants located 
in the Fraser Health Authority and Vancouver Coastal Health Authority regions, whereas 
for RQ3 through RQ6, I delimited the study to restaurants located in the Fraser Health 
Authority. I did not include restaurants closed for lack of hot water or because of fires, 
floods, or sewage back-ups in RQ1 through RQ6, as managers cannot work to prevent 
closures for these reasons. Because I focused on unsafe food handling practices known to 
be associated with foodborne illness, I collected and analyzed data on specific food 
handling violations. Results may not be generalizable to other regions where different 
temporary restaurant closure policies and practices exist. Regarding this, even within the 
same country, enforcement measures may not be used uniformly by different local food 
control units (Kettunen et al., 2015). However, this research provides a foundation from 
which other scholars can design area-specific studies. Last, I did not examine barriers to 
the performance of safe food handling practices in work environments, or relationships 
between intentions and behaviors, or between knowledge and behaviors. Potential areas 
for future research are discussed in Chapter 5, such as undertaking qualitative studies that 
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involve restaurant employees to examine barriers to the performance of safe food 
handling practices following temporary restaurant closures.  
Limitations 
Although secondary data analysis is widespread in public health research, there 
will always be limitations. For example, researchers may not find data for every variable 
they are interested in studying. Furthermore, there are rarely opportunities to address 
missing or inconclusive data. In this study, due to time constraints, I did not question 
EHOs to obtain clarifications about their restaurant inspections.  
There are some issues related to analyzing restaurant inspection reports that 
should be noted. First, EHOs are only able to observe food handling practices that are 
occurring at the time of inspections, and they may never become aware of unsafe food 
handling practices happening at other times. Next, individual EHOs have their own 
biases, and as a result, there may be minor differences in terms of the violations they cite. 
Researchers have identified this limitation in several studies that have used inspection 
data (Cates et al., 2009; Cotterchio, Gunn, Coffill, Tormey, & Barry, 1998; Lee, Nelson, 
& Almanza, 2012; Murphy, DiPietro, Kock, & Lee, 2011). Researchers frequently use 
inspection scores or numbers of violations to study the effectiveness of food safety 
interventions, such as kitchen manager training; however, the ability of these studies to 
find improvements depends to some extent on the quality of inspections performed by 
inspectors. 
In this study, selection was an important threat to internal validity. For example, 
data collected to answer RQ1 and RQ2 was gathered using a convenience sampling 
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procedure, because a limited number of restaurants have been temporarily closed in the 
two health authorities in 2015 and 2016. I included all temporarily closed restaurants in 
the Fraser Health Authority and Vancouver Coastal Health Authority that had a restaurant 
menu available online, and for which the reasons for closure were improper food 
handling practices, pest infestations, and/or unsanitary conditions. Although random 
sampling procedures are preferable to convenience sampling procedures, I would argue 
that the sampled restaurants were representative of temporarily closed restaurants in 
British Columbia. When answering RQ1 through RQ6, I kept in mind that results might 
not be generalizable and made sure to develop conclusions carefully. Similarly, treatment 
variation was a threat to external validity. Although EHOs typically close a restaurant for 
no more than 1 to 3 days, occasionally restaurant closures are longer, and longer 
restaurant closures may have a greater influence on food handler behaviors. 
Relevance 
This study will assist EHOs in better understanding the effects of temporary 
restaurant closures on food handler behaviors. Limited data exists regarding the effects of 
temporary closures on food handlers’ performance of safe food handling practices. By 
examining the effectiveness of this widely used enforcement measure, temporary 
restaurant closures, I have filled an important knowledge gap. Understanding behavioral 
outcomes will allow more effective policies to be developed. My findings also have the 
potential to increase EHOs’ understandings of barriers to the performance of safe food 
handling practices. Unsafe food handling practices are of professional significance to 
EHOs as they are responsible for preventing foodborne illnesses.  
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In this study, I found that temporary restaurant closures terminated immediate 
health hazards but were generally ineffective in improving food handling behaviors. I 
have thus contributed to positive social change by challenging the traditional assumption 
that temporary restaurant closures automatically result in lasting improvements in food 
handling practices. My purpose with this study was to use scholarship to encourage 
EHOs to think differently about how to strengthen food handlers’ intentions to perform 
safe food handling practices, specifically in situations where food safety knowledge 
levels, workplace conditions, and restaurant food safety cultures are negatively 
influencing food handling practices. I have several possible proposals for action to 
achieve these ends. One recommendation is for EHOs to deliver targeted food safety 
communications after closure orders are issued or at other teachable moments, such as 
after recurrent critical violations are observed. Next, there is a strong argument to be 
made for requiring all food handlers to complete a food safety training course after 
restaurants have been closed due to unsafe food handling practices or unsanitary 
conditions. One exception might be if food handlers cannot find a course in a suitable 
language. Last, I would suggest that if food handling practices do not improve following 
temporary restaurant closures, in addition to requiring employees to take a food safety 
training course, environmental health managers might require a reduction in problematic 
menu items. 
My findings illustrate that EHOs need to engage in dialogue about new strategies 
that can be used in combination with temporary restaurant closures, as temporary 
restaurant closures overall were not found to be an adequate deterrent to future poor food 
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handling practices. By evaluating behavioral outcomes and questioning the effectiveness 
of existing measures, as I did, EHOs can open doors to new strategies for protecting the 
public’s health. 
Summary 
In this first chapter, I have described the topic of the study and its relevance. In 
the Theoretical Foundations section, I introduced the two theories that provided the 
frameworks for the study and discussed their relation to food handler behaviors. Next, I 
identified the research questions, study assumptions, scope, delimitations, and limitations. 
My research questions were formulated following a review of the literature discussed in 
the next chapter. In the literature review chapter, I will examine literature related to three 
major topics: food handler knowledge, theories that explain food handler behaviors, and 
studies examining food handler behaviors. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Despite temporary restaurant closures, employees may not improve food handling 
practices. In this literature review, I consider potential barriers to improving employees’ 
food handling behaviors in restaurants where food safety knowledge levels, working 
conditions, and restaurant food safety cultures negatively influence food handling 
practices. I will focus on North American research; however, studies conducted in other 
countries are included because they offer a broader perspective of food handler 
knowledge levels and behaviors. Without identifying food handler knowledge gaps and 
other barriers to safe food handling practices, effective strategies for improving food 
handling behaviors following temporary restaurant closures cannot be developed. 
Restaurant- and employee-related factors contributing to low levels of compliance 
with food safety regulations may not be adequately understood. For example, interviews 
with food handlers in the United States revealed that oftentimes preparing foods quickly 
takes precedence over following food safety procedures (Clayton et al., 2015). In Finland, 
Kettunen et al. (2015) noted that a preceding request to correct violations had been given 
in 52.1% of critical violations. In terms of specific violations, Waters et al. (2015) 
reported that the risk for holding temperature, contamination, and sanitizing violations 
increased after a follow-up by EHOs when compared to restaurants without a prior 
follow-up; the ORs were 1.91, 1.90, and 3.42, respectively. More research is needed to 
determine potential restaurant- and employee-related factors that contribute to low levels 
of compliance with food safety regulations and to create strategies EHOs can use to 
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improve food handler behaviors, especially following temporary restaurant closures. 
In this literature review, I concentrate on three topic areas: food handler 
knowledge, theoretical frameworks for the study, and food handler behaviors. Food 
safety knowledge is one factor that likely influences food handler intentions and 
behaviors. However, upon examining applicable studies, I found that food safety 
knowledge study results are not directly comparable because of differences in 
questionnaires. Food handler participants from the studies discussed in this review 
worked in fast food or full service restaurants, catering companies, food processing 
companies, hotels, hospitals, nursing homes, or schools. One limitation I discovered 
when reviewing studies on food handler knowledge is their dependency on participants 
willing to volunteer; participation bias may result in an overestimation of food handler 
knowledge, if those who volunteered to participate were more knowledgeable food 
handlers compared to others (Manes et al., 2013; Pichler, Ziegler, Aldrian, & Allerberger, 
2014). I also discuss relationships between training, levels of education, language, 
experience, and age of food handlers, and overall food handler knowledge levels. Studies 
covered in this review highlight the possibility that inadequate food safety knowledge 
may be a barrier to improvements in food handling practices postclosure. In addition to 
reviewing study findings, I question the adequacy of provincial and territorial regulatory 
training requirements pertaining to restaurants that have been temporarily closed due to 
insanitary conditions and improper food handling practices.  
In the second section, I report on how the theory of planned behavior and the 
health action process approach explain food handler behaviors. Studies covered in this 
 
 
29 
section involved foodservice employee, university student, and consumer participants, 
and thus provide veritable insight into strategies likely to support behavior change among 
restaurant employees. In the third section of the literature review, which covers food 
handler behaviors, I discuss studies that primarily involved employees working in 
restaurants located in the United States or students attending universities in the United 
States. Studies conducted by researchers in Brazil, Canada, Dubai, Korea, and Portugal 
are also included. As well, I cover studies examining the importance of positive 
restaurant food safety cultures. 
Literature Search Strategy 
Research databases used to locate journal articles included the following: 
Academic Search Complete, CINAHL Complete, Emerald Management 200, ProQuest 
Central, PubMed Central, Science Direct, and Taylor and Francis Library. I also used the 
web resource Google Scholar. Relevant keywords used to search the literature were as 
follows: behavior, food handler, food handling, food hygiene, food safety, food safety 
culture, food safety violations, habit, health action process approach, intentions, 
knowledge, motivation, past behavior, restaurant inspections, theory of planned 
behavior, and training. During my literature search, I found approximately 140 
behavioral science and food safety journal articles of interest.  
In this literature review, I review journal articles published between 2008 and 
2016 relating to food handler knowledge, the theoretical foundations for this study, food 
handler behaviors, and food safety culture. In addition, I discuss original articles written 
about behavioral change theories published before 2008. Last, I describe one qualitative 
 
 
30 
study from 2005, in which researchers focused on barriers to performing safe food 
handling practices in restaurants. 
Knowledge of Safe Food Handling Practices 
Food safety instructors teach participants about foodborne illness causes and 
consequences, operating on the principle that once knowledge is enhanced individuals 
will perform safe food handling practices. In Canada, Manitoba, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Ontario, and Yukon have no provincial or territorial requirements for food 
safety training (Manitoba, 1988; Newfoundland and Labrador, 1996; Ontario, 1990; 
Yukon, 1961), and in Alberta, British Columbia, New Brunswick, Northwest Territories, 
Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and Saskatchewan, food safety training is 
required for managers and for one employee in the absence of a manager (Alberta, 2006; 
B.C., 1999; New Brunswick, 2009; Northwest Territories, 2009; Nova Scotia, 2005; 
Prince Edward Island, 1988; Quebec, 2015; Saskatchewan, 2009). Managers of 
international multiunit restaurant businesses often provide standardized food safety 
training for employees, but such training takes place less frequently in independent 
restaurants and small chains. If employees were required to take food safety training 
programs after temporary restaurant closures for reasons such as unsanitary conditions 
and unsafe food handling practices, this would be beneficial in terms of helping 
individuals understand the importance of safe food handling behaviors. An exception 
might be if food handlers could not find a course in a suitable language. In the next 
section, I highlight research examining food handler knowledge levels about specific safe 
food handling practices. 
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Contamination 
Restaurant food handlers may not have adequate knowledge about how to protect 
foods from contamination to prevent foodborne illness. Manes et al. (2013) observed that 
39.5% of surveyed food handlers in the United States were not aware that raw meats 
should be stored separately in fridges. A study by Santos, Nogueira, Patarata, and Mayan 
(2008) surveyed food handlers in Portugal and found that 12.9% were not aware that raw 
meat fluids can contaminate foods and cause foodborne illness. Panchal et al. (2013) 
reported that 12% of food handler respondents in Switzerland did not realize that if raw 
chicken juice dripped onto salad greens they should be thrown away. Similarly, Panchal 
et al. (2014) observed that 44% of food handler participants in Italy did not know that 
raw chicken juice dripped onto salad greens contaminates them. These studies show that 
food handlers need more knowledge about how to protect against food contamination. 
EHOs traditionally communicate about food safety with restaurant employees both 
verbally and through inspection reports; however, new opportunities to use information 
technology to deliver targeted food safety communications exist. 
Handwashing 
Restaurant customers assume that food handlers are knowledgeable about how 
and when to wash their hands, but this is simply not true. DeBess, Pippert, Angulo, and 
Cieslak (2009) reported that 61% of food handler respondents in the United States did not 
know they needed to wash their hands for approximately 20 seconds after using the toilet. 
In other studies, Santos et al. (2008) highlighted that 34.7% of food handler participants 
working in schools in Portugal mistakenly thought hands should be dried with a multiuse 
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kitchen towel, and Manes, Kuganantham, Jagadeesan, Laxmidevi, and Dworkin (2016) 
observed that 51% of food handlers working in restaurants in India did not know they 
should dry their hands with a clean paper towel. The findings of these studies give the 
impression that targeted food safety communications about protecting foods from 
contamination, handwashing, and glove use would be beneficial for employees in 
restaurants that have been cited for these types of critical violations. 
Temperature Control 
Restaurant food handlers may also not be aware of the safe minimum internal 
cooking temperatures required to prevent foodborne illness. Researchers in the United 
States found respectively that 80% and 82.8% of surveyed food handlers did not know 
the temperature to which hamburger should be cooked (71°C or 160°F) (DeBess et al., 
2009; Manes et al., 2013). In Austria, 85% of restaurant food handlers incorrectly 
answered this same question about cooking hamburger (Pichler et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, studies conducted in Switzerland and Italy showed that none of the food 
handler respondents knew the internal temperature for properly (i.e., safely) cooked 
chicken pieces (74 °C or 165 °F) (Panchal et al., 2013; Panchal et al., 2014). 
Besides this, restaurant food handlers may have knowledge gaps in relation to 
minimum hot holding temperatures for potentially hazardous foods. In the United States, 
21% of assessed food handlers did not know the safe temperature for hot holding (60 °C 
or 140 °F) (DeBess et al., 2009). Researchers in Italy found that 82% of food handlers 
working in participating nursing homes and long-term care facilities were not aware of 
the safe temperatures for hot holding (Buccheri et al., 2010). Researchers in Italy and 
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Switzerland found respectively that 92% and 98% of food handlers working in 
participating restaurants were not aware of the maximum temperature at which pathogens 
grow well (Panchal et al., 2014; Panchal et al., 2013).  
Moreover, researchers have shown that restaurant food handlers may not be aware 
of proper refrigeration temperatures to store foods to prevent foodborne illness. Manes et 
al. (2016) reported 97% of restaurant food handlers working in India who participated in 
the knowledge survey did not know the temperature at which potentially hazardous foods 
should be stored (5°C or 41°F, or colder). In Smigic et al.s (2016) study, conducted in 
Serbia, Greece, and Portugal, 59.5% of food handlers mistakenly believed that 13°C 
(55°F) was an adequate temperature for the cold storage of food. Similarly, 33.2% of 
food handlers working in the tourism industry in Brazil did not perceive it to be risky to 
store raw or cooked meats at room temperature (De Andrade, Sturion, & Mendoza, 
2016). In addition to EHOs communicating with restaurant employees about food safety 
verbally and through inspection reports, health authorities could use communication 
technologies to deliver specific food safety messages that would address such crucial 
knowledge gaps. 
Food Appearance 
Foods may appear normal and yet be dangerous to eat. DeBess et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that 83% of food handlers assessed in the United States mistakenly 
assumed that one can tell if a food is dangerous to eat by its look, smell, and taste. Da 
Cunha, Stedefeldt, and de Rosso (2014b) found that 62.1% of surveyed food handlers in 
Brazil presumed food that is unfit for consumption always has a bad smell and tastes 
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spoiled. Martins, Ferreira, Moreira, Hogg, and Gestal (2014) and Martins, Hogg, and 
Otero (2012) showed respectively that 48.9% of food handlers working in nursing homes 
and kindergartens and 64.4% of food handlers working in catering companies in Portugal 
thought sensorial checks could be used to identify bacterial contamination of foods.  
There is little doubt that a food handler’s misconceptions about how to tell if food 
is safe to eat may result in foodborne illness. Ultimately, food handlers with inadequate 
knowledge of safe food handling practices pose a threat to the health of the consumers 
eating at the restaurants where they work. There are two occasions at which targeted food 
safety messages might be sent to restaurant managers: after EHOs observe critical 
violations during inspections and immediately after temporary restaurant closures. In the 
following section, I expand this discussion to address employee-related factors associated 
with higher food safety knowledge survey scores. 
Training and Food Safety Knowledge 
There is evidence that food safety training programs improve food safety 
knowledge. Food safety training programs typically involve one day of classroom or 
online training. Researchers have found that food safety knowledge scores increase 
significantly with training (Brown et al., 2014; Buccheri et al., 2010; Da Cunha et al., 
2014b; DeBess et al., 2009; Faour-Klingbeil, Kuri, & Todd, 2015; Husain, Muda, & 
Jamil, 2016; Liu, Zhang, Lu, Liang, & Huang, 2015; Manes et al., 2013; Martins et al., 
2014; Osaili et al., 2013; Pichler et al., 2014; Santos et al., 2008). In British Columbia, 
Canada, FOODSAFE© trained food handlers scored an average of 68%, which was 
significantly higher than untrained food handlers, whose average score was 58% 
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(McIntyre, Vallaster, Wilcott, Henderson, & Kosatsky, 2013). Researchers evaluating 
FOODSAFE© retraining effectiveness in British Columbia, found significantly improved 
food safety knowledge scores for the intervention group, but not for the control group, 
with these groups scoring 83% and 74%, respectively (McIntyre, Peng, & Henderson, 
2014). In the United States, certified food handlers on average scored 69%, whereas 
uncertified food handlers on average scored 63% (DeBess et al., 2009). On the other 
hand, researchers in Italy, Switzerland, and Trinidad and Tobago found food safety 
knowledge scores were not higher for trained food handlers (Panchal et al., 2013; Panchal 
et al., 2014; Webb & Morancie, 2015). However, these researchers did not assess when 
the training occurred, and it is tenable that any positive effects of training had diminished 
over time. In fact, Da Cunha et al. (2014b) and McIntyre et al. (2013) observed that 
knowledge scores do indeed decrease as the period of time from the last training 
increases. 
Level of Education and Food Safety Knowledge 
Researchers have found that food safety knowledge scores increase significantly 
with higher levels of education, although levels of education are often categorized 
differently (Brown et al., 2014; Buccheri et al., 2010; DeBess et al., 2009; Jeon, Park, 
Jan, Choi, & Hong, 2015; Jianu & Chiş, 2012; Manes et al., 2016; Martins et al., 2012; 
Martins et al., 2014; Panchal et al., 2014; Pichler et al., 2014). In British Columbia, when 
researchers compared food handler knowledge scores with education level, workers with 
college and university education scored higher than those with some or completed high 
school education; their scores were 69%, 65%, and 62%, respectively (McIntyre et al., 
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2013). In the United States, food handlers with at least some college education scored 
76% on average, whereas those with less education scored 66% on average (Manes et al., 
2013). Also, in another study from the United States, food handlers who reported having 
some college education scored 73% on average, whereas food handlers who did not have 
any college education scored 64% on average (DeBess et al., 2009). However, 
researchers in Portugal, Switzerland, and Trinidad and Tobago have found that food 
safety knowledge scores do not increase significantly with higher levels of education 
(Panchal et al., 2013; Santos et al., 2008; Webb & Morancie, 2015). In the study 
conducted in Portugal, 89 participants had an elementary school education, and 31 
participants had some education beyond elementary school, making the influence of level 
of education difficult to ascertain from this study population (Santos et al., 2008). In the 
study conducted in Switzerland, 86% of the study participants had obtained university, 
college, or technical degrees following high school, making the study participants highly 
similar in terms of education level (Panchal et al., 2013). In the study conducted in 
Trinidad and Tobago, information was not collected on whether participants had 
completed elementary school, high school, or college/university, making the influence of 
level of education difficult to ascertain from the collected data (Webb & Morancie, 
2015). 
Due to the various levels of education attained by restaurant food handlers, to be 
effective, food safety communications and educational interventions must be designed to 
meet the needs of learners with different educational backgrounds and capabilities. 
Meanwhile, Arendt et al. (2014) go even further, emphasizing that to improve food safety 
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knowledge levels, educators must gear training toward learners of different ages and with 
different learning styles. 
Language and Food Safety Knowledge 
Language barriers can prevent restaurant employees from successfully completing 
food safety training programs and thwart communications between restaurant employees 
and EHOs. In British Columbia, food handlers who spoke English as their first language 
achieved significantly higher food safety knowledge scores than those for whom English 
was a second language, with their scores being 79.7 % and 74.5%, respectively (McIntyre 
et al., 2014). In the United States, food handlers who spoke English as their primary 
language scored 76% on average, and those with Spanish as their primary language 
scored 68% on average (Manes et al., 2013). Similarly, Brown et al. (2014) found that 
workers in the United States whose primary language was English had higher odds of 
passing a certification exam than did workers whose primary language was not English. 
In Austria, German-speaking food handlers on average scored 7.4% points higher than 
food handlers who spoke other first languages (Pichler et al., 2014).  
Researchers in Italy and Switzerland found that the language spoken by food 
handlers did not affect their knowledge scores (Panchal et al., 2013; Panchal et al., 2014). 
In the study conducted in Italy, for 47% of the food handlers, their primary language was 
Italian, and for 41% of the food handlers, their primary language was German; however, 
the questionnaire was administered in both Italian and German, and therefore the finding 
of no association is unsurprising (Panchal et al., 2014). In Switzerland, researchers 
observed the primary language was French for 93% of the food handlers, whereas 7% of 
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the food handlers spoke other languages (Panchal et al., 2013). Interestingly, food 
handlers who spoke other languages scored slightly higher than the French-speaking food 
handlers; however, the sample size of this group was small, with only seven individuals 
speaking other languages (Panchal et al., 2013). Although food safety training programs 
are offered in a variety of languages, such as French, Spanish, and Chinese, courses in 
other languages tend to be more difficult to access. Therefore, developers of food safety 
communications and educational interventions should keep individuals with limited 
language proficiencies in mind. 
Experience and Food Safety Knowledge 
Researchers examining experience and food safety knowledge have found 
variable results. Some researchers have found food safety knowledge scores increased 
significantly with years of experience (Buccheri et al., 2010; Da Cunha et al., 2014b; 
Faour-Klingbeil et al., 2015; Manes et al., 2013; Pichler et al., 2014). McIntyre et al. 
(2013), in a study conducted in British Columbia, revealed that more years of experience 
improved food safety knowledge scores in both FOODSAFE© trained and untrained 
groups. In a study conducted in the United States, Brown et al. (2014) agreed that 
workers with more food service experience had higher odds of passing a food safety 
certification exam. On the other hand, other researchers have found food safety 
knowledge scores do not increase significantly with years of experience (Jianu & Chiş, 
2012; Martins et al., 2012; Martins et al., 2014; Osaili et al., 2013; Santos et al., 2008; 
Smigic et al., 2016; Webb & Morancie, 2015). Studies may show variable results because 
food handlers with more experience do not consistently have higher food safety 
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knowledge levels. Furthermore, such findings of a lack of food safety knowledge in 
experienced food handlers provides evidence that food safety communications and 
educational interventions should be a priority for health authorities. 
Age and Food Safety Knowledge 
Researchers examining the relationship between age and food safety knowledge 
have found inconsistent results. In British Columbia, age improved food safety 
knowledge for untrained food handlers (McIntyre et al., 2013). In the United States, food 
handlers aged 15–19, 20–29, 30–39, and 40 or older had mean scores of 65%, 67%, 68%, 
and 71%, respectively (DeBess et al., 2009). In another study conducted in the United 
States, food handlers aged 18–29, 30–39, and 40 or older had mean scores of 70%, 74%, 
and 76%, respectively (Manes et al., 2013). Similarly, Brown et al. (2014) claimed older 
food handler participants in the United States had higher odds of passing a food safety 
certification exam. In addition, in Austria, researchers found food handlers aged 30 or 
older had greater mean knowledge scores compared to younger food handlers (Pichler et 
al., 2014). However, nearly equal numbers of researchers have found the opposite (Jeon 
et al., 2015; Jianu & Chiş, 2012; Manes et al. 2016; Martins et al., 2014; Panchal et al., 
2013; Santos et al., 2008; Smigic et al., 2016). For example, in a study conducted in 
Portugal, food handlers aged less than 36, 36–45, 46–55, and greater than 55 had average 
scores of 12.5, 13.4, 12.7, and 14.4 respectively (Martins et al., 2012). In addition, food 
handlers aged 18–29, 30–39, 40–49, and 50 or older had mean scores of 65%, 68%, 63%, 
and 68%, in an Italian study (Panchal et al., 2014). Findings showing older food handlers, 
who potentially have more years of work experience, lacking knowledge of safe food 
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handling practices provide further evidence of the need for food safety communications 
and educational interventions. It could be further argued that, regardless of their food 
knowledge levels and test scores, restaurant employees working in facilities that have 
been temporarily closed due to unsanitary conditions and improper food handling 
practices are most in need of food safety communications and training programs to assist 
them in improving their food handling behaviors. 
Summary 
In British Columbia, EHOs ascertain whether at least one employee present at the 
time of inspection has taken the FOODSAFE© course. In this study, I counted not having 
at least one employee present who has taken the FOODSAFE© course as a training 
violation. Other violation categories that contributed to the numbers of food handling 
violations included: contamination, handwashing, hot holding, refrigeration, thawing, 
sanitizing, and cooling.  
Researchers’ findings raise concerns about restaurant employees’ food safety 
knowledge gaps. Similar study findings in terms of low knowledge levels over time and 
throughout many locations exemplify the need for food safety communications and 
educational interventions. Generally, food handlers appear to have greater food safety 
knowledge when they have taken a food safety training program, have higher levels of 
education, and speak the primary language where they are working. Regulatory 
requirements that mandate training for only one employee place less burden on 
restaurants, but these policies depend on that one employee taking responsibility for 
providing food safety training to other individuals. In restaurants where managers are not 
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focused on food safety, the burden of providing food safety information defaults to 
EHOs. My findings suggest that food safety training programs should be mandatory for 
nearly all food handlers employed in restaurants that have been temporarily closed for 
reasons such as unsanitary conditions and improper food handling. 
Scholars have deemed training for food handlers necessary to improve their food 
safety knowledge (Brown et al., 2014; Buccheri et al., 2010; DeBess et al., 2009; Faour-
Klingbeil et al., 2015; McIntyre et al., 2013; Osaili et al., 2013; Pichler et al., 2014; Sani 
& Siow, 2014; Santos et al., 2008; Webb & Morancie, 2015). In addition, many experts 
have concluded that food handlers require periodic retraining and recertification 
(Buccheri et al., 2010; Da Cunha et al., 2014b; DeBess et al., 2009; Faour-Klingbeil et 
al., 2015; Jianu & Chiş, 2012; McIntyre et al., 2014; Osaili et al., 2013; Sani & Siow, 
2014; Webb & Morancie, 2015). This is because, as Da Cunha et al. (2014b) and 
McIntyre et al. (2013) observed, trained food handler knowledge scores decrease over 
time. In looking at the numbers of food safety violations, one could argue that regulatory 
food safety training requirements in Canada are failing to protect the public’s health. 
Because the answer to why particular restaurant food handlers have such low levels of 
compliance with food safety regulations remains unknown, a pragmatic approach would 
be to use a combination of strategies to improve compliance. As a first step, EHOs should 
work to increase restaurant employees’ food safety knowledge using food safety 
communications and educational interventions. 
Theoretical Foundations 
In this second section, I discuss how the theory of planned behavior and the health 
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action process approach help to explain food handler intentions and behaviors. I do so by 
providing a review of relevant studies. The theory of planned behavior has been used 
more frequently than the health action process approach to examine food handling 
intentions and behaviors. In such studies, researchers determine the relative importance 
of the theoretical constructs with respect to food safety practices. 
The reviewed studies have several limitations that decrease the reliability of the 
researchers’ findings. For example, participants’ food handling practices were self-
reported, making findings vulnerable to recall and social desirability bias. In addition, 
questions are often asked about general intentions to perform safe food handling 
practices, rather than intentions to perform specific behaviors such as handwashing. The 
limitation with researchers asking about general intentions to perform safe food handling 
practices is that these intentions are less likely to correspond closely with participants’ 
actual behaviors. Moreover, researchers operated on the assumption that respondents 
were aware of the times when they had prepared food safely versus unsafely, which is not 
a valid assumption; in many cases, individuals lack food safety knowledge. Despite these 
limitations, I included these studies in this review because they provide insight into 
behavioral interventions most likely to be effective in changing unsafe food handling 
practices. 
Using regression analyses, researchers have drawn conclusions about the extent to 
which the theory of planned behavior can explain food handling intentions and behaviors. 
Food handlers’ intentions to perform safe food handling practices are influenced by 
subjective norm or perceived social pressure from important others (Bai, Tang, Yang, & 
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Gong, 2014; Fulham & Mullan, 2011; Mullan, Allom, Sainsbury, & Monds, 2015; 
Mullan & Wong, 2009; Mullan & Wong, 2010; Mullan, Wong, & Kothe, 2013; Pilling, 
Brannon, Shanklin, Howells, & Roberts, 2008; Shapiro, Porticella, Jiang, & Gravani, 
2011). In Seaman and Eves’s 2008 study, food handlers who worked in child and 
residential care settings were asked how likely it was that most people important to them 
felt they should carry out safe food handling practices; participants responded that 
subjective norm had the greatest influence on their intentions to perform safe food 
handling practices (ß = 0.55, p ≤ 0.001). In Seaman and Eves’s 2010 study, food handlers 
who worked in hospitality settings were asked the same question; respondents again 
stated that subjective norm had the greatest influence on their intentions to perform safe 
food handling practices (ß = 0.62, p ≤ 0.001). Clayton and Griffith (2008) assessed 
caterers’ perceptions about how likely it was that their managers, EHOs, customers, and 
co-workers felt they should perform proper handwashing; subjective norm had the 
greatest influence on food handlers’ intentions (ß = 0.28, p ˂ 0.01) when researchers 
considered the variables attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. 
Looking at such results, we can conclude that following temporary restaurant closures, if 
food handlers do not perceive any social pressure to perform safe food handling practices, 
especially from their managers, it is unlikely they will change their food handling 
behaviors. Moreover, if restaurant employees were required to take a food safety training 
course following temporary restaurant closures for reasons such as insanitary conditions 
or improper food handling practices, this might lead to the formation of new beliefs that 
would positively affect their performance of expected protocols. 
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Similarly, food handlers’ intentions to perform safe food handling practices are 
influenced by perceived behavioral control (Bai et al., 2014; Fulham & Mullan, 2011; 
Mari, Tiozzo, Capozzo, & Ravarotto, 2012; Milton & Mullan, 2012; Mullan et al., 2015; 
Mullan & Wong, 2009; Mullan & Wong, 2010; Mullan et al., 2013; Shapiro et al., 2011). 
In Seaman and Eves’s 2008 study, food handlers who worked in child and residential 
care settings were asked if it was true that, if they wanted to, they could carry out safe 
food handling practices on every occasion; respondents’ answers illustrated that 
perceived behavioral control had the second greatest influence on their intentions to carry 
out safe food handling practices (ß = 0.24, p ≤ 0.001). In other words, these participants 
felt that their perceptions about their abilities to perform safe food handling practices 
influenced their behaviors. Seaman and Eves (2010) asked the same question of food 
handlers working in hospitality settings, and respondents again indicated that perceived 
behavioral control had the second greatest influence on their intentions to carry out safe 
food handling practices (ß = 0.21, p ≤ 0.001). In another study, Pilling et al. (2008) found 
that perceived behavioral control had the second greatest influence on food service 
employees’ handwashing intentions (ß = 0.37, p < 0.01), when they asked participants 
how frequently not having enough time affected their handwashing. When researchers 
Clayton and Griffith (2008) considered the variables attitude, subjective norm, and 
perceived behavioral control, caterers’ responses showed that perceived behavioral 
control had the second greatest influence on their handwashing intentions (ß = 0.27, p < 
0.01). In addition to these findings, Rimal (2000) found the overall relation between 
knowledge and behavior to be strongest among those with high levels of perceived 
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behavioral control and lowest among those with low levels of perceived behavioral 
control. These findings illustrate the possibility that, even if their restaurant is temporarily 
closed, if food handlers have low levels of perceived behavioral control, they might not 
develop intentions to change their food handling behaviors of their own accord. One way 
to ensure that restaurant employees feel capable of performing safe food handling 
practices is for restaurant managers to formulate standardized operating procedures 
detailing how and when behaviors are to be performed. 
In the next section, I provide brief overviews of the theory of planned behavior 
and the health action process approach before a further discussion of their applications to 
food handling. 
The Theory of Planned Behavior 
In this theory, Icek Ajzen (2011) focuses on explaining intentions and behaviors. 
Ajzen (1991) proposes that intentions to perform behaviors can be predicted from 
attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. A 
person’s intentions to perform a behavior should be stronger the more favorable the 
attitude and subjective norm, and the greater the perceived control (Ajzen, 2002). 
Enforcement measures, such as temporary restaurant closures, may not be sufficient to 
change food handler intentions because they are not directed at attitudes towards food 
safety, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control. 
The Health Action Process Approach 
In the health action process approach, Ralf Schwarzer (2008) focuses on a 
distinction between the processes that lead to behavioral intention and the processes that 
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lead to actual behaviors. Action self-efficacy, outcome expectancies, and risk perception 
lead to behavioral intentions, and postintentional factors influence behaviors such as 
maintenance and recovery self-efficacy (Schwarzer, 2008). Schwarzer emphasizes that, if 
no preparatory steps are taken such as managers developing standardized operating 
procedures, intentions may not be translated into action or behaviors might not be 
maintained. As restaurant employees often stop performing safe food handling practices 
after complying for a short period, this theory is particularly relevant. 
Next, to set the theoretical foundations for the current study, I review studies 
examining food handling intentions and behaviors using the theory of planned behavior 
or the health action process approach. 
Applying the Theory of Planned Behavior 
Researchers have examined handwashing intentions using the theory of planned 
behavior. In one study, using a theory of planned behavior questionnaire, Pilling et al. 
(2008) found that restaurant food handler handwashing intentions are significantly 
predicted by attitudes (ß = 0.50, p < 0.001) and then perceived behavioral control (ß = 
0.37, p < 0.01). Moreover, Shapiro et al. (2011) used a similar questionnaire to find that 
consumer handwashing intentions are significantly predicted by perceived behavioral 
control (ß = 0.43, p < 0.001), attitudes (ß = 0.27, p < 0.001), and then subjective norm (ß 
= 0.11, p < 0.05). Pilling et al. (2008) and Shapiro et al. (2011) identified perceived 
behavioral control and attitudes as predictors of handwashing intentions, although these 
factors’ importance varied. When restaurant food handlers were asked about barriers to 
handwashing, they frequently mentioned not having enough time and resources not being 
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conveniently located (York, Brannon, Roberts, Shanklin, & Howells, 2009). Ultimately, 
it is possible that restaurant food handlers may perceive handwashing to be only partially 
under their control. This could explain why some food handlers might not perform proper 
handwashing, even following temporary restaurant closures. I now examine intentions to 
use thermometers. 
Using a survey, Pilling et al. (2008) found restaurant food handler intentions in 
terms of using thermometers were significantly predicted by attitudes (ß = 0.53, p < 
0.001), subjective norms (ß = 0.34, p < 0.001), and then perceived behavioral control (ß = 
0.26, p < 0.01). In a study conducted in the United States, consumer participants 
indicated that perceived behavioral control (ß = 0.37, p < 0.001) most strongly predicted 
thermometer use, followed by subjective norms (ß = 0.27, p < 0.001), and then attitudes 
(ß = 0.12, p < 0.05); perceived behavioral control was measured by asking participants if 
using a thermometer the next time they cooked chicken would be very easy (Shapiro et 
al., 2011). Pilling et al. (2008) and Shapiro et al. (2011) found the theory of planned 
behavior constructs predicted intentions to use thermometers, but their relative 
importance varied. When restaurant food handlers were asked about barriers to 
thermometer use, not having enough time and not having thermometers available were 
the most frequent responses (York et al., 2009). These findings show that many food 
handlers may perceive their ability to use thermometers as only partially under their 
control.  
In this study, I examined overall food handling violations and specific categories 
of food handling violations before and after temporary restaurant closures. Because 
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intentions to perform safe food handling practices are likely situation dependent, 
examining overall food handling violations and specific categories of food handling 
violations was a constructive approach.  
Applying the Health Action Process Approach 
The theory of planned behavior and the health action process approach offer 
insights into why restaurant food handlers may fail to perform safe food handling 
behaviors despite temporary restaurant closures. Mullan, Wong, and O’Moore (2010) 
noticed first-year university students’ intentions to perform hygienic food handling 
behaviors were significantly predicted by action self-efficacy (ß = 0.37, p < 0.01), risk 
awareness (ß = 0.26, p < 0.05), and outcome expectancies (ß = 0.24, p < 0.01), with 
action self-efficacy being the strongest predictor. In a second study, first-year university 
students’ answers showed that severity (ß = 0.13, p < 0.05), risk awareness (ß = 0.16, p < 
0.01), outcome expectancies (ß = 0.36, p < 0.001), and motivational self-efficacy (ß = 
0.25, p < 0.001) significantly predicted their intentions to avoid contamination; however, 
outcome expectancies were the strongest predictor (Bearth, Cousin, & Siegrist, 2014). In 
a third study, Chow and Mullan (2010) found university students’ intentions in terms of 
performing safe food handling practices were significantly predicted by past behavior (ß 
= 0.38, p < 0.001), direct and indirect subjective norms (ß = 0.19, p = 0.001) (ß = 0.17, p 
= 0.006), and outcome expectancies (ß = 0.14, p = 0.006); past behavior and direct 
subjective norm had the greatest influence on intentions. Outcome expectancies and 
action self-efficacy appear to be important in the motivation phase, which is where an 
individual chooses what to do. Motivation to continue with unsafe food handling 
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practices will be high following temporary restaurant closures, as employees’ action self-
efficacy or confidence about being able to perform safe food handling practices may 
decrease. Furthermore, restaurant employees may not work to correct unsafe food 
handling practices if they decide that it is unlikely that an EHO will issue another closure 
order. 
Applying Extended Models of the Theory of Planned Behavior 
There are limits to the predictive powers of the theory of planned behavior. Ajzen 
(2011) observed the intention-behavior correlation can vary considerably. Because of 
this, many researchers have added one or more additional variables in an attempt to 
increase the predictive power (Bai et al., 2014; Clayton & Griffith, 2008; Fulham & 
Mullan, 2011; Mari et al., 2012; Mullan et al., 2016; Mullan & Wong, 2009; Mullan & 
Wong, 2010). Although empirical evidence is necessary to support any extension of the 
theory of planned behavior, Conner and Armitage (1998) highlighted that theoretically 
describing the processes through which the variable influences intentions and behaviors 
is equally critical. In this section, I focus on several variables that have been used to 
extend the theory of planned behavior, such as habit.  
To increase the predictive power, researchers have added the variable habit; 
however, it is nearly impossible to reliably determine whether behaviors are habituated. 
Ajzen (2002) emphasized that even if a behavior has been performed many times that 
does not guarantee it has been habituated; repeated performance may instead be related to 
weak intentions. Although past behavior provides information about actual behavioral 
control, Ajzen (1991) concluded that researchers should not assume past behavior 
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frequency is a valid measure of habit, as many other factors can influence past behavior. 
Ouellette and Wood (1998) and Verplanken and Orbell (2003) concurred that past 
behavior frequency does not necessarily indicate whether a behavior has become 
habituated. Incidentally, Verplanken and Aarts (1999) believed that retrospective, self-
reported behavioral frequency is frequently invalidated if participants are asked to 
retrieve from memory instances when they performed behaviors. They also observed that 
questions asking participants to report on having unconsciously conducted an act in the 
past are also problematic as respondents may have difficulty thinking along these lines. 
To alleviate this problem, Verplanken and Orbell recommended using a 12-question self-
report habit index to evaluate habit strength, instead of using self-report measures to 
examine past behavioral frequency. Although it may not be possible to reliably determine 
whether unsafe food handling practices are habituated, it is certainly a possibility that 
unsafe food handling practices may continue postclosure because these behaviors are 
habituated.  
Past behavior is frequently used to extend the theory of planned behavior; 
however, exactly what past behavior represents has not yet been adequately 
conceptualized (Rhodes & Courneya, 2003). Conner and Armitage (1998) agreed that 
researchers adding past behavior have not clarified the process by which this variable 
affects theory of planned behavior constructs. Other researchers have presumed that past 
behavior adds to predictive value because theory of planned behavior constructs are 
temporally unstable (Rhodes and Cournya, 2003). Moreover, Doll and Ajzen (1992) 
observed that the ability to predict behaviors improves as the temporal stabilities of 
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attitudes, perceived behavioral control, and intentions increase. Researchers Ouellette and 
Wood (1998) went further to advise that past behavior may affect future responses 
through multiple mechanisms. To explain, when behaviors are performed once or twice a 
year and occur in unstable contexts, intentions more strongly predict future behavior than 
past behavior; however, when behaviors are performed daily or weekly in stable contexts, 
past behaviors more strongly predict future behavior than intentions (Ouellette & Wood, 
1998). Last, another line of thinking is that intention stability moderates the effect of 
intentions on behavior; when intention stability is high, past behavior is unrelated to 
current behavior, but when intention stability is low, past behavior strongly predicts 
current behavior (Conner, Sheeran, Norman, & Armitage, 2000). What all of these 
studies point to is that, to change food handler intentions about performing safe food 
handling practices, multiple strategies may be needed, as past behavior is expected to be a 
strong predictor of future food handling behaviors. From here onward, I review studies 
examining food handler intentions and behaviors using extended models of the theory of 
planned behavior. 
Researchers who have added past behavior to improve explained variance in 
intentions to perform safe food handling practices appear to have overlooked the 
challenges involved in accurately measuring past behaviors. Individuals may not 
remember their own frequently performed behaviors, and will thus often attempt to make 
inferences regarding past behavioral frequency (Verplanken & Aarts, 1999). Given the 
above discussion about past behavior, it should be kept in mind that respondents may not 
be knowledgeable about safe food handling practices, and they may not be able to recall 
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whether they performed these behaviors. 
When they conducted a study in China with consumer participants to examine 
intentions to perform safe food handling practices, Bai et al. (2014) found that adding 
past behavior, perceived ease, and habit to the theory of planned behavior increased 
explained variance from 41.8% to 44.5%. Participants reported the number of times they 
had prepared food safely, and this number was divided by the number of times food was 
prepared to calculate past behavior proportions (Bai et al., 2014). Participants also 
answered questions about whether they prepared food safely without having to 
consciously remind themselves, and were asked if they would feel weird if they did not 
prepare food safely; this information was used to measure habit (Bai et al., 2014). 
Participants’ intentions were significantly predicted by attitude (ß = 0.24, p < 0.001), 
perceived ease (ß = 0.23, p < 0.001), subjective norm (ß = 0.21, p < 0.001), habit (ß = 
0.15, p < 0.001), past behavior (ß = 0.08, p < 0.01), and perceived behavioral control (ß = 
0.06, p < 0.05); attitude made the largest contribution to predictions of intentions (Bai et 
al., 2014). This study’s findings illustrate that specific restaurant- and employee-related 
factors may result in one or more construct or variable being more influential, and these 
differences may affect food handling behaviors. 
In a study with Australian university student participants, Mullan and Wong 
(2009) noticed that adding past behavior as a factor increased the variance predicted from 
66.4% to 69.3% for intentions to prepare food safely. Participants completed two online 
questionnaires one month apart; past behavior was measured by asking participants how 
many times per week in the previous four weeks they had prepared food safely. The 
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researchers found that participants’ intentions to prepare food hygienically were 
significantly predicted by perceived behavioral control (ß = 0.511, p < 0.01), subjective 
norm (ß = 0.220, p < 0.05), and past behavior (ß = 0.198, p < 0.01); perceived behavioral 
control was the most significant predictor of intentions. In the same study, participants’ 
behaviors were significantly predicted by past behavior (ß = 0.525, p <0.01). Mullan and 
Wong (2009) reached the same conclusion as Milton and Mullan (2012) that, to change 
intentions, interventions should focus on increasing food handlers’ perceptions of control. 
Fulham and Mullan (2011) demonstrated how adding behavioral prepotency to 
the theory of planned behavior constructs increased the variance predicted from 37.6% to 
43.7%, for Australian university students’ intentions to prepare food safely. To measure 
behavioral prepotency or past behavior frequency, participants answered questions about 
the percentage of meals they had prepared hygienically in the week preceding the study. 
Participants’ intentions to prepare food safely were predicted by perceived behavioral 
control (ß = 0.371, p < 0.001), subjective norm (ß = 0.236, p < 0.001), and behavioral 
prepotency (ß = 0.271, p < 0.001), and again, perceived behavioral control was the 
strongest predictor of intentions (Fulham & Mullan, 2011). As was the case in Mullan 
and Wong’s 2009 study, past behavior or behavioral prepotency was a significant 
predictor of actual behaviors (ß = 0.587, p < 0.001) (Fulham & Mullan, 2011). 
In their 2010 study on Australian university students’ intentions to perform safe 
food handling practices, when Mullan and Wong added past behavior to the theory of 
planned behavior constructs, explained variance increased from 32.8% to 38.4%. 
Participants’ intentions were significantly predicted by attitudes (ß = 0.216, p < 0.01), 
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subjective norm (ß = 0.173, p < 0.01), perceived behavioral control (ß = 0.286, p < 0.01), 
and past behavior (ß = 0.255, p < 0.01); perceived behavioral control had the greatest 
influence on intentions (Mullan & Wong, 2010). To calculate the past behavior 
proportion, the Mullan and Wong asked respondents how many meals they had prepared 
safely in the week preceding the study, and then divided this number by the number of 
meals cooked. Interestingly, intentions (ß = 0.233, p < 0.01) and past behavior (ß = 0.209, 
p < 0.01) both significantly predicted behavior; however, intentions, not past behavior, 
was the most significant predictor (Mullan & Wong, 2010). 
As a final point, Mullan and Wong (2009, 2010) and Fulham and Mullan (2011) 
have shown that adding the factor of past behavior improves the prediction of food 
handling behaviors above and beyond the theory of planned behavior constructs. 
Although the above researchers have provided empirical evidence for adding past 
behavior, investigators have not focused on the processes through which past behavior 
might be influencing food handling behaviors. Nor have they discussed the reliability and 
validity of self-reported past behavior measures. These are important factors to consider 
because the question about past behavior regarding the number of times foods were 
prepared hygienically is open to multiple interpretations, such as whether it refers to 
handwashing between handling raw and cooked foods, or whether it refers to using a 
thermometer to check minimum internal cooking temperatures.  
In another study, researchers Ramalho, de Moura, and Cunha (2015) extended the 
theory of planned behavior constructs with the variable personal norm and examined 
butchers’ intentions to implement food safety systems in both high and low compliance 
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establishments. Ramalho et al. defined personal norm as feelings of strong obligation that 
people experience within themselves that then prompt them to engage in certain social 
behaviors. Notably, Conner and Armitage (1998) observed that, for behaviors where 
moral norms are not relevant, the variable personal norm may prove useful because of its 
focus on personal rather than societal values. Ramalho et al. found that in butcher shops 
with high levels of compliance with regulations, attitude (ß = 0.38, p < 0.001) and 
personal norm (ß = 0.37, p= 0.002) were the only significant predictors of intentions to 
fully implement food safety systems. For butcher shops with low levels of compliance 
with regulations, participants’ responses showed that personal norm (ß = 0.84, p=0.000) 
was the only significant predictor of intentions to fully implement food safety systems 
(Ramalho et al., 2015). Pertinent to the current study, food handlers’ cognitions around 
food safety may be very different, in particular between those working in food premises 
with low rather than high levels of compliance with regulations. 
In another study, Mullan et al. (2015) observed that adding moral norm as a factor 
improved prediction of intentions from 46.5% to 50.9% for handwashing. To measure 
moral norm, Mullan et al. asked participants to rate whether it was within their principles 
to clean their hands every time they prepared foods over the next week. In this case, 
participants’ responses showed that perceived behavioral control (ß = 0.36, p < 0.001) 
and moral norm (ß = 0.304, p < 0.001) both significantly predicted their handwashing 
intentions (Mullan et al., 2015). The researchers did not establish that university student 
participants viewed handwashing as a moral issue. However, Mullan et al. commented 
that for behaviors that affect other people, compared to more individually focused 
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behaviors, intention is more likely to be influenced by moral norm than subjective norm. 
Mullan et al. also noted that only habit could significantly predict handwashing behavior; 
this was measured as the extent to which respondents rated whether they performed the 
behavior automatically. These researchers’ findings are in agreement with those of 
Ouellette and Wood (1998), who found that when behaviors are performed daily, past 
behavior more strongly predicts behavior than intentions. 
In another study, adding moral norms and descriptive norms improved explained 
variance in caterers’ hand hygiene intentions from 43% to 49% (Clayton & Griffith, 
2008). These researchers examined normative beliefs instead of subjective norm, with the 
understanding that normative beliefs and motivation underlie subjective norm. Clayton 
and Griffith (2008) distinguished descriptive norms as describing one’s perceptions of 
what others do, whereas subjective norms concern one’s perceptions of others’ opinions. 
To measure descriptive norms, respondents were asked whether their managers and work 
colleagues carried out appropriate food safety actions at all appropriate times. To 
measure moral norm, Clayton and Griffith asked participants whether they felt they had a 
moral obligation to carry out hand hygiene at all appropriate times. Findings showed that 
caterers’ handwashing intentions were significantly predicted by normative beliefs (ß = 
0.20, p < 0.05), perceived behavioral control (ß = 0.20, p < 0.05), and descriptive norms 
(ß = 0.23 p< 0.05) (Clayton & Griffith, 2008). Thus, contrary to Mullan et al.’s 2015 
study, the researchers found that moral norms did not significantly predict hand hygiene 
intentions. Given the different results from these two studies, whether food handlers 
perceive safe food handling practices such as handwashing in moral terms remains 
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unclear. One might speculate that, in restaurants with low food safety regulation 
compliance levels, food handlers are not viewing food safety as a moral issue. If this is 
the case, temporary restaurant closures might not increase food handlers’ internal feelings 
of obligation to perform safe food handling practices. 
Summary 
Using theory of planned behavior questionnaires, researchers have found that 
subjective norm and perceived behavioral control explain food handler intentions. 
However, in temporarily closed and high-risk categorized restaurants, food handlers’ 
normative and control beliefs are likely weaker than those of food handlers from other 
restaurants. To achieve behavioral change following temporary restaurant closures, 
additional strategies may be required. Restaurant- and employee- related factors may 
contribute to the non-uniform motivational effects of temporary restaurant closures. This 
literature review section covered researchers who examined individual food handling 
intentions and behaviors using questionnaires based on the theory of planned behavior or 
health action process approach. In the next literature review section, I focus on food 
handler behaviors, and later, in Chapter 5, I interpret the study findings using the 
theoretical foundations as context. 
Food Handler Behaviors 
In the first section of the literature review, I examined studies about food handler 
food safety knowledge. In the second section of the literature review, I focused on 
theoretical frameworks that explain food handling intentions and behaviors. In this third 
and final section of the literature review, I discuss food handler behaviors and restaurant 
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food safety culture. In my review of the literature, I focus on two factors that may prevent 
the performance of safe food handling practices following temporary restaurant closures 
(i.e., inadequate food safety knowledge and negative food safety cultures). 
Applying Inspection Results 
Although researchers have used a variety of indicators to evaluate the 
effectiveness of various food safety interventions, the number of violations cited in 
inspection reports is used frequently as the data is readily available. One study conducted 
in the United States by Burke, Manes, Liu, and Dworkin (2014) found that a violation 
related to handwashing was more likely to occur in restaurants where at least one 
manager had missed at least one question related to handwashing (RR 1.96, 95% CI 1.38 
– 2.78, p 0.047). However, with this one exception, restaurant inspection results did not 
correlate well with manager food safety knowledge (Burke et al., 2014). For example, a 
violation related to improper regulation of temperature (RR 1.01, 95% CI 0.78 – 1.32, p 
0.911) and a violation related to contamination (RR 0.70, 95% CI 0.36 – 1.37, p 0.249) 
were not statistically more likely to be related to manager knowledge gaps regarding 
these practices (Burke et al., 2014). A limitation of this study was that researchers did not 
verify that the manager working at the time of inspection was the same manager who had 
taken the knowledge survey (Burke et al., 2014). Nevertheless, these findings suggest 
manager food safety knowledge may have only a limited influence on food handler 
behaviors. A future research priority is to investigate restaurant- and employee-related 
factors associated with lower levels of compliance with food safety regulations. 
Examining numbers of cited violations in inspection reports is also a way in 
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which researchers can examine whether particular restaurant characteristics are 
associated with lower levels of compliance with food safety regulations. In a study 
conducted in the United States, using the Wilcoxon test, Harris, Murphy, DiPietro, and 
Rivera (2015) found significant differences in numbers of violations related to inadequate 
cooking and improper holding temperatures between ethnic-operated and nonethnic-
operated restaurants. Researchers determined that, in a city with 789 ethnic-operated 
restaurants and 2079 nonethnic-operated restaurants, a significantly higher number of 
violations were related to inadequate cooking/improper holding temperatures among 
ethnic-operated restaurants; the mean for ethnic-operated restaurants was 0.946 and the 
mean for nonethnic-operated restaurants was 0.680 (W = 1,225,258.50, Z  = 5.44, p < 
0.001) (Harris et al., 2015). In a different city with 349 ethnic-operated restaurants and 
2168 nonethnic-operated restaurants, a significantly higher number of violations were 
also related to inadequate cooking/improper holding temperatures among ethnic-operated 
restaurants; the mean for ethnic-operated restaurants was 2.206 and the mean for 
nonethnic-operated restaurants was 1.409 (W = 467,793.00, Z = 7.48, p < 0.001) (Harris 
et al., 2015). Harris et al. created the variable “ethnic-operated restaurant” and included 
only restaurants easily identified as serving Mexican, Asian, or Italian foods in this 
category. One limitation of this study was that the explanatory variable under study was 
not pragmatically defined; for example, it would have been more specific to define the 
explanatory variable as restaurants serving Mexican, Asian, or Italian foods. Another 
limitation of this study was that researchers did not examine any other variables that 
might have been related to the findings, for example, ownership, such as whether a 
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restaurant was part of a chain or independent. It is possible that other variables are better 
predictors of problems with food safety violations than whether restaurants are ethnic-
operated or not. Inspection findings and restaurant characteristics should be used to 
prioritize restaurants for food safety communications. For example, if restaurants serving 
a particular type of cuisine have a higher risk of being closed or high-risk categorized, 
then once EHOs have determined the type of cuisine served in restaurants, they can 
provide appropriate restaurants with targeted e-learning food safety resources. 
Researchers have also used inspection reports to study enforcement measure 
outcomes. One study conducted in Finland by Kettunen et al. (2015) evaluated types of 
enforcement measures used by authorities to determine whether compliance was achieved 
or not, and whether enforcement measures had to be used recurrently due to repeated 
violations. Kettunen et al. reported that orders were used in 76.5% of cases. In Finland, 
official hearings are conducted before orders are issued, and orders differ from written 
directives in inspection reports in that they can be further reinforced by penalty payments 
or suspension of operations (Kettunen et al., 2015). Violations were not completely 
corrected in 31.8% of cases and enforcement measures were used recurrently in 15.7% of 
cases (Kettunen et al., 2015). One limitation of this study was that researchers did not 
investigate factors that might be related to noncompliance in situations where 
enforcement measures had to be used repeatedly (i.e., restaurant- and employee-related 
factors). Researchers found that, in many cases, violations were only partially corrected 
and that regular, repeated enforcement measures were needed. These findings are pivotal 
to the present study because they provide evidence that temporary restaurant closures 
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might have limited effectiveness. This means that other interventions should be used in 
conjunction with enforcement measures; for example, employees can be required to 
attend food safety training programs and environmental health managers can require 
restaurants to stop serving problematic menu items. 
Researchers have investigated the effect of type of ownership, specifically 
independent versus chain, using inspection reports. Murphy et al. (2011) examined 
whether there were any differences in violation frequencies among chain restaurants on 
the 2008 Restaurants and Institutions Top 400 Restaurant Chains List, other chain 
restaurants, and independent restaurants located in Florida. Murphy et al. hypothesized no 
significant differences between chain and independent restaurants would be found 
because the state of Florida requires that all food service employees be trained in safe 
food handling practices every three years in approved training programs, and that 
managers successfully complete training within 30 days of employment. However, 
Murphy et al. found there was a difference in critical violations between restaurant types 
(F [2,904] = 6.325, p < 0.05). Using the Scheffe procedure, Murphy et al. determined 
there was a significant difference in critical violations between chain restaurants on the 
2008 Restaurants and Institutions Top 400 Restaurant Chains List and independent 
restaurants. Fewer violations may be found in multiunit chains compared to independent 
restaurants due to several factors, including: standardized, mandatory operating 
procedures; superior kitchen designs; and specialized equipment. If independent 
restaurants are found more likely to be in the temporarily closed or high-risk categorized 
group, this may indicate that EHOs need to prioritize independent restaurants for food 
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safety communications, such as information graphics that can be posted in restaurants. 
Researchers have calculated the likelihood of having at least one critical violation 
of food temperature and time control inspection items for restaurants with and without 
certified kitchen managers. When Cates et al. (2009) conducted a study in the United 
States, they examined the effect of the presence of a certified manager and service type 
(fast food/full service) on the odds of food temperature and time control violations. The 
researchers used logistic regression analyses and the explanatory variables were certified 
manager presence and service type. Cates et al. observed that restaurants with a certified 
kitchen manager present were less likely to have a critical violation for hot holding (Odds 
Ratio 0.75, p < 0.05); however, the presence of a certified kitchen manager did not have a 
significant effect on cooling (0.98), cold holding (1.08), cooking (1.26), or reheating 
violations (0.86). Full service establishments were more likely than fast food 
establishments to have a critical violation for food temperature and time control (1.83) 
(Cates et al., 2009). One limitation of this study was that limited data about restaurant 
characteristics and other factors was available (Cates et al., 2009), which is also a 
limitation of the present study. In the present study, I examined number of menu items as 
an explanatory variable because health authorities do not collect information about 
service type, i.e., fast food or full service. In full service restaurants and restaurants with 
larger numbers of menu items, more food preparation has to occur simultaneously, and 
kitchens may not be adequately designed to support the preparation of large quantities of 
different types of foods safely. One potential policy intervention is for Environmental 
Health managers to require a reduction in problematic menu items in restaurants where 
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food handling practices do not improve postclosure.  
In the United States, Kassa, Silverman, and Baroudi (2010) evaluated a manager 
food safety training program using inspection reports. Researchers compared restaurants 
with and without certified managers and calculated means and standard deviations for 
numbers of critical and non-critical violations (Kassa et al., 2010). Researchers have used 
numbers of violations cited by EHOs in inspection reports as an indicator in quite a few 
food safety studies (Burke et al., 2014; Cates et al., 2009; Harris et al., 2015; Kassa et al., 
2010; Murphy et al., 2011). Kassa et al. determined the mean number of critical 
violations per inspection for restaurants with certified personnel was 1.88 ± 2.078; for 
premises without certified personnel, the mean number of critical violations per 
inspection was 2.19 ± 2.368 (p 0.065). Manager food safety training did not appear to 
reduce numbers of critical violations significantly. In addition, researchers found that as 
numbers of outlets increased in multiunit chains, numbers of critical violations decreased 
(Kassa et al., 2010). One limitation of this study, however, was that the researchers did 
not explore other restaurant characteristics associated with fewer violations. In this 
particular study, critical and non-critical violations were analyzed separately, with critical 
violations being defined in these categories: time and temperature, poor hygiene practices 
by food handlers, cross contamination, and food from unapproved sources. As Kassa et 
al. found that restaurants belonging to a chain with many outlets have fewer critical 
violations, food safety communications should likely be focused on independent 
restaurants and those with fewer locations that do not have well-implemented standard 
operating procedures. In the present study, instead of analyzing critical and non-critical 
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violations separately, I focused on food handling violations associated with foodborne 
illness outbreaks. 
Examining Food Handler Behaviors 
In this section, I review studies involving observations of food handlers’ 
behaviors; data was not collected from inspection reports. Park et al. (2010) conducted a 
study in Korea that evaluated the effectiveness of a one-hour food safety training 
program. Park et al. assessed food handler knowledge using a 20-item questionnaire and 
observed food handling practices. Park et al. calculated mean scores and standard 
deviations for food safety knowledge and food handler behaviors and they performed t-
tests. The intervention group’s food safety knowledge score before training was 49.3 ± 
19.5, while after training it was 66.6 ± 16.5, making the difference significant (p < 0.05) 
(Park et al., 2010). Food handler behavior scores increased from 57.2 ± 7.8 before 
training to 63.7 ± 7.6 after training; however, the difference was not significant (Park et 
al., 2010). One limitation of this study was that there were differences between the 
intervention and control groups in terms of participants’ education levels and work 
experience. Such differences among participants can produce variability in results, 
specifically around how well participants perform on food safety knowledge tests. As one 
example, if a participant did not graduate from high school, it is possible his or her food 
safety knowledge score will greatly differ from another participant who has a college 
level education. Park et al.’s study shows that food handlers have difficulty translating 
food safety knowledge into practice in the workplace. As individuals are more easily 
motivated to meet clearly defined goals, EHO food safety communications should be 
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specific about the actions restaurant managers must take, to have closure orders rescinded 
and after restaurant reopenings. Food safety communications from EHOs might provide 
reminders to restaurant managers to verify employees are performing specific food safety 
behaviors consistently. 
Researchers have also assessed knowledge and observed food handling behaviors. 
In a study conducted in Dubai, Abushelaibi et al. (2015) examined the effect of a kitchen 
manager training program on food handlers’ practices. Researchers assessed kitchen 
manager knowledge with 12 food safety questions and observed food service 
establishment employees to record their performance of 20 food safety practices 
(Abushelaibi et al., 2015). Abushelaibi et al. found that managers’ food safety knowledge 
had improved significantly after training; the mean values before training were 71.3%, 
whereas after training mean values were 76.1% (p < 0.05). However, in terms of 
observed food handler food safety practices, they found no significant difference after 
manager food safety training, as the mean values before the intervention were 70.4% and 
after training values were 69.8% (Abushelaibi et al., 2015). These results show that 
managers either did not attempt to change food handler behaviors, or, alternatively, they 
did try and were unsuccessful in changing food handler practices. These findings are 
similar to Burke et al.’s (2014) findings, which showed that inspection results did not 
correlate well with manager knowledge. Therefore, having one manager on duty who has 
taken a food safety training course may have little influence on a restaurant’s food safety 
culture. To change food handler intentions, managers need to work actively to reduce 
unsafe food handling practices on a daily basis and implement standard operating 
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procedures. Further, Abushelaibi et al. did not investigate barriers that may have 
prevented the translation of food safety knowledge into practices. According to the theory 
of planned behavior and the health action process approach, constructs important in the 
translation of food safety knowledge into practice are perceived behavioral control, action 
self-efficacy, and subjective norms. Investigating related barriers can provide important 
information on what can be done to encourage food handlers to practice proper food 
handling protocols. 
Researchers conducted the next study in the hot/cold self-serve bars of grocery 
stores, where food is available for immediate consumption. Rowell, Binkley, Alvarado, 
Thompson, and Burris (2013) evaluated SafeMark© by providing training to the managers 
of eight grocery stores, whereas the managers of seven other stores received no additional 
training. Rowell et al. completed pretraining observations, and four to six weeks 
following the training sessions they coordinated posttraining observation sessions. For 
the facility category, the change in mean for the control stores was 0.85 ± 1.27 and the 
change in mean for the intervention stores was – 0.14 ± 1.74 (p < 0.05) (Rowell et al., 
2013). Three violations in the facility category were handwashing sinks not supplied, 
handwashing sinks obstructed, and sanitation issues. For the equipment category, the 
change in mean for the control stores was 0.84 ± 0.90 and the change in mean for the 
intervention stores was 0.10 ± 1.04 (p < 0.05) (Rowell et al., 2013). Two violations in the 
equipment category were equipment and food containers not being properly cleaned. 
Rowell et al. concluded that, in this case, training managers had little influence on food 
handler behaviors. It is possible that being observed or other external factors may have 
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prompted improvements for the control group. These results are similar to those found by 
Abushelaibi et al. (2015), in that managers who were trained may not have trained their 
employees, or if they did provide training it appeared to have had little influence. Overall, 
I would conclude from such findings that B.C. Food Premises Regulations that require 
only one person at a restaurant to have taken a food safety training program pose a barrier 
to food handlers’ performance of safe food handling practices, because many food 
handlers are not knowledgeable about how to handle foods safely. Therefore, in the 
absence of more stringent training regulations, there is a need for e-learning resources 
(both verbal and non-verbal) that EHOs can use to quickly show restaurant managers and 
food handlers how to correct violations. EHOs need to coach restaurant employees in not 
only how to perform safe food handling practices, but in what equipment they require, so 
that no further violations occur due to lack of knowledge. 
Strohbehn, Paez, Sneed, and Meyer (2011) evaluated a food safety training 
intervention focused on reducing contamination in restaurants located in the United 
States. Researchers provided managers with food safety training materials over a one-
year time frame. Using a food practices assessment form, Strohbehn et al. observed food 
handlers at each establishment for 15 hours before the intervention and for three hours 
after the intervention. Researchers calculated mean scores and standard deviations and 
used ANOVA comparisons to check for significant differences between pre-test and post-
test scores (Strohbehn et al., 2011). Food handler scores improved significantly: mean 
pre-test scores were 63.7 ± 5.7 and mean post-test scores were 70.7 ± 7.7 (p ≤ 0.001) 
(Strohbehn et al., 2011). The intervention, which involved providing restaurant managers 
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with modifiable standard operating procedures, posters, soap dispensers with timers, and 
educational materials with lesson plans, appeared to be useful in helping food handlers 
improve their food safety behaviors. Two barriers to the performance of food safety 
behaviors are lack of good habits and employees not knowing that they need to follow 
safe food handling practices (Strohbehn et al., 2014). Therefore, it follows that, in 
restaurants where managers do not have clear food safety expectations and/or do not train 
staff in how to perform tasks correctly, there will be fewer improvements in food 
handling practices postclosure. 
Investigating Food Handler Risk Perceptions 
Risk perceptions are believed to be important in influencing food handlers’ 
intentions to perform safe food handling practices. Da Cunha, Stedefeldt, and De Rosso 
(2014a) asked study participants in Brazil: “What is the consumers’ likelihood of 
presenting abdominal pain and/or vomiting (foodborne disease) after eating a meal or 
food prepared by you?” (p. 96). Food handlers working in street food kiosks, beach 
kiosks, restaurants, hospitals, and school meal services perceived themselves as less 
likely than other food handlers to spread foodborne disease to consumers (Mean 
Difference = 2.75, p < 0.01) (Da Cunha et al., 2014a). The concern here is that food 
handlers with these misperceptions might not be easily convinced that performing safe 
food handling practices is necessary. This relates to the fact that optimistic bias 
(Weinstein & Klein, 1995), or unrealistic optimism, may also result in food handlers not 
performing safe food handling practices and/or not changing their behaviors following 
temporary restaurant closures. Optimistic bias poses a much more subtle barrier to the 
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performance of safe food handling practices than inadequate resources; however, it is an 
equally important factor to consider. One of the strongest arguments for providing food 
safety training to as many food handlers as possible revolves around increasing their 
knowledge about how to manage risks associated with food preparation to prevent 
foodborne disease. Although food safety training courses may not always be successful in 
terms of changing food handler behaviors, they do appear to increase knowledge about 
how to prepare foods safely. They may also address food handler misperceptions around 
the need to perform safe food handling practices. 
Examining Food Safety Culture 
In this section, I review four studies examining food safety culture. Restaurant 
employees are believed to be more likely to develop intentions to perform safe food 
handling practices when they have attended a food safety training course and work in 
restaurants with positive food safety cultures. Brannon, York, Roberts, Shanklin, and 
Howells (2009) asked study participants to list the people who cared about them washing 
their hands, using thermometers, and protecting foods from contamination (i.e., 
customers, managers, and coworkers). Study participants were recruited from a university 
in the United States. Participants were classified into three groups: as having no 
experience with preparing foods in restaurants; as having basic experience, but not 
having completed a food safety training course; or, as having well informed experience if 
they had both prepared foods in restaurants and taken a food safety training course 
(Brannon et al., 2009). Not unexpectedly, respondents with no experience reported a 
perception that fewer important others cared about them performing handwashing, using 
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thermometers, and protecting foods from contamination (2.63 ± 1.48) than those with 
basic experience (3.05 ± 1.47), or those with well-informed experience (3.83 ± 1.50); 
these differences were significant (Brannon et al., 2009). Although training may not 
always change restaurant employee behaviors, it does appear to strengthen food handlers’ 
perceptions that people important to them at their workplace think they should perform 
safe food handling practices. Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior suggests that, generally, 
there is a relationship between favorable subjective norms and the strength of food 
handlers’ intentions (Ajzen, 1991). One limitation of my study design is that I was not 
able to investigate postclosure barriers to the performance of safe food handling 
practices, such as normative beliefs and other background factors, for example, 
knowledge and the availability of resources. 
By sending employees to food safety training courses, restaurant managers may 
improve food handlers’ knowledge and intentions. Lee, Almanza, Jang, Nelson, and 
Ghiselli (2013) examined whether organizational climate and food safety certification can 
affect food handlers’ intentions to perform safe food handling practices. Participants were 
asked seven questions about organizational climate, e.g., “Employees receive enough 
training and are strongly encouraged to develop their skills” (Lee et al., 2013, p. 286). 
Lee et al. found employees’ perceptions of organizational climate significantly influence 
their attitudes and intentions to follow safe food handling practices. Restaurant food 
handlers with food safety certification showed significantly better behavioral intentions 
with respect to following food safety practices in food service establishments (6.34 ± 
0.75) than food handlers without certification (6.08 ± 0.97, t = 5.02, p 0.013) (Lee et al., 
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2013). Managers are uniquely positioned to motivate food handlers to perform safe food 
handling practices. As studies like Lee et al.’s show, employees’ commitment to food 
safety is likely to be greater when management consistently focuses on safe food 
handling. As Lee et al. found that restaurant employees with food safety certification had 
better intentions to follow food safety practices, requiring as many food handlers as 
possible to take a food safety training course following a temporary restaurant closure 
may be crucial in strengthening safe food handling intentions. 
In the next study, researchers examined certified and noncertified restaurant 
managers’ behavioral intentions and beliefs around sending employees to food safety 
training courses. Using a telephone survey, Roberts and Barrett (2009) noticed 
foodservice managers in the United States who were certified had significantly higher 
intentions to train their employees (6.16 ± 1.34) than their noncertified counterparts (5.22 
± 1.92, p = 0.000). Roberts and Barrett also observed differences in behavioral beliefs 
about whether training would increase employees’ awareness of food safety among 
certified managers (18.39 ± 5.31) and noncertified managers (16.00 ± 6.95, p = 0.011). 
Certified managers appeared to have different behavioral beliefs than noncertified 
managers about food safety training; such differing beliefs may influence managers’ 
intentions to send or not send employees to a food safety training course. These 
researchers looked at managers’ behavioral beliefs and intentions in their study and found 
that such intentions also connect to food safety culture. Restaurants with certified 
employees and a positive food safety culture likely have employees who are more 
attentive to potential threats to food safety. Lack of mindfulness about food safety is 
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another subtle barrier to the performance of safe food handling practices. 
Using a food safety climate survey, Neal, Binkley, and Henroid (2012) assessed 
participants’ beliefs about factors that contribute to food safety culture in food service 
establishments. Participants were majoring in hotel and restaurant management and 
attended a university located in the United States. Based on their findings, Neal et al. 
concluded that a work environment that encourages safe food handling practices is 
essential in creating a positive food safety culture. Their study participants identified the 
role of management as a critical factor in food safety culture; for example, it is important 
that management stresses food safety even when the restaurant is busy (Neal et al., 2012). 
Green and Selman (2005) similarly determined that manager and coworker emphasis 
plays a significant role in the extent to which employees engage in safe food handling 
practices. These studies support my contention that without cooperation from restaurant 
managers, food handlers are unlikely to improve their food handling practices despite 
temporary restaurant closures. 
Qualitative Studies 
In the studies reviewed previously, researchers did not focus on barriers to the 
performance of safe food handling practices in work environments, and therefore, in this 
section, I examine studies about this topic. EHOs can use such information to develop 
strategies for improving food handling practices at specific restaurants. Green and 
Selman (2005) conducted a study in the United States with food service workers and 
managers that explored factors that participants believed influenced food handlers’ 
handwashing, protection of foods from contamination, and temperature control of 
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potentially hazardous foods. Focus group respondents emphasized that time pressure, 
high volume of business, and staffing, as well as the structural environment, equipment, 
and resources influenced food preparation practices (Green & Selman, 2005). In addition, 
food handler respondents observed that management and coworker emphasis affected 
their handwashing, protection of foods from contamination, and temperature control of 
potentially hazardous foods (Green & Selman, 2005). Although the results of this study 
are not generalizable, various combinations of these factors are likely relevant in other 
situations. Temporary restaurant closures might not be associated with reductions in 
numbers of food handling violations because these measures do not adequately address 
the full range of factors that influence restaurant employee behaviors, for example, time 
pressure and high volumes of business. 
In the United States, Clayton et al. (2015) conducted 25 interviews with restaurant 
employees to discover what factors might be influencing their performance of safe food 
handling practices. In their discussion of their findings, Clayton et al. claimed more 
comprehensive approaches are needed to address the range of factors that affect 
employees’ food handling practices. Two particular factors discussed were employee 
perceptions about management supervision and whether food safety knowledge was 
related to food hygiene practices. Across all respondents, manager supervision was 
believed to be key in keeping food handlers focused on food safety (Clayton et al., 2015). 
Notably, although a number of participants stated that food safety knowledge was 
unrelated to their food hygiene practices, a couple of participants suggested that 
knowledge was related to food hygiene practices (Clayton et al., 2015). Clayton et al.’s 
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findings highlight that without addressing individual factors (e.g., knowledge and 
attitudes) and institutional factors (e.g., issues with resources and inadequate standardized 
operating procedures), enforcement measures may not have the anticipated effect on food 
safety behaviors. Furthermore, although some factors such as time pressure and workload 
have been well documented as affecting employee performance in this regard, others 
have not, such as rate of pay and benefits. 
Roberts, Arendt, Strohbehn, Ellis, and Paez (2012) conducted focus groups in the 
United States with current and future food service managers around challenges managers 
face in training and motivating employees to follow safe food handling practices. Most 
participants agreed that shorter, focused, activity-based training sessions were preferable 
to full-day, classroom-based food safety courses (Roberts et al., 2012). However, it is 
important to note that because the study participants were current restaurant managers or 
university students studying to become food service managers, the perspectives of food 
service employees were missing from these results. Roberts et al. suggested workplace 
training provided by managers might be more effective in motivating food handlers to 
apply their food safety knowledge than full-day, classroom-based food safety courses. 
This study supports my recommendation that EHOs provide targeted e-learning resources 
to restaurant managers. 
Arendt, Roberts, Strohbehn, Paez, and Ellis (2014) conducted a study with food 
handlers in the United States, with the goal of developing recommendations for managers 
around how to increase food handlers’ performance of safe food handling practices. 
Participants said that having standard operating procedures related to food safety was 
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important; equally critical was having managers follow up on procedures to assure food 
handler compliance (Arendt et al., 2014). Findings were similar to the study conducted by 
Roberts et al. (2012), in which researchers found that communication with food handlers 
within restaurants was a key issue. In particular, Arendt et al. illustrated that managers 
can motivate food handlers to perform safe food handling practices by having proper 
procedures in place. With regard to training preferences, 88% of the 32 participants in 
Arendt et al.’s study reported that they preferred workplace food safety training to 
classroom-style courses. One particularly thought-provoking point made by the 
researchers was that food handlers are likely to be motivated to follow safe food handling 
practices for different reasons (Arendt et al., 2014). Applying this to the current study, 
this implies that EHOs will need to use multiple strategies to assist restaurant employees 
in changing unsafe food handling behaviors and that the success of strategies may 
ultimately depend on cooperation from managers. 
EHOs need to better understand the possible reasons for lack of compliance with 
safe food handling practices, particularly in restaurants with low levels of compliance 
with food safety regulations. Arendt, Paez, and Strohbehn (2013) conducted focus groups 
in the United States with current food service managers and university students enrolled 
in hospitality programs. These researchers explored the question: “What role do 
managers play in making certain that employees follow safe food handling practices?” 
(Arendt et al., 2013, p. 125). One theme that emerged from the focus group discussions 
was employee resistance to following food safety regulations; current and future 
managers attributed this to a variety of factors such as employees’ lack of motivation and 
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lack of time (Arendt et al., 2013). Another theme from the focus group discussions was 
the need for managers to continuously communicate about food safety using various 
training tools (Arendt et al., 2013). One limitation of Arendt et al.’s study was that all the 
responses were coming from a managerial perspective due to the makeup of the group 
under study. To help EHOs better understand the possible reasons for lack of compliance 
with safe food handling practices, future research needs to be conducted with food 
handlers, especially those working in restaurants with low levels of compliance with food 
safety regulations. Certainly the reasons for employees’ lack of compliance do not justify 
noncompliance; however, uncovering such reasons will provide an important perspective 
on the types of interventions that are most needed in restaurants with low levels of 
compliance with food safety regulations. 
Summary 
In this literature review, I have discussed research examining food service 
establishment employees’ food safety knowledge levels. Following an account of the 
theoretical foundations for this study, I reviewed studies relating to food handler 
behaviors. In reviewing food safety research, I noted several themes. Individuals who 
take food safety training courses appear to benefit in terms of their food safety 
knowledge. Although food handler food safety knowledge is important, other factors 
influence the translation of this knowledge into behaviors, for example, manager 
commitment to food safety. Abushelaibi et al. (2015) and Rowell et al.’s findings (2013) 
provide evidence that policies requiring the training of managers alone are not sufficient 
to change food handler behaviors; one possible reason for this is that many managers may 
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lack the skills and training tools necessary to communicate food safety information to 
employees. Manager commitment and positive food safety cultures appear to play a key 
role in motivating food handlers to perform safe food handling practices consistently. 
To conclude, I will summarize what is known in relation to food handling 
violations. Brown et al. (2014), Manes et al. (2013), and McIntyre et al. (2013, 2014) 
have established that food handler training programs improve food safety knowledge. 
However, the proportions of food handling violations observed by EHOs attributable to 
inadequate food handler knowledge are not clear. Seaman and Eves (2008, 2010) and 
Mullan and Wong (2009, 2010) corroborated that food handler intentions to perform safe 
food handling practices are explained by subjective norm and perceived behavioral 
control. Nevertheless, further research is needed to clarify how EHOs can utilize these 
study findings to change food handler behaviors. Abushelaibi et al. (2015), Park et al. 
(2010), Roberts et al. (2008), Rowell et al. (2013), and York et al. (2009) confirmed food 
safety training courses are not effective in changing food handler behaviors. Still, 
researchers have not yet fully examined the skills and training tools that restaurant 
managers might need to reduce food handling violations. 
Research shows that restaurant employees’ food handling practices may not 
improve through any single intervention. Multiple interventions are most likely required 
because food handlers generally lack a strong foundation of food safety knowledge, and 
many do not have well developed intentions to perform safe food handling practices. In 
the current study, I filled a notable gap in the literature regarding the effectiveness of 
temporary restaurant closures in reducing food handling violations. This study was 
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unique because of my focus on food handling violations and on how EHOs might support 
food handlers in performing safe food handling practices using enforcement and 
nonenforcement-related approaches. 
In Chapter 3, I describe the research design and rational, data collection 
procedures, and data analysis strategy. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
EHOs often claim that compliance with food safety regulations improves 
following temporary restaurant closures. In this study, I investigated whether this 
presumption is correct by examining differences in the average overall numbers of food 
handling violations per inspection in temporarily closed restaurants, both before and after 
closures. My hypothesis was that EHOs who maintain that temporary restaurant closures 
improve restaurant food handler behaviors may be overlooking the broad range of factors 
that influence practices, including attitude, perceived behavioral control, subjective norm, 
and action self-efficacy. For instance, Clayton et al. (2015) found that employees are 
unlikely to perform safe food handling practices consistently in restaurants where 
managers are not focused on food safety. Furthermore, Kettunen et al. (2015) reported 
that enforcement measures do not always result in food safety violations being corrected, 
as enforcement actions had to be used recurrently for 15.7% of the cases examined in 
their study. In the absence of a positive food safety culture, a subset of food handlers may 
not be compelled to improve their food handling behaviors despite enforcement actions. 
One purpose of this study was to determine whether temporary restaurant closures are 
associated with reductions in food handling violations postclosure in the groups under 
study. 
In this chapter, I discuss the research design and rationale, the methodology, and 
threats to the validity of the study. With regard to the research design and rationale, in the 
next section I focus on the approach I took to answer the research questions. The 
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methodology section describes the sampling, data collection, and data analysis 
procedures. Last, the threats to validity section reviews threats to both internal and 
external validity, as well as the ethical procedures. 
Research Design and Rationale 
For RQ1 and RQ2, the explanatory variables were occasion and health authority 
and the outcome variable was a count variable, (i.e., numbers of food handling violations) 
measured repeatedly for each restaurant. The occasion variable kept track of whether the 
violations were recorded before or after closure. Next, for RQ3, the explanatory variables 
were group and year and the outcome variable was a count variable (i.e., numbers of food 
handling violations), measured once per restaurant. Finally, for RQ4 through RQ6, the 
explanatory variables were type of cuisine, type of ownership, and number of menu 
items, respectively, and the outcome variable was group (i.e., temporarily closed, high, 
moderate, or low risk). After investigating the availability of restaurant data, I chose to 
perform a secondary data analysis. Restaurant inspection reports are publicly available on 
health authority websites. Moreover, my decision to use restaurant data made a 
quantitative study design the logical choice. This research plan also resulted in my study 
having a retrospective, rather than a prospective, design. 
Not only did my decision to analyze secondary data have important implications 
for the study design, it also had consequences for other aspects of the study. I was limited 
to analyzing publicly available data posted by the health authorities on their inspection 
report and restaurant closures webpages. Data were not available about several variables I 
would have liked to investigate, such as inspection time of day and inspector. More 
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importantly, I had no control over the frequency of inspections because the study 
involved conducting a secondary analysis of restaurant data. Another consequence of my 
choice to analyze secondary data for this study was that there were a greater number of 
threats to validity, as will be discussed shortly. 
After reviewing food safety research and finding a gap in the research, I 
developed my research questions. The study design was influenced by my research 
questions and time constraints. To answer RQ1, I counted numbers of food handling 
violations per inspection and studied the relationship between temporary restaurant 
closures and the occurrence of food handling violations; therefore, a quantitative design 
was necessary. Time constraints made on-site observations of food handlers impractical. 
Furthermore, as other researchers have found, few restaurant managers are willing to 
allow their employees to participate in food safety research (Roberts et al., 2008; York et 
al., 2009). Restaurant managers’ unwillingness to allow their employees to participate in 
food safety research involving on-site observations of food handlers has meant that 
considerable research has focused on examining food handler knowledge levels (DeBess 
et al., 2009; Manes et al., 2013; McIntyre et al., 2013; McIntyre et al., 2014; Panchal et 
al., 2014). Theoretical constructs most influential in explaining restaurant employees’ 
performance of safe food handling behaviors have also been widely studied (Bearth et al., 
2014; Fulham & Mullan, 2011; Pilling et al., 2008; Seaman & Eves, 2008, 2010). 
However, minimal research has been conducted on the influence of temporary restaurant 
closures on numbers of food handling violations. 
I determined that it was necessary to study overall and specific food handling 
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practices to better inform EHOs and decision makers of the efficacy of restaurant 
closures as an enforcement measure. I decided this was important as Mullan et al. (2015), 
Pilling et al. (2008), and Shapiro et al. (2011) found that examining different safe food 
handling practices separately resulted in meaningful distinctions between predictors of 
behaviors. This might be a result of food handlers feeling that they have less control over 
performing some food handling practices and more control over performing others. This 
might also be due to the fact that food handlers perceive social pressure to perform some 
food handling behaviors and not others. My first approach of examining overall food 
handling practices provides a more general perspective. In contrast, my second approach 
considered the effect of temporary restaurant closures on individual food handling 
practices to provide more detailed information.  
Last, it is through the analysis of restaurant data that EHOs can advance 
knowledge and develop strategies to better protect the public’s health. Evaluations like 
my study are widely accepted as important in tracking outcomes, assessing the 
effectiveness of policies, and providing opportunities for making policy adjustments. In 
the next section, I describe my research procedures.  
Methodology 
Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
The availability of restaurant inspection reports and data about temporarily closed 
restaurants influenced my sampling procedures. For example, the director of the 
Vancouver Coastal Health Authority posts recent restaurant inspection reports on the 
health authority’s website. However, the Fraser Health Authority director posts recent 
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restaurant closure information on the health authority’s website. As has been mentioned, 
in British Columbia only the directors of Fraser Health Authority and Vancouver Coastal 
Health Authority post restaurant closures information on their websites. I used a 
convenience sampling technique because there were not an adequate number of 
temporarily closed restaurants (i.e., 96 restaurants) to allow for the use of a probability 
sampling technique. In addition, data on the total number of restaurants located within the 
areas serviced by Fraser Health Authority and Vancouver Coastal Health Authority were 
not available. 
Operationalization 
I established a scoring system after reviewing prewritten food safety violation 
comments available to EHOs working within the Fraser Health Authority and Vancouver 
Coastal Health Authority (see Appendix B). This scoring system specified how violations 
would be categorized and counted. I did not use a weighting system; in other words, each 
food handling violation was counted as one. For some categories of violations, the 
maximum possible score was one, whereas for others more than one violation was 
achievable. There were five possible violations that fell under the category of 
contamination violations: foods not covered, foods stored on the floor, foods double 
stacked without covers, foods stored in open tin cans, and raw meats stored above cooked 
and ready to eat foods. There were three possible handwashing category violations: 
kitchen handwashing sinks not adequately supplied, kitchen handwashing sinks not 
accessible, and handwashing not performed. The violations of no written safe food 
handling procedures, no written records of refrigeration equipment temperatures, and no 
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thermometers were counted as food safety management category violations. Three 
violations were counted as sanitizing category violations: no sanitizing solutions, wiping 
cloths not in sanitizing solutions, and inadequate manual or mechanical dishwashing. 
Potentially hazardous foods being stored at room temperature and refrigerator 
temperatures being in excess of 4°C (40°F) were counted as refrigeration category 
violations. A training violation consisted of no restaurant employees on-site having taken 
a food safety training course. A cooling violation referred to procedures not being 
followed to ensure foods were cooled to 4°C (40°F) or colder within 6 hours. Potentially 
hazardous foods being hot held at temperatures below 60°C (140°F) was a hot holding 
violation. Finally, potentially hazardous foods being thawed at room temperature or 
without flowing cool water was a thawing violation (see Appendix B). Identical 
violations were not counted twice in the same inspection report; however, two 
handwashing violations could be cited if the EHO had observed no liquid soap and the 
handwashing sink not being accessible.  
The outlined scoring system made it possible to consistently analyze inspection 
reports. One point was assigned for each food handling violation and zero points were 
assigned for the use of correct procedures. Less serious violations not known to be 
associated with foodborne illness were excluded, i.e., items stored on-site that were not 
required for daily operations. Although inspection reports can be used to facilitate the 
comprehension of the status quo in restaurants, no guidelines exist concerning how to use 
scores in research (Da Cunha, De Rosso, & Stedefeldt, 2016). When scores include low-
risk violations, the results may be confusing (Da Cunha et al., 2016). As there are no 
 
 
85 
guidelines on how to score violations, I developed a system for categorizing and counting 
food handling violations that focused on the violations more likely to result in foodborne 
illness. 
For RQ4 through RQ6, I assessed the explanatory variables as follows. Type of 
cuisine was ascertained by referring to restaurant websites and menus. Independent or 
chain status was determined by referring to restaurant and health authority websites. 
Number of menu items was determined by referring to restaurant menus online.  
Data Collection Procedures and Delimitations 
I obtained lists of temporarily closed restaurants from the restaurant closures 
webpages of the Fraser Health Authority and Vancouver Coastal Health Authority 
websites. One study delimitation with regard to RQ1 and RQ2 was that restaurants closed 
because of lack of hot water, fire, flood, or sewage back-ups were excluded, because 
managers do not have control over these types of events. Another delimitation for RQ1 
and RQ2 was that at least one routine inspection report had to be available from before 
and after the closure for the restaurant to be included in the study. Last, for RQ1 through 
RQ6, restaurants were excluded if restaurant menus were not available online. 
Sample Size Justification 
To establish how many restaurants to include in my analysis, I performed a 
sample size calculation using a Monte Carlo simulation study. Monte Carlo simulation 
can be used for sample size calculations when planning a research study, provided 
analytic formulas for the sample size are not available for the setup considered in that 
study. This setup refers to the study design, research questions, data, and statistical 
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model(s) pertaining to the study. Details about the steps involved in conducting such a 
simulation are provided in Landau and Stahl’s (2013) article. This calculation was driven 
by RQ3. I determined the smallest number of restaurants, n, required for detecting 
statistically significant differences in the average overall number of food handling 
violations between temporarily closed and high-risk categorized restaurants at the α= 
0.05 significance level with 80% power. Recall that the four restaurant groups were: 
Group A (temporarily closed), Group B (high-risk categorized), Group C (moderate-risk 
categorized), and Group D (low-risk categorized). For the simulation study, each 
restaurant group contained the same number of restaurants, k, such that the sample size 
was given by n = 4 × k. Then, for a given k, I followed these steps: 
Step 1: I generated 2,000 simulated data sets from a Poisson regression model, with each 
data set containing data on the variable’s number of food handling violations, number of 
routine inspections, and restaurant group. 
Step 2: For each simulated data set, I used the deviance test to test the null and alternative 
hypotheses HO3 and HA3 corresponding to RQ3. 
Step 3: After performing the deviance test for all 2,000 simulated data sets, I computed 
their associated p values with reference to the chi-square distribution. 
Step 4: I estimated the power of the deviance test as the proportion of times the null 
hypothesis was rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis across the 2,000 simulated 
data sets; the null hypothesis was rejected for a simulated data set if the p value 
associated with the deviance test was smaller than α = 0.05. I repeated the above steps for 
each value of k, where k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , k. 
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The Poisson regression model with log link used in Step 1 was formulated as 
follows:  
log(average overall number of food handling violations)=  
ß0 + ß1D2 + ß2D3 + ß3D4 + log(number of inspections) 
Where D2, D3, and D4 are dummy variables equal to 1 for restaurants in groups C, B, and 
A, respectively, and 0 otherwise.  
The values of the Poisson regression parameters ß0, ß1, ß2, and ß3 I used in my 
simulation study were chosen to satisfy the equations: exp(ß0) = 0.5, exp(ß0 + ß1) = 1.5, 
exp(ß0 + ß2) = 2.5, exp(ß0 + ß3) = 3.5. The quantities exp(ß0), exp(ß0 + ß1), exp(ß0+ ß2), 
and exp(ß0 + ß3) in these equations denote the theoretical average of overall number of 
food handling violations per inspection for restaurants in Groups D, C, B, and A, 
respectively. 
Subtractions revealed that the differences in the theoretical average overall 
number of food handling violations per inspection corresponding to the above stated 
regression parameter values were 1.5 – 0.5 = 1 (Group C – Group D), 2.5 – 0.5 = 2.0 
(Group B – Group D), 3.5 – 0.5 = 3.0 (Group A – Group D), 2.5 – 1.5 = 1.0 (Group B – 
Group C), 3.5 – 1.5 = 2.0 (Group A – Group C), and 3.5 – 2.5 = 1.0 (Group A – Group 
B). The values of the offset variable corresponding to the restaurants in each group were 
simulated for each simulation iteration from a Poisson distribution with a mean of 3, 
thereby allowing for an average of 3 inspections during the study period under study.  
The simulation study was performed with the open source software R version 
3.2.4, using R code with modifications (Murakami, 2010), and produced the estimated 
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power curve displayed in Figure 1. The estimated power curve corresponds to the null 
hypothesis of no difference between just Group A (temporarily closed restaurants) and 
Group B (high-risk categorized restaurants), with respect to the average overall number 
of food handling violations per inspection versus the alternative hypothesis of a 
difference between these groups. The curve displays the estimated power of the deviance 
test as a function of the number of restaurants in each group, k, for k = 1, 2, 3, . . . 40. 
From this curve, I could see that the smallest value of k for which I would be able to 
achieve a target power level of 80% was k = 24. Thus, the smallest value of n = 4 × k for 
which I could achieve this power was n = 96. 
 
Figure 1. Estimated power associated with the test for detecting significant differences between 
temporarily closed and high-risk categorized restaurants. 
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Data Analysis Plan 
I used R software version 3.2.4 to perform the data analyses. To start with, I 
addressed RQ1 and RQ2 using mixed effects Poisson regression modeling (Hedeker & 
Gibbons, 2006). This type of modeling accounts for the fact that each restaurant will 
contribute repeated measures data on two occasions: before and after the temporary 
closure. Specifically, for RQ1, I used a mixed effects Poisson regression model, which 
included the outcome variable overall number of food handling violations (treated as a 
count variable) and the explanatory variables occasion (treated as a categorical variable, 
with the categories before the temporary closure and after the temporary closure) and 
health authority (treated as a categorical variable with the categories Fraser Health 
Authority and Vancouver Coastal Health Authority). The model used a log link and 
included number of inspections as an offset variable. To account for the possibility that 
the overall number of food handling violations recorded before and after the temporary 
closure might be correlated for each restaurant, the model also included a random 
restaurant intercept assumed to follow a Normal distribution. 
Since the model included occasion and health authority as explanatory variables 
with fixed effects, I tested first for the significance of the interaction between these two 
variables after controlling for heterogeneity among restaurants via the random restaurant 
effect. I decided that if the interaction between occasion and health authority was found 
to be statistically significant, I would interpret this as evidence that the effect of occasion 
is different for each health authority, conditional on the restaurant (e.g., for the average 
restaurant). To understand how this effect differed across health authorities, I would 
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further test the significance of the effect of occasion separately for each health authority. 
These separate tests are described as tests of simple effects of occasion for each health 
authority. If the interaction between occasion and health authority was found not 
statistically significant, I would omit the interaction term involving these variables from 
the model, but kept the main effects of occasion and health authority in the model. With 
this modification in place, I would assume the effect of occasion to be the same for each 
health authority and I would test the significance by performing a test of the main effect 
of occasion, conditional on the restaurant (e.g., for the average restaurant). 
Subsequently, for RQ2, I used a separate mixed effects Poisson regression model 
with log link for each specific food violation, which included the number of specific food 
handling violations as the outcome variable, occasion and health authority as the 
explanatory variables (defined exactly as for RQ1), number of inspections as the offset 
variable, and a random restaurant intercept assumed to follow a Normal distribution. For 
each mixed effects Poisson regression model, I investigated whether the explanatory 
variables occasion and health authority interacted in their effect on the outcome variable. 
I decided if occasion and health authority interacted with each other to affect the outcome 
variable, I would report the simple effect of the explanatory variable occasion for each 
health authority, with the two simple effects being different across authorities. In the 
model corresponding to RQ1, the simple effects of occasion quantified the differences in 
the average overall number of food handling violations per inspection documented before 
and after temporary closure for restaurants in the two health authorities. In the models 
corresponding to RQ2, the simple effects quantified the differences in the average 
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number of specific food handling violations per inspection documented before and after 
temporary closure for restaurants in the two health authorities. I made the decision if 
occasion and health authority did not interact with each other, I would omit the 
interaction term involving these variables from the model and report the main effect of 
occasion. I fit all mixed effects Poisson regression models to the data using the glmer 
function in the lme4 (Bates, Maechler, & Bolder, 2012) package of R. 
I answered RQ3 by fitting a Poisson regression model to restaurant-specific data 
collected on the outcome variable overall number of food handling violations and the 
explanatory variable restaurant group (Group A, Group B, Group C, and Group D). After 
fitting the Poisson regression model to the data available for answering RQ3, I conducted 
a deviance test based on the Chi square distribution to assess the overall effect of the 
explanatory variable restaurant group. If the p value associated with the deviance test was 
statistically significant, this suggested differences in the average overall number of food 
handling violations between at least two of the four restaurant groups. To uncover the 
pairs of restaurant groups between which the differences occurred, I used Tukey’s post-
hoc multiple comparisons to follow up on the deviance test. On the other hand, if the p 
value associated with the deviance test was not statistically significant, this indicated the 
data did not provide sufficient evidence of a difference between the restaurant groups 
with respect to average overall numbers of food handling violations. 
Prior to reporting the final results produced by the Poisson regression model for 
RQ3, I checked the major assumptions underlying Poisson regression modeling. As there 
was no evidence of over dispersion or zero inflation in the data, I did not need to use a 
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more appropriate model for the data, such as negative binomial regression or zero inflated 
Poisson regression. I used the allEffects function in the effects package to visualize the 
final results. 
I addressed the final three research questions, RQ4 through RQ6, by fitting 
multinomial regression models to the data corresponding to these questions, with one 
model per question. Multinomial logistic regression models help relate a nominal 
outcome variable to one or more explanatory variables. I implemented the multinomial 
regression models by employing the multinom function in the nnet package (Venables & 
Ripley, 2002) of the open-source statistical software R (R Foundation, 2016), using 
version 3.2.0 on a Windows platform.  
All three multinomial regression models used restaurant group (Group A, Group 
B, Group C, and Group D) as the nominal outcome variable. Each model included a 
single explanatory variable, which was different across models. Specifically, the model 
for RQ4 used type of cuisine served as the explanatory variable. The model for question 
RQ5 used restaurant type (chain or independent) as the explanatory variable. Finally, the 
model for question RQ6 used number of menu items as the explanatory variable. For all 
three models, the reference group was Group D, which corresponded to low-risk 
categorized restaurants.  
For each multinomial regression model, I reported the following information: (a) 
p values, (b) odds ratios, and (c) probabilities. The p values helped in detecting the effects 
of the explanatory variable on the outcome variable, restaurant group, in the multinomial 
regression models. The odds ratios and probabilities quantified the effects of the 
 
 
93 
explanatory variables on the outcome variable on different scales. I reported the 
probabilities as percentages. In addition, I used side-by-side bar charts to represent the 
effect of the explanatory variable included in the model on the predicted probability of a 
restaurant being categorized in a particular group. For example, the side-by-side bar chart 
corresponding to RQ5 displays the predicted probabilities of an independent restaurant 
being categorized into each of the four groups alongside the predicted probabilities of a 
chain restaurant being categorized in those same groups, enabling the direct comparison 
of predicted probabilities across types of restaurant for every group. 
Threats to Validity 
Inconsistencies in the documentation of food handling violations between EHOs 
are one threat to validity. Because this study involved conducting a secondary analysis of 
data, I was not able to calculate the degree of agreement among inspectors or interrater 
agreement. One way in which I addressed this issue was by selecting restaurants from 
different cities and municipalities. In doing so, I included data reported by a diverse 
group of inspectors. In addition, certified EHOs typically have a university undergraduate 
degree and two years of educational training in public health inspection and have also 
completed a certification exam. However, educational prerequisites for EHOs have 
changed over time. These changing requirements have resulted in EHOs having differing 
educational backgrounds.  
Performing a retrospective secondary analysis of inspection reports also increased 
threats to validity. When researchers observe food handling practices and analyze data 
themselves, it is easier to make interpretations. Confounding factors are another threat to 
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validity; for example, management changes and not temporary restaurant closures might 
have caused improvements in food handling practices postclosure. Treatment diffusion 
was also a threat to construct validity. For example, a previous temporary restaurant 
closure may have occurred before the period under study began. Previous temporary 
restaurant closures, or the use of other enforcement measures such as violation tickets, 
might also have influenced numbers of food handling violations.  
Internal validity is also essential when researchers try to draw conclusions from 
study findings. There were two threats to internal validity in this study in terms of history 
and selection. Because random assignment did not occur, temporarily closed restaurants 
may have differed on a number of confounding factors, for example, restaurant- and 
employee-related characteristics. Specifically, restaurant employee turnover may have 
resulted in improvements in food handling behaviors.  
There were two threats to external validity in the present study: population and 
treatment variation validity. Differences might exist in restaurant and restaurant 
employee characteristics that prevent study findings from being generalizable. For 
instance, independent restaurants may be predominately high-risk categorized in one 
district and low-risk categorized in another. Another factor was that temporary restaurant 
closures might vary in length of time, from 1 day to many months, depending on the time 
required to address the issues causing the health hazard. Longer closures might have a 
greater effect on restaurant employees’ safe food handling intentions. 
Because I did not conduct interviews with EHOs, background information about 
restaurants was not available. Nearly all of the restaurants identified on the Fraser Health 
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Authority and Vancouver Coastal Health Authority restaurant closure lists were included 
in this study, making random assignment for the temporarily closed restaurants 
impractical. For the high, moderate, and low-risk categorized restaurants, I selected 
restaurants from different cities and municipalities to ensure inspections were not 
performed by a small number of EHOS. In addition, as I did not examine any details 
about food service employees and only a few details about restaurant characteristics, 
confounding variables such as restaurant employee food safety knowledge levels were a 
concern. 
Ethical Procedures 
I performed a secondary data analysis of publicly available data. As information 
was not collected from restaurant employees, consent forms were not needed for this 
study. I assigned numbers to each food service establishment to protect the identity of 
restaurants in the data set. To prevent a data breach, data was secured on a password 
protected computer. After five years, I will delete the study data from my computer and 
security-protected storage device. The Walden University approval number for this study 
is 09-19-16-0085853.  
Summary 
When EHOs issue closure orders, restaurant employees typically work swiftly to 
address all violations so that they may reopen as soon as possible to minimize the 
economic effect. In this study, I used data from two British Columbia health authorities to 
examine whether restaurant employees continued to focus on food safety once closure 
orders were rescinded in the groups of restaurants under study. In this chapter, I have 
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described the research design and rationale, the methodology, and the threats to the 
validity of the study. In the next chapter, I will discuss the study findings. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is to present the findings of the statistical analyses 
conducted to address RQ1 through RQ6. The outline of this chapter is as follows: 
overview of research questions, descriptive statistics, results related to each research 
question, and a summary of the results.  
The purpose of RQ1 was to determine whether temporary restaurant closures 
motivated restaurant employees to improve their food handling practices, with an 
improvement translating into fewer food handling violations in postclosure restaurant 
inspections. Next, with RQ2, I examined (one violation at a time) whether temporary 
closures were associated with a decrease in the average number of handwashing, 
sanitizing, refrigeration, and contamination violations per inspection for the typical 
restaurant in each health authority—Vancouver Coastal Health Authority or Fraser 
Health Authority—and whether that decrease was the same or different across the two 
authorities. I designed RQ3 to verify whether the average number of food handling 
violations differed significantly among high, moderate, and low-risk categorized 
restaurants. With RQ4 through RQ6, the purpose was to determine whether the 
explanatory variables predicted two outcomes: temporary restaurant closure and 
restaurant categorization as high risk. RQ4 centers on how well the type of cuisine 
predicted the categorization of restaurants into the temporarily closed and high-risk 
categorized groups. With RQ5, attention was placed on how well the type of ownership 
(chain or independent) predicted restaurants being categorized into the temporarily closed 
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and high-risk groups. And last, RQ6 concentrated on whether the number of menu items 
was useful in predicting whether a restaurant would be temporarily closed and 
categorized as high risk. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics corresponding to RQ1 and RQ2 are shown in Table 2. These 
statistics were computed from data in routine inspection reports from 61 temporarily 
closed restaurants located in the Fraser Health Authority and from 35 temporarily closed 
restaurants located in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority. The inspection dates for 
these reports ranged from March 20, 2014, to October 6, 2016, for restaurants in the 
Fraser Health Authority and from January 16, 2014, to September 22, 2016, for 
restaurants in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority. The majority of temporarily 
closed restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority served East Asian cuisine (34%), were 
independent (66%), and had between 50 and 100 menu items (28%). In contrast, the 
majority of temporarily closed restaurants located in the Vancouver Coastal Health 
Authority served North American/other cuisine (40%), were independent (74%), and had 
<50 or 50 to 100 menu items (57%). As can be seen in Table 2, temporarily closed 
restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority and Vancouver Coastal Health Authority have 
different characteristics, and this is of interest because it provides evidence that health 
service regions may need to be taken into consideration during such analyses.  
Descriptive statistics relating to RQ3 through RQ6 are given in Table 3, and were 
computed from data in routine inspection reports from 376 temporarily closed, high, 
moderate, and low-risk categorized restaurants located in the Fraser Health Authority. 
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The inspection dates listed in the routine inspection reports ranged from January 8, 2015, 
to September 19, 2016. Forty-one percent of the high-risk categorized restaurants served 
North American/other cuisine, 71% of the high-risk categorized restaurants were 
independent, and 38% of the high-risk categorized restaurants had between 50 and 100 
menu items. Alternatively, 83% of the low-risk categorized restaurants served North 
American/other cuisine, 51% of the low-risk categorized restaurants were chain 
restaurants, and 47% of the low-risk categorized restaurants had less than 50 menu items. 
Differences were observed in restaurant characteristics between temporarily closed, high, 
moderate, and low-risk categorized restaurants. My findings from this study showed 
diversity in restaurant characteristics between food service establishments of different 
risk categories, which supports further investigations into how type of cuisine, type of 
ownership, and number of menu items may be influencing inspection outcomes. 
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Table 2 
 
Temporarily Closed Restaurants in Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and Fraser 
Health Authority  
Restaurant characteristic  VCHA  
n (%) 
FHA  
n (%) 
Type of cuisine   
North American/other  14 (40%) 20 (33%) 
East Asian 12 (34%) 21 (34%) 
Japanese 6 (17%) 11 (18%) 
South Asian 3 (9%) 9 (15%) 
Ownership   
Chain 9 (26%) 21 (34%) 
Independent 26 (74%) 40 (66%) 
Number of menu items    
<50 10 (28.5%) 16 (26%) 
50-100 10 (28.5%) 17 (28%) 
101-150 8 (23%) 14 (23%) 
151-200 6 (17%) 13 (21%) 
>201 1 (3%) 1 (2%) 
 
Note. VCHA, Vancouver Coastal Health Authority; FHA, Fraser Health Authority. 
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Table 3 
 
Temporarily Closed, High, Moderate, and Low-Risk Categorized Restaurants in Fraser 
Health Authority 
Restaurant characteristic  All groups Closed High Moderate Low 
 FHA  
n 
Type of cuisine      
North American/other 201 34 39 50 78 
East Asian 88 31 26 24 7 
Japanese  44 16 13 12 3 
South Asian 43 13 16 8 6 
Type of ownership      
Chain 139 34 27 30 48 
Independent 237 60 67 64 46 
Number of menu items      
<50 129 28 32 25 44 
50-100 135 24 36 39 36 
101-150 61 18 17 16 10 
151-200 38 19 6 9 4 
>201 13 5 3 5 0 
 
Note. FHA, Fraser Health Authority. 
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Research Question 1 
When EHOs issue a closure order to an operator, it is a last resort measure to 
protect the public from a situation where foodborne illness is likely to occur. EHOs 
sometimes assume temporary restaurant closures will motivate restaurant employees to 
improve their food handling practices, with an improvement translating into fewer food 
handling violations in postclosure restaurant inspections. In this section, I focus on 
whether this assumption is correct for a typical restaurant in the Vancouver Coastal 
Health Authority and for a typical restaurant in the Fraser Health Authority. The section 
starts with an exploratory analysis of the data used to address RQ1, which was designed 
to test the correctness of this assumption. I then provide a discussion of the statistical 
modeling employed to formally address RQ1 and the findings produced by this modeling. 
The section concludes with a verification of modeling assumptions based on diagnostic 
plots.  
Data from 96 temporarily closed restaurants were included in the statistical 
analyses; 35 of these restaurants were located in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority 
and 61 in the Fraser Health Authority. These were the only health authorities considered, 
since other British Columbia health authorities do not post their restaurant closure 
information on a public website. Restaurants considered in the analyses experienced a 
single closure over the period of the study (2015–2016) and were inspected at least once 
before closure and at least once postclosure.  
The average numbers of food handling violations per inspection observed before 
and after temporary restaurant closure for the restaurants in the Vancouver Coastal Health 
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Authority and the Fraser Health Authority are displayed in Figure C1 and Figure C2, 
respectively. For restaurants in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, 12 out of 35 
restaurants had fewer numbers of overall food handling violations per inspection 
postclosure compared to before closure. Meanwhile, for restaurants in the Fraser Health 
Authority, 20 out of the 61 restaurants had fewer overall numbers of food handling 
violations per inspection postclosure. 
For restaurants in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, the average number of 
overall food handling violations per inspection ranged from 0 to 9 before closure and 
from 0 to 8 postclosure. In contrast, for restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority, the 
average number of overall food handling violations per inspection ranged from 0 to 5 
before closure and from 0 to 6.5 postclosure. Before closure, the typical restaurant had an 
average number of overall food handling violations per inspection that was 2.73 in the 
Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and 2.07 in the Fraser Health Authority. After 
closure, the typical restaurant had an average number of food handling violations that was 
3.03 in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and 2.50 in the Fraser Health Authority. 
Interestingly, in both authorities, there was an increase in the average number of overall 
food handling violations per inspection postclosure compared to before closure for the 
restaurants included in this study.  
I used mixed-effects Poisson regression modeling to determine if temporary 
restaurant closures were associated with a decrease in the average overall number of food 
handling violations per inspection postclosure, after controlling for restaurant and 
whether the effect of temporary restaurant closure differed across the two health 
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authorities. The response variable used in this modeling was a count variable that 
consisted of the number of overall food handling violations incurred by a restaurant. This 
variable was measured on two occasions for each restaurant in the study: before 
temporary closure and after temporary closure. The explanatory variables used in this 
modeling were Occasion and Authority; an offset term took into account the number of 
routine inspections conducted before and after closure. The variable Occasion had two 
levels—before closure and after closure—with the former being treated as the reference 
level. The modeling allowed for a random intercept effect for restaurant, intended to 
control for heterogeneity among restaurants due to restaurant characteristics that were not 
captured in the modeling. 
I considered three competing models as part of the mixed effects Poisson 
regression modeling used to address RQ1. The first model (glmer.1) included only 
Occasion as an explanatory variable. The second model (glmer.2) included both Occasion 
and Authority as explanatory variables, assuming the effect of Occasion to be the same 
across both health authorities. The third model (glmer.3) contained not just Occasion and 
Authority as explanatory variables, but also their interaction, thereby assuming that the 
effect of Occasion on the outcome variable was different in each health authority. I 
compared the three models against each other on the basis of the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) to determine which model was best for the overall food handling 
violations data. A model was deemed best for the data if it produced the smallest AIC 
value. The notation glmer stands for generalized linear mixed effects models, of which 
the mixed effects Poisson regression models used here are a special case. 
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The glmer.2 model fitted to the overall food handling violations data had the 
lowest AIC value of 835.544, compared to 837.246 for glmer.1, and 836.425 for glmer.3, 
so it was preferable for the overall food handling violations data. The best-fitting model, 
glmer.2, investigated the effect of temporary restaurant closure on the (log) average 
number of overall food handling violations per inspection, after controlling for the 
Authority and random restaurant effect. In light of this, the effect of temporary restaurant 
closure captured—for a typical restaurant—the difference in the (log) average number of 
overall food handling violations per inspection between the two occasions considered, 
controlling for the Authority the restaurant came from.  
Models such as glmer.2, which includes a count response variable, can suffer 
from overdispersion. Therefore, I checked for overdispersion in the glmer.2 model using 
the R package glmeco. The scale parameter for the glmer.2 model was 1.079, which is 
very close to 1. In the absence of any evidence of overdispersion for the glmer.2 model, I 
used this model for final reporting. The summary output associated with the glmer.2 
model is reported in Table C1 (on the log scale). For reference, I also included the 
summary outputs for the competing models glmer.1 and glmer.3 in the same table. 
The marginal and conditional R squared values associated with the glmer.2 model 
revealed the following. For the glmer.2 model, the proportion of variance in the average 
number of overall violations per inspection explained by the fixed factors alone was 
0.039, whereas the proportion of variance explained by both the fixed and random factors 
was 0.424. The former proportion represents the marginal R squared and the latter 
represents the conditional R squared. Recall that the glmer.2 treated Occasion and 
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Authority as fixed factors and the random restaurant effect as the random factor. 
Therefore, it appears that the restaurant-to-restaurant variation in the number of overall 
food handling violations captured by the random restaurant effect was the dominant 
source of variation in the model. This variation could have been induced by either 
unobserved restaurant-level factors or observed restaurant-level factors that were not 
included in the model, but that might have affected the number of overall food handling 
violations per inspection recorded on each occasion. Such factors are assumed to have 
had a stable influence over time on each restaurant at each occasion—at least throughout 
the study duration. 
There was no evidence in the data that, for the typical restaurant in either health 
authority, the log average number of overall food handling violations after closure was 
significantly lower than the log average number of overall food handling violations 
before closure (one sided p 0.9708). In fact, the typical restaurant in either health 
authority had an estimated 16% increase in the average number of overall food handling 
violations per inspection after temporary closure compared to before closure; this is 
opposed to the (expected) decrease that would be observed were restaurant closure an 
effective intervention in reducing food handling violations. 
Figure 2 helps in visualizing the findings produced by the glmer.2 model using 
two different scales—the log scale used by the model and the natural scale obtained by 
the exponentiation of results reported on the log scale. For each health authority, these 
findings apply to all restaurants, which are represented by the restaurants included in this 
study. In particular, Figure 2 shows that both the log average number of overall food 
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handling violations per inspection (left panel) and the average number of overall food 
handling violations per inspection (right panel) increased—rather than decreased—from 
before to after temporary restaurant closures for the typical restaurant in both health 
authorities. On the log scale, the log average number of overall food handling violations 
increased from 0.89 to 1.03 for the typical restaurant in the Vancouver Coastal Health 
Authority. Meanwhile, the log average number of overall food handling violations 
increased from 0.65 to 0.79 for the typical restaurant in the Fraser Health Authority. On 
the natural scale, the average number of overall food handling violations increased from 
2.43 to 2.81 for restaurants in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and from 1.91 to 
2.21 for restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority. For the natural scale, notice how 2.81 
represents a 16% increase over 2.43, whereas 2.21 represents a 16% increase over 1.91. 
The reported increases seem fairly small from a practical perspective; however, they go 
in the opposite direction relative to what would be expected if temporary closure were an 
effective measure for reduction of food handling violations. 
The results reported here for the best-fitting glmer.2 model hold, provided the 
assumptions underlying the model are not violated by the data. Residual diagnostic plots 
for the glmer.2 model are shown in Figure C3. These diagnostics were produced using 
the DHARMa package in R and are discussed below (Dunn & Smyth, 1996; Gelman & 
Hill, 2006). The DHARMa package uses simulation to produce readily interpretable 
residuals for generalized linear mixed effects models (such as the glmer.2 model) that are 
standardized to values between 0 and 1. By virtue of how they were simulated, these 
residuals would be expected to have a uniform (flat) distribution.  
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The top left panel in Figure C3 displays a qq-uniform plot to detect deviations 
from the overall uniformity of the standardized residuals. For a correctly specified model, 
one would expect a uniform (flat) distribution of the overall standardized residuals, 
evidenced by a straight line in the qq-plot.  
The top right panel in Figure C3 displays the plot of standardized residuals versus 
predicted (or fitted) values. For a correctly specified model, one would expect uniformity 
of the standardized residuals in the y-direction in this plot. To provide a visual aid for 
detecting deviations from uniformity in y-direction in the plot, 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 
quantile regression lines are displayed across the plot. These lines should be straight, 
horizontal, and at y-values of 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75. However, some deviations from this are 
to be expected by chance, even for a perfect model, especially if the sample size is small.  
The bottom left and right panels in Figure C3 display the standardized residuals 
versus the explanatory variables included in the model using side-by-side boxplots: 
Occasion (bottom left) and Authority (bottom right). For a correctly specified model, one 
would expect uniformity in the y direction if the residuals were plotted against any 
predictor. In other words, there should be no systematic dependency of the standardized 
residuals on the explanatory variables. By examining the top left, top right, bottom left, 
and bottom right panels of Figure C3 for the glmer.2 model, I concluded that the model is 
correctly specified for the data.  
Last, Figure C4 shows a final diagnostic plot for the glmer.2 model, which 
consists of a caterpillar plot of the predicted random effects of restaurant. This plot shows 
that most restaurants have uncertainty intervals around the predicted random effects that 
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cross the zero line, suggesting that they are close to the typical restaurant in their 
respective health authority. Although I did not exclude any restaurants from my analysis, 
several restaurants located at the top right of this diagnostic plot appeared significantly 
different compared to the typical restaurants across the health authorities. Either 
temporary restaurant closures do not motivate food handlers to perform safe food 
handling practices, or, alternatively, barriers to safe food handling practices could not be 
overcome. In RQ2, I will examine whether temporary restaurant closures were associated 
with decreases in four specific food handling violations, beginning with handwashing 
violations. 
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Figure 2. Log average and average number of overall food handling violations per inspection 
before and after temporary restaurant closure.  
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Research Question 2 
In the previous section, I focused on presenting the results of the mixed-effects 
Poisson regression modeling for overall food handling violations. In the current section, I 
present similar results regarding specific food violations: handwashing, sanitizing, 
contamination, and refrigeration violations. These results correspond to my second 
research question, RQ2, with which I investigated whether, during the time period of the 
study, temporary restaurant closures were associated with a decrease in the average 
number of specific violations per inspection for a typical restaurant in either one or both 
of the two health authorities considered. 
Handwashing Violations 
In this subsection, I describe how I used mixed-effects Poisson regression 
modeling to uncover whether temporary closures were associated with a decrease in the 
average number of handwashing violations per inspection for the typical restaurant in 
each health authority—Vancouver Coastal Health Authority or Fraser Health Authority—
and whether that decrease was the same or different across the two authorities.  
Prior to conducting the mixed-effects Poisson regression modeling for the 
handwashing violations data, I performed an exploratory examination of the data, the 
related insights of which are discussed below. 
The average number of handwashing violations per inspection before and after 
temporary restaurant closures for each restaurant included in the study are presented in 
Figure D1 and Figure D2. Among the 35 restaurants studied in the Vancouver Coastal 
Health Authority, only 8 restaurants had fewer numbers of handwashing violations per 
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inspection after closure compared to before closure. Meanwhile, among the 61 
restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority, only 11 restaurants had fewer handwashing 
violations per inspection after closure compared to before closure.  
For restaurants in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, the average number of 
handwashing violations per inspection ranged from 0 to 2 before closure and from 0 to 3 
postclosure. Meanwhile, for restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority, the average 
number of handwashing violations per inspection ranged from 0 to 2 both before and 
after closure. The average number of handwashing violations for a typical restaurant 
before closure was 0.37 in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and also 0.37 in the 
Fraser Health Authority, whereas after closure, it was 0.40 in the Vancouver Coastal 
Health Authority and 0.52 in the Fraser Health Authority. 
As was the case for RQ1, I considered three competing mixed-effects Poisson 
regression models for my analysis of the handwashing violations data, which were of 
increasing complexity. These models, referred to as glmer.1, glmer.2, and glmer.3, were 
similar to the ones corresponding to overall food violations, except they used a different 
outcome variable. Whilst the outcome variable for the glmer models concerning overall 
food violations was the number of overall food violations, measured before and after 
temporary restaurant closure, the outcome variable for the glmer models concerning 
handwashing violations was the number of handwashing violations, also measured before 
and after temporary restaurant closure. All three models included an offset term that kept 
track of the number of inspections conducted before and after closure for each restaurant.  
I evaluated the glmer.1, glmer.2, and glmer.3 models for the handwashing 
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violations data to determine which of these models had the best fit. The glmer.1 model 
had the lowest Akaike information criterion value of 384.772, compared to 386.614 for 
glmer.2, and 386.777 for glmer.3. Thus, the glmer.1 model was preferable.  
Using the R package blmeco, I found no evidence of overdispersion for the 
glmer.1 model, since the estimated scale parameter returned by this package for the 
glmer.1 model was 0.954, which was close to 1. In the absence of any evidence of 
overdispersion for the glmer.1 model, I used this model for final reporting. I detail the 
summary output for glmer.1 model on the log scale in Table D1. For reference, I also 
report the summary outputs associated with the competing models glmer.2 and glmer.3.  
Using the glmer.1 model, I investigated the effect of temporary restaurant closure 
on the (log) average number of handwashing violations per inspection after controlling 
for the random restaurant effect. As discussed in my section on RQ1, the glmer.1 model 
does not control for health authority, so the model combines restaurants from the two 
health authorities, rather than treating them separately. The effect of temporary restaurant 
closure in the glmer.1 model is quantified via the fixed effect of the Occasion variable, 
where Occasion keeps track of when handwashing violations were measured for each 
restaurant. To this end, the Occasion variable was treated in the glmer.1 model as a fixed 
factor with two levels: 1) before temporary restaurant closure (reference level), and 2) 
after temporary restaurant closure. The fixed effect of Occasion in the glmer.1 model (or, 
equivalently, the effect of temporary restaurant closure) —for the typical restaurant 
across the two health authorities—was the difference in the (log) average number of 
handwashing violations per inspection between the two occasions considered. Recall that 
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the random restaurant effect was included in the glmer.1 model to capture the potential 
correlation among the number of handwashing violations contributed by the same 
restaurant before and after temporary closure. 
In investigating the effect of temporary restaurant closure using the glmer.1 
model, I found no evidence in the data that the log average number of handwashing 
violations per inspection after closure was significantly lower than the log average 
number of handwashing violations per inspection before closure (one-sided p value 
0.900). In fact, the data showed that the average number of handwashing violations after 
closure was 29% higher than before closure for a typical restaurant across the two health 
authorities.  
A visualization of the results produced by the glmer.1 model for all restaurants, 
represented by the 96 restaurants from the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and 
Fraser Health Authority included in this study, is provided in Figure 3, and uses both the 
log scale and the natural scale. The figure shows that the log average number of 
handwashing violations per inspection increased from -1.26 before to -1.01 after 
temporary restaurant closure, whereas the average number of handwashing violations 
increased from 0.28 before to 0.36 after temporary restaurant closure, with 0.36 
representing a 29% increase over 0.28.  
For the glmer.1 model, the proportion of restaurant-to-restaurant variation in the 
number of handwashing violations per inspection explained by the Occasion factor alone 
was 0.010, whereas the proportion of variance explained by both Occasion and the 
random restaurant effect was 0.270. Therefore, the restaurant-to-restaurant variation in 
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the number of handwashing violations captured by the random restaurant effect was the 
dominant source of variation in the model. This variation was induced by either 
unobserved restaurant-level factors or observed restaurant-level factors that were not 
included in the model, but that might have affected the number of handwashing violations 
per inspection recorded on each occasion. Such factors can be assumed to have a stable 
influence over time on each restaurant at each occasion—at least throughout the study 
duration. For handwashing violations, adding the random restaurant effect to the model 
was useful; however, for sanitizing violations, which I discuss later, this was not the case.  
The results I reported for the glmer.1 model depend on the assumptions 
underlying the model not being violated by the data. Model diagnostics used to test 
whether assumptions hold for the glmer.1 model are shown in Figure D3.  
The diagnostic plots in Figure D3 were constructed with the help of the DHARMa 
package in R. As explained previously, this package uses simulation to produce readily 
interpretable residuals for generalized linear mixed models (such as the glmer.1 model) 
that are standardized to values between 0 and 1. For a correctly specified model, these 
residuals would be expected to have a uniform (flat) distribution by virtue of how they 
were simulated. For guidelines on the interpretation of these diagnostics, please refer 
back to the section on overall food violations. In examining these diagnostics, I found no 
evidence that the glmer.1 model was incorrectly specified.  
The diagnostic plot in Figure D4 consists of a caterpillar plot of the predicted 
random effects of restaurant in the glmer.1 model. Restaurants have uncertainty intervals 
around the predicted random effects that cross the zero line, suggesting that they are close 
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to the typical restaurant across the two health authorities. No restaurants appeared to be 
significantly different compared to the typical restaurant.  
In the restaurants studied, despite temporary restaurant closures there were no 
overall improvements in keeping kitchen handwashing sinks properly supplied with 
liquid soap and paper towels, in ensuring kitchen handwashing sinks were accessible, and 
in performing handwashing properly and at appropriate times. Therefore, targeted food 
safety communications delivered by EHOs to managers following temporary restaurant 
closures should place some focus on handwashing. 
 
Figure 3. Log average and average number of handwashing violations per inspection before and 
after closure.  
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Sanitizing Violations 
This subsection covers my findings related to sanitizing violations and whether 
temporary restaurant closures are associated with a decrease in the average number of 
sanitizing violations per inspection postclosure. I discuss the sanitizing violations data 
first and then present the results produced by the statistical modeling applied to these 
data. 
The average number of sanitizing violations per inspection observed before and 
after closure for the 35 restaurants in Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and the 61 
restaurants in Fraser Health Authority are displayed in Figure E1 and Figure E2, 
respectively, and are discussed below. For restaurants in the Vancouver Coastal Health 
Authority, 10 restaurants had fewer numbers of sanitizing violations per inspection 
postclosure. With regard to restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority, 25 restaurants had 
fewer numbers of sanitizing violations per inspection postclosure.  
For the 35 restaurants studied in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, the 
average number of sanitizing violations per inspection ranged between 0 and 2 both 
before and after temporary closure. For the 61 restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority, 
the average number of sanitizing violations per inspection ranged between 0 and 2 before 
temporary closure and between 0 and 3 after closure. The average number of sanitizing 
violations for a typical restaurant before closure was 0.59 in the Vancouver Coastal 
Health Authority and 0.57 in the Fraser Health Authority. The average number of 
sanitizing violations for a typical restaurant after closure was 0.67 in the Vancouver 
Coastal Health Authority and 0.64 in the Fraser Health Authority. This preliminary 
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exploration of the data reveals there was not much differentiation between health 
authorities when considering the difference in the average number of sanitizing violations 
across the two occasions. Also, there was an increase in the typical number of sanitizing 
violations across occasions in each health authority.  
To formally analyze the sanitizing violations data, I considered three mixed-
effects Poisson regression models of increasing complexity. For economy, the notation 
used for these sanitizing violation models is identical to that used for the overall food 
handling violations models: glmer.1, glmer.2, and glmer.3. All three models shared the 
same outcome variable—number of sanitizing violations—and used the log number of 
inspections as an offset term. The glmer.1 model included occasion of measurement 
(Occasion) as an explanatory variable. The glmer.2 model included Occasion and Health 
Authority as explanatory variables. The glmer.3 model included not just Occasion and 
Health Authority, but also their interaction. The summary output associated with the 
glmer.1, glmer.2, and glmer.3 models is reported in Table E1, and is used here only as a 
basis for performing the comparison of the three models.  
Based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC), glmer.1 was the best of the 
three mixed effects Poisson regression models considered for the sanitizing violations 
data. This model had the lowest AIC value of 459.079, compared to 460.760 for glmer.2, 
and 462.736 for glmer.3. 
Further examination of the results produced by the glmer.1 model revealed that 
the estimated variance for the random restaurant effect included in the model was equal 
to zero, suggesting that the random restaurant effect is not needed in the model. Indeed, 
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the variation among restaurants with respect to the number of sanitizing violations was 
explained by the occasion of measurement (i.e., before or after temporary closure), but 
not by restaurant-level factors with a stable influence on the number of sanitizing 
violations across occasions. As discussed previously, such restaurant-level factors refer to 
either unobserved factors or factors that were observed but not included in the glmer.1 
model. 
Since the glmer.1 model did not warrant including a restaurant-level random 
effect, I simplified this model to a standard Poisson regression model, by omitting the 
random restaurant effect while keeping the fixed effect of occasion of measurement. The 
simplified model, glm.1, is used for final reporting in what follows. The summary output 
associated with the glm.1 model is reported in Table E2. 
Prior to interpreting the results produced by the glm.1 model, I checked the model 
for signs of overdispersion using the function dispersiontest in the R package modEva. 
The (estimated) scale parameter for the glm.1 model was 0.898, which was not 
significantly different from 1 (p value = 0.9072). Thus, there was no evidence of 
overdispersion for the glm.1 model, so the model can be interpreted safely, provided the 
underlying model assumptions are not violated by the data. The verification of model 
assumptions is deferred to the end of this section, whereas the interpretation of model 
results is provided next.  
The effect of temporary closure was captured by the fixed effect of Occasion in 
the glm.1 model. On the log scale, this effect is expressed as the difference in the log 
average number of sanitizing violations per inspection after closure and the log average 
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number of sanitizing violations per inspection before closure across restaurants in both 
authorities combined. Note that the model does not distinguish between restaurants in the 
two health authorities, with respect to the log average number of sanitizing violations per 
inspection before and after closure, since the data provided no evidence that health 
authority should be included as an explanatory variable in the model.  
The data provided no evidence that the log average number of sanitizing 
violations after closure was significantly lower than the log average number of sanitizing 
violations before closure (one-sided p 0.820). In actuality, the average number of 
sanitizing violations per inspection after temporary closure was estimated to be 15% 
higher than before temporary closure. This increase in the average number of sanitizing 
violations runs counter to what one might expect to see if temporary closure were an 
effective intervention for reducing sanitizing violations. 
Figure 4 presents the log average (left panel) and the average (right panel) number 
of sanitizing violations before and after closure across restaurants in the two health 
authorities combined. Irrespective of which authority the restaurant came from, the 
restaurants studied experienced an average number of 0.56 sanitizing violations per 
inspection before closure. After closure, they experienced an average number of 0.64 
sanitizing violations per inspection. As reported earlier in this section, this represents a 
15% increase in the average number of sanitizing violations per inspection between the 
two occasions.  
As is the case with other models considered thus far, the results reported for the 
glm.1 model hold provided the assumptions underlying the model are not violated by the 
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data. The model diagnostics used to test whether assumptions hold for the glm.1 model 
are reported in Figure E3. These diagnostics were produced using the DHARMa package 
in R and are discussed below. The package uses simulation to produce readily 
interpretable residuals not only for generalized linear mixed models (such as the glmer.1 
model discounted in favor of the glm.1 model), but also for generalized linear models 
(such as the glm.1 model employed here for final reporting). The residuals are 
standardized to values between 0 and 1. By virtue of how they were simulated, the 
residuals would be expected to have a uniform (flat) distribution if the glm.1 model was 
correctly specified for the sanitizing violations data. 
The top left panel in Figure E3 displays a qq-uniform plot to detect deviations 
from the overall uniformity of the standardized residuals. The straight line followed by 
the observations in that plot is consistent with the glm.1 model being correctly specified. 
The top right panel in Figure E3 displays the plot of standardized residuals versus the 
predicted (or fitted) values produced by the glm.1 model, with superimposed 0.25, 0.5 
and 0.75 quantile regression lines. These lines provide a visual aid for detecting 
deviations from the expected uniformity of the standardized residuals in the y-direction. 
The y-direction refers to the vertical direction. Since the quantile regression lines are 
straight, nearly horizontal, and approximately located at the y-values of 0.25, 0.5, and 
0.75, this provides further evidence that the glm.1 model is correctly specified for the 
data. 
The bottom panel in Figure E3 displays the standardized residuals versus the 
explanatory variable Occasion included in the glm.1 model using a side-by-side boxplot. 
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Since the side-by-side boxplots reveal no systematic dependency of the standardized 
residuals on the explanatory variables Occasion, this further reinforces the fact that the 
glm.1 model is correctly specified. In conclusion, in assessing the residual diagnostic 
plots provided in Figure E3, I found no evidence that the glm.1 model was incorrectly 
specified. 
To conclude, temporary restaurant closures may not motivate food handlers to 
prepare sanitizing solutions, keep wiping cloths in sanitizing solutions, and ensure dishes 
are properly washed (manually or mechanically). Lack of progress in reducing sanitizing 
violations despite temporary restaurant closures indicates targeted food safety 
communications may need to cover food contact surface maintenance and proper 
dishwashing. 
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Figure 4. Model results visualization for glm.1 (log scale on the left, natural scale on the right). 
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Contamination Violations 
This subsection focuses on the results of the mixed-effects Poisson regression 
modeling concerning contamination violations. This modeling addresses whether 
temporary closures were associated with a decrease in the average number of 
contamination violations per inspection for the typical restaurant in each health authority 
and whether this decrease was different across the two health authorities.  
The average numbers of contamination violations per inspection observed before 
and after closure for the 35 restaurants in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and the 
61 restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority are displayed in Figure F1 and Figure F2. 
For restaurants in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, only seven restaurants had 
fewer numbers of contamination violations per inspection postclosure. Meanwhile, for 
restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority, only 19 restaurants had fewer contamination 
violations per inspection postclosure.  
The average number of contamination violations per inspection in the Vancouver 
Coastal Health Authority ranged between 0 and 5 before temporary restaurant closure and 
between 0 and 3 after temporary restaurant closure. In the Fraser Health Authority, this 
average number ranged between 0 and 1.5 before temporary restaurant closure and 
between 0 and 3 after temporary restaurant closure. Before closure, for the typical 
restaurant, the average number of contamination violations per inspection was 0.57 in the 
Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and 0.53 in the Fraser Health Authority. After 
closure, the typical restaurant had an average number of contamination violations per 
inspection was 0.71 in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and 0.55 in the Fraser 
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Health Authority.  
Since I considered three competing mixed effects Poisson regression models for 
the contamination violations data (referred to as glmer.1, glmer.2, and glmer.3), I first 
determined which of these models provided the best fit to my data in the sense of 
producing the smallest Akaike information criterion (AIC) value. These models were 
similar in nature to those considered for the overall food violations data, except they used 
the number of contamination violations as the response variable, rather than the number 
of overall food violations. The glmer.1 model fitted to the contamination violations data 
had the lowest AIC value of 457.495, compared to 459.306 for glmer.2 and 461.150 for 
glmer.3, so it was preferred.  
As the best-fitting model was glmer.1, I used this model as a basis for 
investigating the effect of temporary restaurant closure on the (log) average number of 
contamination violations per inspection after controlling for the random restaurant effect. 
Recall that the glmer.1 model does not control for health authority. The effect of 
temporary closure in the model is quantified via the fixed effect of the Occasion variable. 
The Occasion variable detailed when the (total) number of contamination violations was 
recorded for each restaurant and was treated as a factor with two levels: 1) before 
temporary restaurant closure (reference level), and 2) after temporary restaurant closure. 
In light of this, the effect of temporary restaurant closure captures—for a typical 
restaurant across the two health authorities combined—the difference in the (log) average 
number of contamination violations per inspection between the two occasions considered.  
I checked for overdispersion in the glmer.1 model using the R package glmeco. 
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The scale parameter for the glmer.1 model was 0.969, which is very close to 1. In the 
absence of any evidence of overdispersion for the glmer.1 model, I used this model for 
final reporting. The summary output associated with the glmer.1 model is reported in 
Table F1. For completeness, I also report summary outputs associated with the competing 
models glmer.2 and glmer.3. The findings that emerged from this table in connection 
with the glmer.1 model are discussed in more detail below. 
For the glmer.1 model, the proportion of restaurant-to-restaurant variation in the 
average number of contamination violations per inspection explained by the Occasion 
factor alone was 0.002, whereas the proportion of variance explained by both Occasion 
and the random restaurant effect was 0.281. Therefore, the restaurant-to-restaurant 
variation captured by the random restaurant effect was the dominant source of variation 
in the model. This variation would have been induced by either unobserved restaurant-
level factors or observed restaurant-level factors that were not included in the model, but 
that might affect the number of contamination violations per inspection recorded on each 
occasion. Such factors were assumed to have a stable influence over time on each 
restaurant across occasions—at least throughout the study duration.  
The one-sided p value for the Wald z-test used to test the significance of the 
fixed-effect of Occasion was 0.7264. Since this p value was not statistically significant at 
the 5% significance level, there was no evidence in the data that, for the typical restaurant 
in both authorities combined, the log average number of contamination violations after 
closure was significantly lower than the log average number of contamination violations 
before closure. In fact, the typical restaurant across these two authorities had an estimated 
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10% increase in the average number of contamination violations per inspection after 
temporary closure compared to before closure, rather than the decrease expected, if 
restaurant closure were to be an effective intervention. 
Figure 5 helps in visualizing the findings produced by the glmer.1 model using 
two different scales—the log-scale used by the model and the natural scale obtained by 
exponentiation of results reported on the log-scale. In particular, this figure shows that 
both the log average number of contamination violations per inspection (left panel) and 
the average number of contamination violations per inspection (right panel) increased—
rather than decreased—from before to after temporary restaurant closure for the typical 
restaurant in the two health authorities. Specifically, the log average number of 
contamination violations per inspection increased from -0.77 to -0.68, whereas the 
average number of contamination violations per inspection increased from 0.46 to 0.51 
(i.e., the 10% increase reported earlier). The reported increases seem fairly small from a 
practical perspective; however, they go in the opposite direction relative to what would 
be expected if temporary closure were an effective measure for reducing contamination 
violations.  
The results reported here for the glmer.1 model hold provided the assumptions 
underlying the model are not violated by the contamination data. I report on three of the 
model diagnostic plots used to test whether assumptions hold for the glmer.1 model in 
Figure F3. These diagnostics were produced using the DHARMa package in R and 
revealed no evidence of violations of the model assumptions, suggesting that the model is 
correctly specified for the data. Recall that a more detailed discussion of how these 
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diagnostics should be interpreted was provided in the results section concerning overall 
food violations.  
Figure F4 shows the fourth and final diagnostic plot for the glmer.1 model, which 
consists of a caterpillar plot of the predicted random effects of restaurant. This plot shows 
that most restaurants have uncertainty intervals around the predicted random effects that 
cross the zero line, suggesting that they are close to the typical restaurant in their 
respective health authority. Only three restaurants seem to be significantly different 
compared to the typical restaurant. These restaurants are located at the top right of the 
plot. It is possible that the glmer.1 model fit would improve if these three restaurants 
were excluded from the model, however I did not take this action.  
Following temporary restaurant closures, targeted food safety communications 
about how to protect foods from contamination are advisable. However, it is unlikely 
these types of violations will be reduced by education alone in the absence of measures 
that could be taken in restaurant kitchens, including the provision of adequate shelving 
and suitable containers with tight fitting lids. 
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Figure 5. Log average and average number of contamination violations per inspection before and 
after temporary restaurant closure. 
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Refrigeration Violations  
In this subsection, I focus on refrigeration violations. After describing features of 
the refrigeration data, I will present the results produced by the mixed-effects Poisson 
regression modeling I applied to these data. In this modeling, I addressed whether 
temporary restaurant closures were associated with a decrease in the average number of 
refrigeration violations per inspection for the typical restaurant in either one or both of 
the two health authorities considered.  
The average number of refrigeration violations per inspection before and after 
temporary restaurant closures are shown in Figure G1 for the 35 restaurants in the 
Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and in Figure G2 for the 61 restaurants in the Fraser 
Health Authority. For restaurants in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, 15 
restaurants had fewer average numbers of refrigeration violations per inspection 
postclosure. For restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority, 17 restaurants had fewer 
average numbers of refrigeration violations per inspection postclosure. 
For restaurants in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, the average number of 
refrigeration violations before closure ranged from 0 to 1.5 and from 0 to 1 postclosure. 
Meanwhile, for restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority, the average number of 
refrigeration violations ranged from 0 to 1 both before and after closure. Before closure, 
for the typical restaurant, the average number of refrigeration violations per inspection 
was 0.47 in the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and 0.30 in the Fraser Health 
Authority. After closure, the typical restaurant had an average number of refrigeration 
violations per inspection that was 0.36 for the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and 
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0.26 for the Fraser Health Authority.  
The three mixed-effects Poisson regression models I considered for the 
refrigeration violations data, glmer.1, glmer.2, and glmer.3, were similar in nature to 
those used previously. Specifically, the models used the same explanatory variables and 
offset term as outlined for the overall food handling violations data, but employed a 
different outcome variable (i.e., number of refrigeration violations). This outcome 
variable was measured on two different occasions for each restaurant—before temporary 
closure and after temporary closure—thereby justifying the inclusion of a random 
restaurant effect in the model. The random restaurant effect captures the within-restaurant 
correlation among the values of the outcome variable. For completeness, I report the 
summary outputs for all three models in Table G1.  
Based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC), glmer.2 was the best of the 
three mixed-effects Poisson regression models considered for the refrigeration violations 
data. The glmer.2 model had the lowest Akaike information criterion value of 331.412, 
compared to 334.260 for glmer.1 and 332.488 for glmer.3. In addition to an offset term 
for the number of inspections, the glmer.2 model included a fixed effect for occasion of 
measurement and a fixed effect for health authority, along with a random restaurant 
effect. 
Closer examination of the results produced by the glmer.2 model revealed the 
estimated variance of the random restaurant effect was very small. However, I decided to 
keep the random restaurant effect in the glmer.2 model since the estimated variance of 
the random restaurant effect was not exactly zero and it was still possible to calculate 
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marginal and conditional R-squared values for the model.  
As the best fitting model for the refrigeration violations data was glmer.2, I used 
this model as a basis for investigating the effect of temporary restaurant closure on the 
log average number of refrigeration violations per inspection, after controlling for health 
authority and for random restaurant effect. Recall that the effect of temporary closure is 
captured in the glmer.2 model by the effect of the Occasion variable. In the model, 
Occasion was treated as a fixed factor with two levels: before temporary restaurant 
closure (reference level) and after temporary restaurant closure (nonreference level). 
Furthermore, Authority was treated as a fixed factor with two levels: Vancouver Coastal 
Health Authority (reference level) and Fraser Health Authority (nonreference level). For 
each factor, the nonreference level was compared against the reference level. 
Prior to conducting the one-sided test of significance of the effect of temporary 
restaurant closure in the glmer.2 model, I checked the model for evidence of 
overdispersion, using the function dispersion_glmer from the R package blmeco. The 
scale parameter for the glmer.2 model was 0.927, which is very close to 1, suggesting 
that overdispersion was not an issue for the glmer.2 model.  
The p value associated with the one-sided test of significance of the effect of 
temporary restaurant closure in the glmer.2 model was 0.153, indicating that there was no 
evidence in the data in favor of a statistically significant decrease postclosure in the 
average number of refrigeration violations per inspection for the typical restaurant in 
either health authority. Although the typical restaurant in either health authority had an 
average number of refrigeration violations per inspection after temporary closure that was 
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19% lower than before temporary closure, this decrease was not statistically significant. 
The decrease is further explored via Figure 6, which displays the log average number of 
refrigeration violations per inspection predicted by the glmer.2 model (left panel), and the 
average number of refrigeration violations per inspection predicted by the glmer.2 model 
(right panel), for the typical restaurant in each health authority before and after temporary 
restaurant closure. As can be seen from the right panel, the average number of 
refrigeration violations per inspection before closure for the Vancouver Coastal Health 
Authority was 0.48, while the number postclosure was 0.39. The latter number (0.39) 
represents a 19% decrease in the former (0.48). Meanwhile, for the Fraser Health 
Authority, the average number of refrigeration violations per inspection before closure 
was 0.3, while the number postclosure was 0.24. Here as well, the latter number (0.24) 
represents a 19% decrease in the former (0.3). Although the 19% decrease seems large, 
because it is applied to fairly small numbers (i.e., 0.48 for the Vancouver Coastal Health 
Authority and 0.3 for the Fraser Health Authority), it results in numbers that are also 
small (i.e., 0.39 for the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority and 0.24 for the Fraser 
Health Authority). The lack of statistical significance of this decrease suggests that there 
are no grounds for believing, based on this study, that the decrease noted in the sample of 
restaurants can be generalized to the underlying population of restaurants represented by 
the sample.  
The marginal R2 value, which represents the variance explained by the fixed 
factors of Occasion and Authority, was 0.053. Meanwhile, the conditional R2 value, 
which represents the variance explained by both fixed and random factors, was 0.053. 
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Therefore, the fixed factors, not the random factors, explained the observed variance.  
Residual diagnostic plots for the glmer.2 model are shown in Figure G3. These 
diagnostics were produced via the DHARMa package in R. The top left panel in Figure 
G3 displays a qq-uniform plot to detect deviations from the overall uniformity of the 
standardized residuals. The straight line in the qq-plot provides evidence that the model is 
correctly specified.  
The top right panel in Figure G3 displays the plot of standardized residuals versus 
predicted (or fitted) values. For a correctly specified model, one would expect uniformity 
of the standardized residuals in the y-direction in this plot. The nearly straight, horizontal 
lines, at the y-values 0.25 and 0.75, provide further evidence that the model is correctly 
specified. Some deviations from this are to be expected by chance, even for a perfect 
model, especially if the sample size is small.  
The bottom left and right panels in Figure G3 display the standardized residuals 
versus the explanatory variables included in the model using side-by-side boxplots: 
Occasion (bottom left) and Authority (bottom right). For a correctly specified model, one 
would expect uniformity in the y direction if the residuals were plotted against any 
predictor. In other words, there should be no systematic dependency of the standardized 
residuals on the explanatory variables. In assessing the residual diagnostic plots provided 
in Figure G3, I found no evidence that the glmer.2 model was incorrectly specified.  
The caterpillar plot of random effects shown in Figure G4 shows little variation 
among the predicted random effects, which is to be expected considering that the 
estimated variance of the random restaurant effect was very close to 0.  
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This study provides evidence that there is a need for food safety communications 
about handwashing, sanitizing, and preventing contamination following temporary 
restaurant closures. Targeted food safety communications about ensuring that 
refrigerators are maintaining foods at 4 degrees Celsius (40 degrees Fahrenheit) or colder 
and not storing potentially hazardous foods at room temperature should be reserved for 
restaurants in which these types of violations have been recurrently observed. 
 
Figure 6. Model results visualization for glmer.2 (log scale on the left, natural scale on the right). 
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Research Question 3 
With RQ3, I set out to answer the following question: is there any evidence that 
the average number of food handling violations differs significantly among closed, high, 
moderate, and low-risk categorized restaurants for the groups studied? In the event of 
differences in the average number of food handling violations between groups, I 
determined whether this effect differed across years. In this section, I describe and 
explore the data available in relation to RQ3, introduce the statistical models used to 
analyze these data, and present and interpret the model findings. I conclude the section by 
considering whether the data satisfied the underlying modeling assumptions. 
The restaurants of interest for RQ3 were all located in the Fraser Health 
Authority, were inspected in either one or both of the years 2015 and 2016, and were 
categorized as closed, high, moderate, or low risk. Each of the four risk groups contained 
38 restaurants in 2015 and 56 restaurants in 2016. The overall numbers of restaurants 
across the four risk groups were 152 in 2015 and 224 in 2016, for a total of 376 across the 
two years. Predominately different restaurants were sampled from one year to the next, 
with only 24 restaurants being sampled in both years.  
Frequency distributions showing the number of overall food handling violations 
documented in routine inspections for the restaurants in the closed, high, moderate, and 
low-risk groups that were included in this study are presented in Figure H1 and are 
discussed below. For restaurants in the closed group, the typical number of food handling 
violations was 3 in both years, where typical refers to the most prevalent number of food 
handling violations that occurred across all restaurants in the group included in this study. 
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For restaurants in the high-risk group, the typical number of food handling violations was 
3 in 2015 and 4 in 2016. In the moderate risk group, the typical number of food handling 
violations was 2 in 2015, but 1 in 2016. In the low risk group, the typical number of food 
handling violations was 0 in both years.  
The closed and high-risk groups exhibited a wider range of numbers of food 
handling violations compared to the low and moderate-risk groups. Indeed, for 
restaurants in the closed group, the number of food handling violations ranged from 0 to 
10 in 2015 and from 0 to 12 in 2016. For restaurants in the high-risk group, it ranged 
from 0 to 7 in 2015 and from 1 to 7 in 2016. The moderate-risk group restaurants 
experienced between 0 and 4 violations in 2015 and between 0 and 5 violations in 2016. 
In contrast, the low-risk group restaurants experienced between 0 and 2 violations in each 
of the 2 years.  
To address RQ3, I considered three competing standard Poisson regression 
models. The three models shared the same outcome variable, number of overall food 
handling violations documented in routine inspections, however the models included 
different explanatory variables. The first model (glm.1) included restaurant group as an 
explanatory variable. This model ignored the year effect when investigating whether 
there were differences between restaurant groups with respect to the average number of 
overall food handling violations. The second model (glm.2) included both restaurant 
group and year as explanatory variables. Thus, the glm.2 model controlled for the year 
effect and assumed that differences between groups with respect to the average number 
of overall food handling violations were the same across years. The third model (glm.3) 
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included restaurant group, year, and their interaction as explanatory variables, thereby 
allowing for the possibility that differences between restaurant groups with respect to the 
average number of overall food handing violations might be different across years. 
I compared the fits of the three models to the data on the basis of the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC), to identify which model provided the best fit to the data. The 
glm.2 model was preferred because it had the lowest AIC value of 1209.997, compared to 
AIC values of 1217.220 for glm.1 and 1211.879 for glm.3. 
To corroborate these findings, I also conducted two analyses of deviance. The 
first analysis of deviance compared glm.2 against glm.1, and the second one compared 
glm.3 against glm.2. The comparison of glm.2 versus glm.1 favored glm.2 (χ2 = 311.55, 
df = 371, p 0.0024). Therefore, I concluded it was appropriate to add the explanatory 
variable year to the model. The comparison of glm.3 versus glm.2 also favored glm.2 
(χ2= 307.43, df = 368, p 0.249). The non-significant change in deviance indicated that I 
should not add the group by year interaction to the model, as it did not improve the model 
fit. Modeling results reported in the remainder of this section are therefore based on the 
output for the best-fitting model glm.2, which included the statistically significant main 
effect of group and the statistically significant main effect of year. Summary outputs for 
glm.2, as well as glm.1 and glm.3 are shown in Table H1.  
According to the findings produced by the glm.2 model, the closed group had an 
average number of overall food handling violations that was 9.95 times higher than that 
corresponding to the low-risk group after controlling for the year effect (CI 7.29–13.99). 
The high-risk group had an average number of overall food handling violations that was 
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8.18 times higher than that corresponding to the low-risk group after controlling for the 
year effect (CI 5.97–11.52). Last, the moderate-risk group had an average number of 
overall food handling violations that was 4.93 times higher than that corresponding to the 
low-risk group after controlling for the year effect (CI 3.55–7.01). 
In Figure 7, I show the estimated average number of food handling violations per 
inspection for each restaurant group separately, for the years 2015 and 2016, along with 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The corresponding average reported in this 
figure refers to all the restaurants in that group that are represented by the restaurants 
included in the present study for the year in question. For 2015, the figure reveals that the 
estimated average numbers of food handling violations per inspection in the four groups 
were as follows: 3.73 (Closed), 3.07 (High), 1.85 (Moderate), and 0.38 (Low). For 2016, 
higher average numbers of violations per inspection were estimated in all four groups: 
4.57 (Closed), 3.76 (High), 2.26 (Moderate), and 0.46 (Low).  
After controlling for the year effect, Tukey’s multiple comparisons revealed 
statistically significant differences between all possible pairs of restaurant groups with 
respect to the (true) log average number of food handling violations, as seen in Figure 8.  
Figure H2 shows rootograms for the three models. Rootograms compare observed 
and expected numbers/counts of overall food handling violations on a square root scale, 
with the expected numbers being produced by the glm.2 model (a standard Poisson 
regression model). In a rootogram, bars are used to denote observed counts and a dashed 
curve is used to indicate expected values. If a particular Rootogram bar fails to reach the 
zero line, then the model overpredicts the underlying observed count; if the bar exceeds 
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the zero line, then the model underpredicts that count. In examining the rootograms for 
the three models, I saw that there was generally good agreement between expected and 
observed counts for each model, and especially for the glm.2 model. Each model 
appeared to under predict between one and four, and over predict above five cumulative 
overall food handling violations. Figure H3 shows the results of the model diagnostics 
associated with RQ3, I found no evidence that the model was incorrectly specified.  
The significant differences in the log average number of food handling violations 
after controlling for the year effect were smallest between temporarily closed restaurants 
and high-risk categorized restaurants. Accordingly, EHOs should prioritize restaurants 
that have been temporarily closed and establishments that are high-risk categorized, to 
focus on achieving long term compliance with safe food handling practices rather than 
only corrections during inspections. 
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Figure 7. Average numbers of food handling violations in the four restaurant groups, as estimated 
by the glm.2 model. 
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Figure 8. Differences in the log average numbers of food handling violations among all possible 
pairs of groups. 
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Research Question 4 
With this question, I examined whether restaurants serving particular types of 
cuisines were associated with higher probabilities of being temporarily closed or high-
risk categorized. For restaurants located in the Fraser Health Authority, multinomial 
logistic regression indicated that type of cuisine (i.e., North American/other, East Asian, 
Japanese, or South Asian) was a statistically significant predictor of restaurant group 
categorization (p < 0.001). In particular, this suggests that there may be significant 
differences between cuisines served by restaurants that relate to the odds of a restaurant 
being categorized as temporarily closed or high-risk rather than being categorized as low 
risk. However, type of cuisine was a relatively weak predictor of restaurant group 
categorization R2 = 5.412%.  
Restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority serving East Asian, Japanese, or South 
Asian foods as opposed to North American/other foods had greater odds of being 
categorized as temporarily closed or high risk rather than low risk. These results can be 
seen in Table I and are detailed below. Compared to restaurants serving North 
American/other cuisine, restaurants serving East Asian cuisine were significantly more 
likely to be in the temporarily closed (p < 0.001) or in the high-risk categorized group (p 
< 0.001) rather than in the low-risk categorized group. In particular, for restaurants 
serving East Asian rather than North American/other cuisine, the odds of being 
temporarily closed were approximately 10 times higher than the odds of being 
categorized as low risk, whereas the odds of being categorized as high risk were almost 
7.5 times higher than the odds of being categorized as low risk.  
 
 
144 
Restaurants serving Japanese rather than North American/other cuisine had 
greater odds of being temporarily closed as opposed to being categorized as low risk (p 
0.0001), and also had greater odds of being categorized as high risk rather than low risk 
(p 0.0013). Specifically, for restaurants serving Japanese rather than North 
American/other cuisines, the odds of being temporarily closed were approximately 12 
times higher than the odds of being categorized as low risk, whereas the odds of being 
categorized as high risk were nearly 9 times higher than the odds of being categorized as 
low risk.  
Restaurants serving South Asian cuisine were significantly more likely than those 
serving North American/other cuisine to be in the temporarily closed (p 0.0027) or the 
high-risk categorized groups (p 0.0012) as opposed to the low-risk categorized group. 
Indeed, for restaurants serving South Asian foods compared to North American/other 
foods, the odds of being temporarily closed were almost 5 times higher than the odds of 
being categorized as low risk, whereas the odds of being high-risk categorized were 
slightly more than 5 times higher than the odds of being categorized as low risk. 
As seen in Figure 9, type of cuisine influenced the magnitude of the predicted 
probability of a restaurant in the Fraser Health Authority being either temporarily closed 
or categorized as high risk. Note that Figure 9 also displays predicted probabilities of a 
restaurant in the Fraser Health Authority being categorized as moderate or low risk, but 
these probabilities are not of direct interest in answering RQ4. In interpreting these 
predicted probabilities, the overall focus was on determining which type of cuisine was 
associated with the highest/lowest predicted probability of a restaurant being temporarily 
 
 
145 
closed or high-risk categorized. 
In the Fraser Health Authority, restaurants serving Japanese cuisine were 
associated with the highest predicted probability of being temporarily closed (36.4%), 
followed by restaurants serving East Asian cuisines (35.2%), and South Asian cuisine 
(30.2%). Restaurants serving North American/other cuisine had the lowest predicted 
probability of being closed, at 16.9%. These findings indicate that restaurants in the 
Fraser Health Authority that serve ethnic cuisines seem to be more prone to temporary 
restaurant closure than restaurants serving North American/other cuisine.  
Type of cuisine was also associated with higher predicted probabilities of a 
restaurant in the Fraser Health Authority being high-risk categorized. Restaurants serving 
South Asian cuisine had the greatest predicted probability of being high-risk categorized 
(37.2%), followed by restaurants serving Japanese foods (29.5%), and restaurants serving 
East Asian foods (29.5%). Restaurants serving North American/other cuisines had the 
lowest probability of being high-risk categorized (19.4%). To sum up, the restaurants in 
the Fraser Health Authority serving Japanese cuisine had the greatest predicted 
probability of being closed, whereas the restaurants serving South Asian cuisine had the 
greatest predicted probability of being high-risk categorized. 
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Figure 9. Probability of a restaurant being categorized in the closed, high, moderate, or low-risk 
groups according to type of cuisine served. 
 
Research Question 5 
With this question, I explored whether chain restaurants out-performed 
independent restaurants in terms of the probability of being temporarily closed or 
categorized as high risk, and whether type of ownership is an important explanatory 
variable. Multinomial logistic regression modeling established that type of ownership 
(i.e., chain versus independent) was a statistically significant, though weak, predictor of 
restaurant group membership for restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority (p 0.009; R2 = 
1.117%). The results of this modeling are presented in Table J and are discussed below. 
Compared to chain restaurants, independent restaurants in the Fraser Health 
Authority were more likely to be temporarily closed rather than low-risk categorized (p 
0.040). In addition, independent restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority were more 
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likely than chain restaurants to be high-risk categorized rather than low-risk categorized 
(p 0.002). Based on the magnitude of the reported p values, type of ownership was 
considerably more useful in predicting membership in the high-risk categorized group 
than in the temporarily closed group (relative to the low-risk group), since the 
corresponding p value was much smaller.  
The odds of an independent restaurant being temporarily closed rather than low-
risk categorized in the Fraser Health Authority were 1.8 times higher than those of a 
chain restaurant. On the other hand, the odds of an independent restaurant being high-risk 
categorized rather than low-risk categorized in the Fraser Health Authority were 2.6 
times higher than those of a chain restaurant. 
Figure 10 shows the probabilities of independent or chain restaurants in the Fraser 
Health Authority being assigned to each of the four restaurant categorization groups, 
where the probabilities were predicted from the multinomial regression model and 
expressed in percentage form. Independent restaurants were only slightly more likely to 
be categorized in the temporarily closed group than chain restaurants. An independent 
restaurant had a 25.3% probability of being categorized in the temporarily closed group, 
whereas a chain restaurant had a 24.5% probability of being in the temporarily closed 
group. Independent restaurants were much more likely to be categorized in the high-risk 
group than chain restaurants: the chance of an independent restaurant being categorized 
as high risk was 28.3%, compared to only 19.4% for a chain restaurant. 
  
 
 
148 
 
Figure 10. Probabilities of an independent or chain restaurant being categorized in the closed, 
high, moderate, or low-risk groups.  
 
Research Question 6 
Serving greater numbers of menu items may amplify the potential for food 
handling violations, whereas serving smaller numbers of items may diminish that 
potential. With this question, I set out to investigate the connection, if any, between the 
number of menu items and the probability that a restaurant would be temporarily closed 
or categorized as high risk. The number of menu items was a statistically significant yet 
relatively weak predictor of membership in these two categories for restaurants in the 
Fraser Health Authority (p < 0.001; R2 = 2.473%). Full results produced by the 
multinomial logistic regression are reported in Table K. Only those results relevant for 
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addressing RQ6 are discussed here. 
The number of menu items had a significant positive effect on the log-odds of a 
restaurant in the Fraser Health Authority being temporarily closed versus being 
categorized as low risk (p < 0.001). Thus, greater numbers of menu items increase the 
likelihood that a restaurant in this authority will be temporarily closed as opposed to 
categorized as low risk. For each additional menu item, the odds of a restaurant in the 
Fraser Health Authority being in the temporarily closed group, rather than the low-risk 
categorized group, increased by 1.5%.  
The number of menu items also had a significant positive effect on the log-odds 
of a restaurant in the Fraser Health Authority being high-risk categorized versus low-risk 
categorized (p <0.01), but this effect was weaker than that reported for temporarily closed 
restaurants. The odds of a restaurant in the Fraser Health Authority being in the high-risk 
rather than the low-risk group increased by 0.9% for each additional menu item.  
The 376 Fraser Health Authority restaurants included in the multinomial logistic 
regression model formed two groups: one group for which the typical number of menu 
items was smaller (i.e., 50), and another group for which the typical number of menu 
items was larger (i.e., 175). These results are shown in the top panel of Figure 11. Based 
on the multinomial logistic regression model, the probability of a Fraser Health Authority 
restaurant with 50 menu items being closed was predicted to be 20.6%, whereas the 
probability of a Fraser Health Authority restaurant with 175 items being closed was 
predicted to be nearly twice as high, namely 38.7%. In contrast, the probability of a 
Fraser Health Authority restaurant with 50 menu items being high-risk categorized was 
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predicted to be 25.7%, and the probability of a Fraser Health Authority restaurant with 
175 menu items being high-risk categorized was predicted to be slightly lower, namely 
23.1%. These predicted probabilities are displayed in visual form in the bottom panel of 
Figure 11, and convey the fact that increasing the number of menu items from 50 to 175 
was associated with a substantial increase in the probability of a restaurant in the Fraser 
Health Authority being in the closed group, but associated with a minor decrease in the 
probability of a restaurant in that same authority being in the high-risk categorized group.  
The findings reported above illustrate that the account provided by the estimated 
odds is different from the description provided by the predicted probabilities. The odds 
ratios reflect a comparison of odds rather than probabilities. In that capacity, the odds 
ratio can indicate a positive effect of the number of menu items on the odds of a 
restaurant being in the high-risk categorized group (versus the low-risk categorized 
group), even in the presence of decreasing probabilities of a restaurant being in the high-
risk categorized group in correspondence with an increased number of menu items. This 
illustrates a unique situation that can occur with multinomial logistic regression, in that 
despite increasing odds, probabilities can decrease. 
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Figure 11. Density plot of the number of menu items (top panel), along with predicted 
probabilities of restaurants being categorized into each of the four outcome groups. 
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Summary 
There was no evidence in the data that, for the typical restaurant in either health 
authority, the log average number of overall food handling violations after closure was 
significantly lower than the log average number of overall food handling violations 
before closure. Furthermore, after considering one violation at a time, I found no 
evidence in the data that the log average number of handwashing, sanitizing, 
refrigeration, and contamination violations per inspection after closure was significantly 
lower than the log average number of violations per inspection before closure. Tukey’s 
multiple comparisons revealed statistically significant differences between all possible 
pairs of restaurant groups with respect to the (true) log average number of food handling 
violations, after controlling for the year effect. My findings showed that type of cuisine 
served predicted restaurants being closed or categorized as high risk better than type of 
ownership and number of menu items. Restaurants serving East Asian and Japanese 
foods were more than twice as likely to be closed, whereas restaurants serving South 
Asian foods were nearly twice as likely to be high-risk categorized compared to 
restaurants serving North American/other foods. The probabilities of independent 
restaurants and chain restaurants being high-risk categorized varied considerably; 
however, independent restaurants were only slightly more likely to be closed than chain 
restaurants. Last, greater numbers of menu items modestly increased the likelihood of 
temporary closure, and, to an even lesser extent, the likelihood of high-risk 
categorization.  
The overall findings related to RQ1 and RQ2 highlight that EHOs should not 
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assume there will be any improvements in food handling practices following temporary 
restaurant closures in a typical restaurant. Additional interventions are needed at this time 
in restaurants closed to due to insanitary conditions and improper food handling 
practices, to change food handler behaviors. RQ3 findings affirm the average number of 
food handling violations differs in an expected manner between restaurants categorized 
as high, moderate, and low risk; this also supports the logic behind risk-based inspection 
programs. The findings related to RQ4 through RQ6 illustrate that restaurant 
characteristics and inspection findings should be used to prioritize restaurants for targeted 
food safety communications. In Chapter 5, I discuss my findings in relation to the 
theoretical frameworks and the findings of other researchers. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
When EHOs issue closure orders, restaurant employees typically work swiftly to 
address all violations so that they may reopen as soon as possible to minimize the 
economic effect. In this study, I used data from two British Columbia health authorities to 
examine whether restaurant employees continued to focus on food safety once closure 
orders were rescinded. Specifically, one purpose of this study was to determine whether 
temporary restaurant closures were associated with reductions in food handling violations 
postclosure in the groups under study. I found no reduction in the average overall number 
of food handling violations per inspection following temporary restaurant closures. In 
fact, after closure, a typical restaurant had an 16% increase in the average overall number 
of food handling violations compared with the number of violations before closure. This 
finding was true for a typical restaurant irrespective of where that restaurant was located 
(in the Fraser Health Authority or Vancouver Coastal Health Authority). Specifically, the 
average numbers of handwashing, sanitizing, and contamination violations after closure 
were 29%, 15%, and 10% higher, respectively, than before closure for the typical 
restaurant across the two health authorities. However, the typical restaurant in both health 
authorities had an average number of refrigeration violations per inspection after 
temporary closure that was 19% lower than before temporary closure. My overall 
findings show that temporary restaurant closures, for reasons such as improper food 
handling practices and insanitary conditions, do not appear to increase food handlers’ 
intentions to perform safe food handling practices, and therefore additional interventions 
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are needed to protect the public’s health. As the B.C. Food Premises Regulation only 
requires one person working in a restaurant to have taken a food safety training course, it 
is commonplace for food handlers to have limited knowledge of safe food handling 
practices. One possible intervention would be for EHOs to deliver targeted e-learning 
food safety resources to restaurant mangers following temporary restaurant closures. In 
addition to this, EHOs might have all employees who can find a food safety training 
course in a suitable language take a course.  
The second purpose of this study was to determine whether three restaurant 
characteristics—type of cuisine served, type of ownership, and number of menu items—
were a factor in restaurants being temporarily closed or high-risk categorized, for 
restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority. My findings showed that type of cuisine 
served (i.e., North American/other, East Asian, Japanese, or South Asian) was a 
statistically significant predictor of restaurant group categorization (p < 0.001) for the 
group studied. Through multinomial logistic regression modeling, I established that type 
of ownership (i.e., independent versus chain) was a statistically significant predictor of 
restaurant group membership (p 0.009). Finally, the number of menu items was a 
statistically significant predictor of restaurant group membership (p < 0.001). Based on 
my results, I would argue that inspection findings and restaurant characteristics should be 
used to prioritize restaurants for targeted food safety communications. Specifically, 
EHOs could provide restaurant employees with e-learning food safety resources at 
teachable moments, such as after a closure order has been issued or in the event of 
recurrent food handling violations. Improving restaurant employees’ knowledge of safe 
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food handling practices and teaching them how to implement these procedures in their 
workplaces may challenge complacency and increase employees’ perceived behavioral 
control. It is important to address factors such as perceived behavioral control and 
subjective norms, as researchers have shown that these are factors that drive food 
handlers’ intentions and actions. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
Multiple factors and not just food safety knowledge affect whether food handlers 
perform safe food handling practices. Therefore, there is a need for food safety 
interventions that do more than provide knowledge. Other factors such as inadequate 
equipment need to be addressed. I discuss my study findings in this section and link these 
findings to other research studies to draw conclusions. Studies discussed examined the 
same types of factors and were conducted in Canada and the United States.  
Although temporary restaurant closures may create, in some employees, feelings 
that they should improve their food handling practices, barriers in the work environment 
may prove insurmountable. Green and Selman (2005) found that time pressures and 
problems in the structural environment influenced safe food preparation practices, and 
Clayton et al. (2015) observed that manager indifference toward proper food safety 
practices affected behaviors. Moreover, when food handlers do not have their food safety 
certification (Lee et al., 2013) and do not receive food safety training in their workplaces 
(Neal et al., 2012), they are less likely to develop intentions to perform food safety 
practices. Barriers to the performance of safe food handling procedures, such as 
inadequate food handler knowledge and equipment, are likely responsible for the 
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continuation of unsafe food handling practices following temporary restaurant closures. 
Any intentions to improve food handling practices created as a result of temporary 
restaurant closures may be quickly eroded in the face of poorly designed kitchen 
facilities, inadequate equipment, and insufficient standard operating procedures. Further, 
manager and coworker indifference to food safety may negatively influence any 
intentions food handlers have to incorporate food safety practices into their work.  
Restaurant characteristics may influence the food safety culture in food service 
establishments. In the Fraser Health Authority, my findings showed that restaurants 
serving Japanese cuisine were associated with the highest predicted probability of being 
closed (36.4%), followed by restaurants serving East Asian cuisines (35.2%), and South 
Asian cuisine (30.2%). Restaurants serving North American/other cuisine had the lowest 
predicted probability of being closed, at 16.9%. My study’s results confirm other findings 
that the type of cuisine served in restaurants does influence inspection outcomes (Harris 
et al., 2015; Kwon, Roberts, Shanklin, Liu, & Yen, 2010; Liu & Lee, 2016; Menachemi 
et al., 2012; Nadler, 2016). For example, New York City restaurants serving Chinese 
(Adjusted OR 0.52) and Latin foods (Adjusted OR 0.52) were least likely to receive an A 
Grade (Nadler, 2016). In Louisiana, researchers studying 769 restaurants determined that 
ethnic restaurants were 1.74 times more likely than nonethnic restaurants to have critical 
violations (Liu & Lee, 2016). Liu and Lee (2016) found the mean number of total 
time/temperature violations for surveyed ethnic restaurants was 0.43 ± 0.84, whereas for 
nonethnic restaurants the mean number of total time/temperature violations was 0.20 ± 
0.66 (p < 0.001). In addition, Liu and Lee found the mean number of total cross 
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contamination violations for ethnic restaurants was 0.34 ± 0.82, whereas for nonethnic 
restaurants the mean number of total cross contamination violations was 0.12 ± 0.50 (p < 
0.001). Similarly, in Kansas, ethnic restaurants had more critical violations, 4.52 ± 2.97, 
than nonethnic restaurants, which had 2.90 ± 2.83 (p < 0.001). Restaurant inspection 
scores, whether they are expressed as categories or number or letter grades, reflect 
numbers of violations and their seriousness. My study’s findings may reflect that some 
types of cuisine involve foods that are more challenging to prepare safely, or that 
restaurant inspections are having less of an effect on restaurants that serve certain 
cuisines. 
For this study, I obtained data about the type of cuisine served in restaurants from 
restaurant menus and websites, as British Columbian health authorities do not collect this 
information. If EHOs did collect data about the type of cuisine served in the restaurants 
they inspect, a number of reports could be generated; for example, such data would show 
the numbers of restaurants serving particular types of cuisine and the most common 
violations in restaurants serving specific types of cuisine (e.g., Japanese). Restaurants 
might then be prioritized by type of cuisine served and inspection findings for targeted 
food safety communications.  
My findings also showed that, compared to chain restaurants, independent 
restaurants in the Fraser Health Authority were more likely to be temporarily closed (p 
0.040) and high-risk categorized (p 0.002), rather than low-risk categorized. Chain 
restaurants tend to have fewer critical violations than independent restaurants. Previously, 
researchers in Florida found significant differences in critical violations between chain 
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restaurants (from the Restaurants and Institutions [R&I] magazine’s 2008 Top 400 
Restaurants Chains list) (Mean 11.00) and independent restaurants (Mean 12.82, p < 
0.05), with independent restaurants faring worse than chain restaurants (Murphy et al., 
2011). In Louisiana, Liu and Lee (2016) recently found that independent restaurants were 
1.64 times more likely than chain restaurants to have critical violations. The mean 
number of time/temperature violations for independent restaurants was 0.36 ± 0.83, 
whereas the mean number of time temperature violations for chain restaurants was 0.11 ± 
0.44 (p < 0.001) (Liu & Lee, 2016). Furthermore, the mean number of cross 
contamination violations was 0.24 ± 0.68 for independent restaurants, but for chain 
restaurants it was 0.09 ± 0.46, p < 0.001 (Liu & Lee, 2016). The present study confirmed 
the findings of Murphy et al. (2011) and Liu and Lee (2016). For example, I found the 
predicted probability of independent restaurants being high-risk categorized to be 28.3%, 
but the predicted probability of chain restaurants being high-risk categorized was only 
19.4%. One implication of having multiple units in chains of restaurants is that food 
handlers are often expected to follow standardized operating procedures. In addition, 
chain restaurants tend to have superior kitchen designs and specialized equipment. These 
factors may particularly contribute to fewer critical violations being found in restaurant 
chains. 
I found that adding the category of number of menu items to my model clearly 
showed significant effects when this factor was taken into account. For each additional 
menu item, the odds of a restaurant in the Fraser Health Authority being in the 
temporarily closed group, rather than the low-risk categorized group, increased by 1.5%. 
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The odds of a restaurant in the Fraser Health Authority being in the high-risk rather than 
the low-risk group increased by 0.9% for each additional menu item. In a related study 
conducted in Iowa, Cates et al. (2009) found that full service restaurants were more likely 
to have cooling (OR 3.39), cold holding (OR 1.85), hot holding (OR 1.42), and reheating 
(OR 1.83) critical violations than fast food restaurants. This may be because full service 
restaurants generally have more menu items than fast food restaurants. In this study, I 
found that restaurants with more menu items were more likely to be temporarily closed 
and high-risk categorized rather than low-risk categorized, meaning that those food 
service establishments had more violations. In restaurants with greater numbers of menu 
items, more food preparation has to occur simultaneously, and kitchens are rarely 
adequately designed in ways that support the safe preparation of large quantities of 
different types of foods. These types of factors outside of food handlers’ control must 
also be addressed to ensure that restaurants can limit their numbers of violations. This 
will positively affect public safety. 
Interpretation of the Findings in the Context of the Theoretical Frameworks 
It is perhaps not unexpected that my findings showed temporary restaurant 
closures were not associated with improvements in food handling behaviors, as this 
enforcement measure is not likely to increase food handlers’ perceived behavioral control 
or action self-efficacy. Increasing action self-efficacy and perceived behavioral control is 
believed to be important in translating knowledge into behaviors (Rimal, 2000). 
According to the theory of planned behavior, increasing food handlers’ perceived 
behavioral control leads to improvements in their intentions to perform safe food 
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handling practices. Similarly, the health action process approach proposes that action 
self-efficacy, or individuals’ beliefs about their capabilities to initiate and maintain 
behaviors, shapes food handlers’ intentions. By consulting behavioral change theories, 
decision makers can gain insight into possible interventions that could be used in 
combination with temporary restaurant closures, so that the public’s health can be better 
protected. 
Food handler intentions to perform safe food handling practices are influenced by 
a restaurant’s food safety culture and climate. Lee et al. (2013) observed that employees’ 
perceptions of their restaurant’s food safety climate (the climate referring to how people 
feel about food safety) significantly influenced their intentions to follow food safety 
practices in their workplace. In restaurants where kitchen facilities are not well designed, 
this may decrease food handlers’ behavioral control and self-efficacy beliefs around their 
abilities to perform safe food handling practices; for example, if there is not an adequate 
number of sinks, food handlers may believe it is not always possible to thaw foods under 
cool running water. Similarly, in independent restaurants without well-established 
standardized operating procedures, food handlers’ feelings of perceived social pressure 
(subjective norm) to perform safe food handling practices, i.e., pressure from managers as 
well as other employees, may be decreased, leading to a decreased focus on food safety. 
As I have shown, food handlers’ intentions are influenced by restaurant food safety 
culture and climate and can be understood through the theoretical constructs perceived 
behavioral control, action self-efficacy, and subjective norm. 
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Limitations of the Study 
The use of secondary data in this study, and particularly, the use of inspection 
reports, brings potential limitations. I did not interview EHOs to determine approximately 
how much time they had spent conducting each inspection. It is logical to assume that 
EHOs who spend less time conducting their inspections will find fewer violations. In 
addition, the inspection process itself is not without shortcomings. Inspection reports only 
provide a snapshot of conditions at the time of inspection, which may or may not provide 
a true representation of broader conditions. Finally, less observable aspects of restaurant 
operations are rarely mentioned in inspection reports, for example, employees’ attitudes 
about food safety or employees’ mindfulness of food safety issues. 
The findings of this study depended on the population of restaurants sampled. 
Data from two British Columbian health authorities were used to answer RQ1 and RQ2. 
Subsequently, data from one British Columbian health authority were analyzed in RQ3 
through RQ6. Due to my focus on temporary restaurant closures for RQ1 and RQ2, I was 
limited to studying British Columbian health authorities that make their restaurant 
closures data publicly available. Because data were not included from the First Nations 
Health Authority, Interior Health Authority, Northern Health Authority, and Vancouver 
Island Health Authority, it is not possible to generalize the results to all restaurants in 
British Columbia or beyond. Further studies are needed in other British Columbian health 
authorities and throughout all Canadian provinces to provide a better understanding of the 
reliability of these findings. For example, without analyzing data from other regions, it 
remains to be established whether temporary restaurant closures for reasons such as 
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unsanitary conditions and improper food handling practices are associated with 
reductions in numbers of other types of food handling violations elsewhere. 
Last, data were primarily collected from one or two inspection reports before and 
after the related temporary restaurant closures. EHO observations made during one or 
two inspections before and after temporary restaurant closures may present a potentially 
incomplete picture of the effect of temporary restaurant closures on restaurant 
employees’ food handling practices. These limitations notwithstanding, my study 
provides evidence that temporary restaurant closures do not automatically lead to 
improvements in food handling practices postclosure in a typical restaurant, and this 
necessitates new strategies to protect the public’s health. 
Future Research 
Only a few studies have been conducted in Canada that examine food handling in 
restaurants. To better understand why temporary restaurant closures were not associated 
with improvements in food handling practices in the groups studied in this research, 
qualitative studies are needed to identify underlying barriers in individual restaurants. For 
example, a survey of restaurant managers might highlight which barriers lead to the 
continuation of unsafe food handling practices postclosure. In addition, interviews with 
EHOs working in British Columbia could hone in on whether health authority guidance 
documents are or are not sufficient to ensure coherent practices. In Finland, Läikkö-Roto, 
Lundén, Heikkilä, and Nevas (2016) identified that 32.7% of inspectors felt guidance 
documents were insufficient to ensure coherent practices in health authority units. These 
same interviews could also assess whether enforcement measures (e.g., administrative 
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penalties, orders) are being used progressively and consistently within and between 
health authorities.  
Although EHOs are quite familiar with the restaurants in their districts with the 
lowest levels of compliance with food safety regulations, research has not been 
conducted on underlying commonalities between such restaurants at the health authority 
or provincial level. Expanding the collection of data about restaurant characteristics, in 
particular, is of great importance for assessing needs and supporting future research. 
Researchers also need to look into how inspection results and restaurant characteristics 
can be used to identify restaurants most in need of food safety interventions, and into how 
targeted e-learning resources can be delivered to restaurant employees. For example, 
information about how to cool foods safely and tools available for cooling foods rapidly 
could be provided, if recurrent cooling violations were observed. 
Future researchers should also focus on studying the influence of restaurant 
characteristics on inspection results and use classification terms more consistently. 
Canziani et al. (2016) noted that restaurant characteristic classification terms are weakly 
defined, making studies difficult to compare. For example, the National Restaurant 
Association categorizes restaurants into five major categories: quick service restaurants, 
fast casual, midscale, moderate, and fine dining (Canziani et al., 2016). The United States 
Census Bureau has four categories: full-service restaurants, limited service eating places, 
special food services, and drinking places (Canziani et al., 2016). Analysts have also 
introduced new category definitions such as specialty eateries (Canziani et al., 2016). The 
absence of a standardized scheme for defining restaurants’ categories and characteristics 
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has resulted in new definitions being frequently developed and these definitions being 
used inconsistently in food safety and restaurant management research. With so many 
definitions in use, the meaning of terms has become unclear, which is detrimental to 
research about restaurants. To enable comparisons of findings from research conducted in 
restaurants in Canada and the United States, we need to ensure that we have the same 
typologies with which to classify restaurants. This is a research priority. 
Implications 
This study has implications for both EHOs and policy makers. I have created 
positive social change with this study in addressing EHOs’ misconceptions about 
temporary restaurant closures. The standard perception about temporary restaurant 
closures is that this enforcement measure will automatically lead to substantial changes in 
employee behaviors. Ultimately, this fallacy may be hampering the development of 
strategies that could more effectively influence restaurant employees’ food handling 
practices over the span of their careers. My findings suggest the numbers of restaurant- 
and employee-related factors contributing to low levels of compliance with food safety 
regulations are not fully appreciated. Finally, this study highlights that there are 
opportunities for using e-learning programs to better educate food handlers about food 
safety. One recommendation I have is for EHOs to deliver targeted e-learning food safety 
resources after closure orders are issued and at the time of recurrent critical violations.  
There is a strong argument to be made for requiring all food handlers to complete 
a food safety training course after restaurants have been closed due to improper food 
handling practices and/or unsanitary conditions. One exception might be if food handlers 
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cannot find the course in a suitable language. Food safety training improves knowledge 
of safe food handling procedures (DeBess et al., 2009; McIntyre et al., 2013), which in 
turn can result in better practices. In fact, Roberts and Barrett (2009) found that restaurant 
managers themselves believe that training increases the probability of employees serving 
safe food. In the absence of regulations that require more than one individual per 
restaurant to take a food safety training course, it is important for EHOs to provide 
restaurant employees with targeted e-learning food safety resources. Although such 
materials would not replace a food safety course, they would certainly improve the 
chances of employees making better decisions around food handling and food safety. In 
situations where only one restaurant employee has taken a food safety course, it is 
challenging for EHOs to impress upon staff the need for reform of unsafe food handling 
practices. Neither a temporary restaurant closure nor the fear of another restaurant closure 
appear to motivate food handlers to perform safe food handling practices.  
Although health authorities do not typically track numbers of menu items, my 
findings do indicate that tracking this information would be useful in terms of policy 
development. One suggestion would be that if food handling practices do not improve in 
restaurants following temporary restaurant closures, in addition to requiring that 
employees take a food safety training course, environmental health managers might 
require a reduction in problematic menu items. 
In many instances, EHOs may not know whether restaurants are independent or 
part of a small chain, as health authorities do not track this information. Although many 
independent restaurants are well run, others are not. According to my research findings, 
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high-risk categorized independent restaurants located in the Fraser Health Authority 
would benefit from targeted food safety communications. One goal in implementing 
targeted food safety communications would be to increase restaurant managers’ 
familiarity with food safety regulations. If critical violations were found to be more 
frequent in restaurants serving particular types of cuisine, broader educational initiatives 
could be taken at the health authority level, such as providing targeted e-learning food 
safety resources. Such educational food safety interventions would be aimed at reducing 
food handling violations associated with the preparation of specific food products.  
Conclusion 
In this research, I found no reduction in the average overall number of food 
handling violations per inspection following temporary restaurant closures. In fact, there 
was a 16% increase in the average overall numbers of food handling violations per 
inspection after temporary restaurant closure compared to before temporary restaurant 
closure. The implications for policy makers are that temporary restaurant closures may 
not influence food handler behaviors even over the short term. For restaurants closed due 
to unsanitary conditions and/or improper food handling practices, combinations of 
interventions are likely needed to change restaurant employee behaviors. Two 
interventions at the policy level might include having all food handlers who can find a 
food safety training course in a suitable language take a course, and environmental health 
managers requiring restaurants to stop preparing the foods that they have repeatedly been 
found to not prepare safely. Although these are two policies that might decrease the risks 
of potential foodborne hazards, other interventions are also needed to increase food 
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handlers’ intentions to perform safe food handling practices.  
I found that restaurants serving East Asian, Japanese, and South Asian foods had 
a greater predicted probability of being closed or high-risk categorized than restaurants 
serving North American/other foods. Meanwhile, the predicted probability of 
independent restaurants being high-risk categorized was 28.3% compared to 19.4% for 
chain restaurants. Last, the predicted probability of restaurants with 175 menu items 
being closed was 38.7%, while the predicted probability of a restaurant with 50 menu 
items being closed was 20.6%. My findings show that both restaurant characteristics and 
inspection findings should be used to prioritize restaurants for food safety 
communications. Above all, new teaching resources are needed that EHOs can use during 
inspections, particularly for food handlers whose first language is not English.  
Thus, in terms of future policy-making, EHOs need to become more involved in 
advancing the field of environmental public health through evaluating food safety 
intervention policies. EHOs should not assume temporary restaurant closures will affect 
food handler behaviors once closure orders are rescinded. Instead, EHOs should provide 
e-learning food safety resources and support restaurant action planning so that it will be 
easier for food handlers to carry out their intentions. An approach that focuses on 
proactive strategies to prevent foodborne illness is needed, rather than an approach that 
concentrates on determining the causes of outbreaks retroactively. 
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Appendix A: Map of Health Authority Boundaries, British Columbia 
 
Source: Government of British Columbia, BC Stats, retrieved from http://www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/ 
StatisticsBySubject/Geography/ReferenceMaps/Health.aspx. Copyright (c) Province of British Columbia. 
All rights reserved. Reproduced with permission of the Province of British Columbia. 
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Appendix B: Prewritten Food Safety Violation Comments 
Violation Categories  Frequently Used Environmental Health Officer Comments  
Contamination Food stored directly on floor 
Food not protected from contamination 
Food not stored off of floor  
Food stored in a manner that promotes cross contamination 
Food not properly covered and protected from 
contamination 
Food in contact with non-corrosion resistant or toxic 
materials 
Handwashing Adequate handwashing stations not available for 
employees  
Employee does not wash hands properly or at adequate 
frequency 
Handwashing stations not properly supplied and 
maintained  
Handwashing station obstructed or being used for other 
purposes  
Employees are not washing hands as often as necessary to 
prevent contamination of foods  
Food Safety Management Refrigeration units and hot holding equipment lack 
adequate thermometers 
A food safety plan is not developed  
Temperature records are not being used to monitor critical 
limits  
An accurate thermometer is not provided for temperature 
monitoring 
Sanitizing Equipment/utensils/food contact surfaces not properly 
washed and sanitized  
Equipment/utensils/food contact surfaces not maintained in 
sanitary condition 
Sanitizing solution is not present or is at insufficient 
concentration  
Mechanical dishwasher does not provide sufficient 
washing and/or sanitizing action to remove contamination  
Wiping cloths are not clean, restricted in use, and/or stored 
in a approved sanitizing solution  
 (table continues) 
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Violation Categories  Frequently Used Environmental Health Officer Comments  
Refrigeration Cold potentially hazardous food stored/displayed above 
4°C (40°F) 
Potentially hazardous food not stored, displayed, or 
transported at a temperature of 4°C (40°F) or colder  
Training In operator’s absence no staff on duty has FOODSAFE© 
level 1 or equivalent 
No employee present holds a valid FOODSAFE© or 
equivalent certificate when the operator is absent 
Cooling Food not cooled in an acceptable manner 
Potentially hazardous food not cooled using appropriate 
equipment and or approved methods  
Potentially hazardous food not cooled from 60°C (140°F) 
to 21°C (70°F) within 2 hours and then from 21°C (70°F) 
to 4°C (40°F) within 4 hours  
Hot Holding Hot potentially hazardous food stored displayed below 
60°C (140°F) 
Potentially hazardous food not stored or displayed at 60°C 
(140°F) or above  
Thawing Food not thawed in an acceptable manner 
Potentially hazardous food not thawed using appropriate 
equipment and/or approved methods 
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Appendix C: Overall Food Handling Violations 
 
Figure C1. Average number of overall food handling violations per inspection before and after 
temporary restaurant closures, Vancouver Coastal Health Authority. 
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Figure C2. Average number of overall food handling violations per inspection before and after 
temporary restaurant closures, Fraser Health Authority. 
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Table C1 
Summary Outputs for the Overall Food Handling Violations Data 
 Model 
Item glmer.1 glmer.2 glmer.3 
Fixed Effects Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value 
 Intercept 0.727 0.075 9.659 <0.001 0.887 0.108 8.224 <0.001 0.944 0.119 7.935 <0.001 
 Occasion 0.158 0.077 2.042 <0.05 0.147 0.078 1.893 0.0583 0.051 0.118 0.434 0.6646 
 Health Authority - - - - -0.242 0.123 -1.966 <0.05 -0.334 0.149 -2.234 <0.05 
 Occasion × Health Authority - - - - - - - - 0.167 0.156 1.070 0.2844 
Random Effect  Variance Standard Deviation Variance Standard Deviation Variance Standard Deviation 
 Restaurant 0.206 0.453 0.188 0.433 0.186 0.432 
Model Fit Information    
 Number of Observations  192 192 192 
 Number of Restaurants 96 96 96 
 AIC 837.246 835.544 836.425 
 Marginal R-Squared 0.013 0.039 0.046 
 Conditional R-Squared 0.430 0.424 0.427 
 
Notes. 1. Occasion was treated as a factor with two levels: before temporary closure (treated as a reference level) and after temporary closure. 
2. Health Authority was treated as a factor with two levels: Vancouver Coastal Health (treated as a reference level) and Fraser Health Authority. 
3. Occasion × Health Authority denotes the interaction between Occasion and Health Authority. 
4. Estimated fixed effects of Occasion, Health Authority, and their interaction are expressed on the log scale, but become more easily interpretable 
after exponentiation. 
 
 
197 
197 
 
 
Figure C3. Glmer.2 model diagnostics for overall food handling violations. 
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Figure C4. Glmer.2 Caterpillar plot for overall food handling violations. 
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Appendix D: Handwashing Violations 
 
Figure D1. Average number of handwashing violations per inspection before and after temporary 
restaurant closures, Vancouver Coastal Health Authority. 
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Figure D2. Average number of handwashing violations per inspection before and after temporary 
restaurant closures, Fraser Health Authority. 
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Table D1 
Summary Outputs for the Handwashing Violations Data 
 Model for Handwashing Violations 
Item glmer.1 glmer.2 glmer.3 
Fixed Effects Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value 
 Intercept -1.265 0.181 -6.981 <0.001 -1.331 0.250 -5.329 <0.001 -1.111 0.283 -3.933 <0.001 
 Occasion 0.254 0.198 1.282 0.2 0.261 0.199 1.315 0.188 -0.106 0.331 -0.319 0.750 
 Health Authority - - - - 0.100 0.252 0.396 0.692 -0.220 0.337 -0.654 0.513 
 Occasion × Health Authority - - - - - - - - 0.562 0.413 1.362 0.173 
Random Effect  Variance Standard Deviation Variance Standard Deviation Variance Standard Deviation 
 Restaurant 0.405 0.636 0.402 0.634 0.393 0.627 
Model Fit Information    
 Number of Observations  192 192 192 
 Number of Restaurants 96 96 96 
 AIC 384.772 386.614 386.777 
 Marginal R-Squared 0.010 0.012 N/A 
 Conditional R-Squared 0.270 0.270 N/A 
 
Notes. 1. Occasion was treated as a factor with two levels: before temporary closure (treated as a reference level) and after temporary closure. 
2. Health Authority was treated as a factor with two levels: Vancouver Coastal Health (treated as a reference level) and Fraser Health Authority. 
3. Occasion × Health Authority denotes the interaction between Occasion and Health Authority. 
4. Estimated fixed effects of Occasion, Health Authority, and their interaction are expressed on the log scale, but become more easily interpretable 
after exponentiation. 
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Figure D3. Glmer.1 model diagnostics for handwashing violations. 
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Figure D4. Glmer.1 Caterpillar plot for handwashing violations. 
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Appendix E: Sanitizing Violations 
 
Figure E1. Average number of sanitizing violations per inspection before and after temporary 
restaurant closures, Vancouver Coastal Health Authority. 
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Figure E2. Average number of sanitizing violations per inspection before and after temporary 
restaurant closures, Fraser Health Authority. 
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Table E1 
Summary Outputs for the Sanitizing Violations Data 
 Model for Sanitizing Violations 
Item glmer.1 glmer.2 glmer.3 
Fixed Effects Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value 
 Intercept -0.585 0.113 -5.166 <0.001 -0.523 0.156 -3.346 <0.001 -0.542 0.200 -2.712 <0.01 
 Occasion 0.142 0.156 0.915 0.36 0.130 0.157 0.830 0.406 0.162 0.254 0.637 0.524 
 Health Authority - - - - -0.091 0.160 -0.566 0.571 -0.062 0.243 -0.256 0.798 
 Occasion × Health Authority - - - - - - - - -0.051 0.323 -0.157 0.875 
Random Effect  Variance Standard Deviation Variance Standard Deviation Variance Standard Deviation 
 Restaurant 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Model Fit Information    
 Number of Observations  192 192 192 
 Number of Restaurants 96 96 96 
 AIC 459.079 460.760 462.736 
 Marginal R-Squared N/A   
 Conditional R-Squared N/A   
 
Notes. 1. Occasion was treated as a factor with two levels: before temporary closure (treated as a reference level) and after temporary closure. 
2. Health Authority was treated as a factor with two levels: Vancouver Coastal Health (treated as a reference level) and Fraser Health Authority. 
3. Occasion × Health Authority denotes the interaction between Occasion and Health Authority. 
4. The marginal and conditional R-squared values could not be computed in light of the fact that the estimated variances of the random restaurant 
effects were equal to 0 in all three models. 
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Table E2 
Results for the glm.1 Model 
 Model for Sanitizing Violations 
Item glm.1 
Fixed Effects Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value 
 Intercept -0.585 0.113 -5.166 <0.0001 
 Occasion 0.142 0.156 0.915 0.36 
Model Fit Information  
 Number of Observations 192 
 AIC 457.08 
 R-Squared (McFadden) 0.038 
 
Notes. 1. Occasion was treated as a factor with two levels: before temporary closure (treated as a reference 
level) and after temporary closure. 
2. The estimated effect of Occasion is expressed on the log scale, but can be re-expressed via 
exponentiation on the natural scale: exp(0.142) = 1.15. 
3. The effect of Occasion on the natural scale can be converted to a percent increase in the average 
number of sanitizing violations after temporary closure compared to before closure using the 
following calculation: (1.15-1) x100% = 15% increase. 
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Figure E3. Glm.1 model diagnostics for sanitizing violations. 
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Appendix F: Contamination Violations 
 
Figure F1. Average number of contamination violations per inspection before and after 
temporary restaurant closures, Vancouver Coastal Health Authority. 
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Figure F2. Average number of contamination violations per inspection before and after 
temporary restaurant closures, Fraser Health Authority. 
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Table F1 
Summary Outputs for the Contamination Violations Data 
 Model for Contamination Violations 
Item glmer.1 glmer.2 glmer.3 
Fixed Effects Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value 
 Intercept -0.771 0.143 -5.398 <0.001 -0.706 0.205 -3.441 <0.001 -0.752 0.239 -3.150 0.002 
 Occasion 0.096 0.159 0.602 0.547 0.089 0.160 0.557 0.578 0.166 0.252 0.656 0.512 
 Health Authority - - - - -0.094 0.215 -0.438 0.662 0.024 0.280 -0.085 0.932 
 Occasion × Health Authority - - - - - - - - -0.129 0.327 -0.394 0.694 
Random Effect  Variance Standard Deviation Variance Standard Deviation Variance Standard Deviation 
 Restaurant 0.358 0.599 0.349 0.591 0.349 0.591 
Model Fit Information    
 Number of Observations 192 192 192 
 Number of Restaurants 96 96 96 
 AIC 457.495 459.306 461.150 
 Marginal R-Squared 0.002 0.003 0.004 
 Conditional R-Squared 0.281 0.276 0.277 
 
Notes. 1. Occasion was treated as a factor with two levels: before temporary closure (treated as a reference level) and after temporary closure. 
2. Health Authority was treated as a factor with two levels: Vancouver Coastal Health (treated as a reference level) and Fraser Health Authority. 
3. Occasion × Health Authority denotes the interaction between Occasion and Health Authority. 
4. Estimated fixed effects of Occasion, Health Authority and their interaction are expressed on the log scale, but become more easily interpretable 
after exponentiation. 
5. The estimated effect of occasion after controlling for the random restaurant effect is expressed on the log scale but can be re-expressed on the 
natural scale via exponentiation exp(0.096)=1.10. The effect can be further converted to a 10 percent increase in the average number of violations 
after temporary restaurant closure compared to before closure via the following calculation (1.10-1)x100=10%. 
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Figure F3. Glmer.1 model diagnostics for contamination violations. 
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Figure F4. Glmer.1 Caterpillar plot for contamination violations. 
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Appendix G: Refrigeration Violations 
 
Figure G1. Average number of refrigeration violations per inspection before and after temporary 
restaurant closures, Vancouver Coastal Health Authority. 
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Figure G2. Average number of refrigeration violations per inspection before and after temporary 
restaurant closures, Fraser Health Authority. 
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Table G1 
Summary Outputs for the Refrigeration Violations Data 
 Model for Refrigeration Violations 
Item glmer.1 glmer.2 glmer.3 
Fixed Effects Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value Estimate Std. Error z-value P-value 
 Intercept -1.030 0.141 -7.281 <0.001 -0.730 0.188 -3.890 <0.001 -0.626 0.209 -3.00 <0.01 
 Occasion -0.153 0.209 -0.730 0.466 -0.216 0.211 -1.024 0.306 -0.424 0.302 -1.405 0.160 
 Health Authority - - - - -0.468 0.211 -2.218 0.027 -0.653 0.284 -2.302 0.021 
 Occasion × Health Authority - - - - - - - - 0.404 0.419 0.963 0.336 
Random Effect  Variance Standard Deviation Variance Standard Deviation Variance Standard Deviation 
 Restaurant 1.238e-15 3.519e-08 6.841e-15 8.271e-08 0 0 
Model Fit Information    
 Number of Observations  192 192 192 
 Number of Restaurants 96 96 96 
 AIC 334.260 331.412 332.488 
 Marginal R-Squared 0.005 0.053 N/A 
 Conditional R-Squared 0.005 0.053 N/A 
 
Notes. 1. Occasion was treated as a factor with two levels: before temporary closure (treated as a reference level) and after temporary closure. 
2. Health Authority was treated as a factor with two levels: Vancouver Coastal Health (treated as a reference level) and Fraser Health Authority. 
3. Occasion × Health Authority denotes the interaction between Occasion and Health Authority. 
4. Estimated fixed effects of Occasion, Health Authority and their interaction are expressed on the log scale but become more easily interpretable 
after exponentiation. 
5. The estimated effect of Occasion controlling for health authority and random restaurant effect is expressed on the log-scale but can be re-
expressed on the natural scale via exponentiation: exp(-0.216) = 0.81. The effect can be further converted to a 19% percent decrease in the average 
number of violations after temporary closure compared to before closure via the following calculation: (0.81-1)x100% = -19%. 
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Figure G3. Glmer.2 model diagnostics for refrigeration violations. 
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Figure G4. Glmer.2 Caterpillar plot for refrigeration violations. 
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Appendix H: Differences in Average Food Handling Violations for Restaurant Groups  
 
Figure H1. Frequency distributions depicting the number of food handling violations documented 
in the closed, high, moderate, and low-risk groups. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Closed Group 
 2015
N
um
be
r o
f R
es
ta
ur
an
ts
Number of Food Handling Violations
1
5
6
10
7
4
1
2
1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 12
0
5
10
15
Closed Group 
 2016
N
um
be
r o
f R
es
ta
ur
an
ts
Number of Food Handling Violations
1
3
2
13
7
11
10
3 3
2
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
High Risk Group 
 2015
N
um
be
r o
f R
es
ta
ur
an
ts
Number of Food Handling Violations
1
5
8
12
7
4
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0
5
10
15
20
High Risk Group 
 2016
N
um
be
r o
f R
es
ta
ur
an
ts
Number of Food Handling Violations
1
10
13
17
6 6
3
0 1 2 3 4
0
5
10
15
20
Moderate Risk Group 
 2015
N
um
be
r o
f R
es
ta
ur
an
ts
Number of Food Handling Violations
3
5
19
8
3
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
10
15
20
Moderate Risk Group 
 2016
N
um
be
r o
f R
es
ta
ur
an
ts
Number of Food Handling Violations
1
20
16
12
5
2
0 1 2
0
5
10
15
20
Low Risk Group 
 2015
N
um
be
r o
f R
es
ta
ur
an
ts
Number of Food Handling Violations
21
16
1
0 1 2
0
10
20
30
40
Low Risk Group 
 2016
N
um
be
r o
f R
es
ta
ur
an
ts
Number of Food Handling Violations
37
16
3
 
 
220 
Table H1 
Summary Outputs for RQ3 Expressed on the Natural Scale 
Model Term GLM1 GLM2 GLM3 
 Exp(B) 95% CI Exp(B) 95% CI Exp(B) 95% CI 
Intercept 0.426 0.307-0.571 0.375 0.268 - 0.510 0.474 0.287 - 0.727 
Risk Group       
 Closed 9.950 7.287-13.985 9.950 7.287 - 13.985 7.444 4.681 - 12.597 
 High 8.175 5.965-11.523 8.175 5.965 - 11.523 6.222 3.886 - 10.579 
 Moderate 4.925 3.548-7.014 4.925 3.548 - 7.014 4.389 2.696 - 7.552 
 Low  Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Year       
 2016 - - 1.225 1.07 - 1.40 0.829 0.445 - 1.564 
 2015  Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Risk Group x Year       
 Closed x Year 2016 - - - - 1.612 0.828 - 3.104 
 High x Year 2016 - - - - 1.571 0.801 - 3.046 
 Moderate x Year 2016 - - - - 1.222 0.611 - 2.422 
Model Fit Information    
Residual Deviance 320.77 311.55 307.43 
Residual Degrees of Freedom 372 371 368 
AIC 1217.220 1209.997 1211.879 
Pseudo R-Squared (McFadden) 0.2390 0.2448 0.2474 
 
Notes. 1. B is used to denote estimated model coefficients for the Poisson regression models on the log scale. 
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Figure H2. Rootograms for GLM1, GLM2 and GLM3. 
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Figure H3. Model diagnostics for glm.2. 
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Appendix I: Results of the Multinomial Regression Analysis Relating Restaurant Group to Cuisine Type 
 Closed vs. Low Risk High vs. Low Risk Moderate vs. Low-Risk 
 Log-Odds Scale Odds Ratio Scale Log-Odds Scale Odds Ratio Scale Log-Odds Scale Odds Ratio Scale 
Variable B SE OR 95% CI B SE OR 95% CI B SE OR 95% CI 
Intercept -0.830*** 0.205 0.44 0.29-0.65 -0.693*** 0.196 0.50 0.34-0.73 -0.445* 0.181 0.64 0.45-0.91 
Cuisine Type             
North American/ 
other 
Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
East Asian 2.318*** 0.466 10.16 4.07-25.34 2.005*** 0.469 7.43 2.96-18.62 1.677*** 0.466 5.35 2.14-13.34 
Japanese 2.504*** 0.662 12.24 3.34-44.77 2.159** 0.670 8.67 2.33-32.21 1.831** 0.670 6.24 1.68-23.22 
South Asian 1.603** 0.535 4.97 1.74-14.17 1.674** 0.517 5.33 1.93-14.70 0.732 0.570 2.08 0.68-6.35 
 
Notes. 1. B = coefficient, SE = standard error, OR = odds ratio, CI = confidence interval 
2. The dependent variable, restaurant group has 4 categories: Low-Risk, Moderate-Risk, High-Risk, and Closed. The Low-Risk category was treated 
as the reference category. 
*p< .05, **p< .01, *** .001 
  
 
 
224 
Appendix J: Results of the Multinomial Regression Analysis Relating Restaurant Group to Type of Ownership 
 Closed vs. Low-Risk High vs. Low Risk Moderate vs. Low-Risk 
 Log-Odds Scale Odds Ratio Scale Log-Odds Scale Odds Ratio Scale Log-Odds Scale Odds Ratio Scale 
Variable B SE OR 95% CI B SE OR 95% CI B SE OR 95% CI 
Intercept -0.345 0.224 0.71 0.46-1.10 -0.575* 0.240 0.56 0.35-0.90 -0.470* 0.233 0.62 0.40-0.99 
Ownership             
Chain Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Independent 0.610* 0.298 1.8 1.03-3.30 0.951** 0.307 2.59 1.42-4.73 0.800** 0.302 2.23 1.23-4.03 
 
Notes. 1. B= coefficient, SE= standard error, OR= odds ratio, CI= confidence interval 
2. The outcome variable, restaurant group has 4 categories: Low-Risk, Moderate-Risk, High-Risk, and Closed. The Low-Risk was treated as the 
reference category. 
*p< .05, **p< .01, *** .001 
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Appendix K: Results of the Multinomial Regression Analysis Relating Restaurant Group to Number of Menu Items 
 Closed vs. Low-Risk High vs. Low-Risk Moderate vs. Low-Risk 
 Log-Odds Scale Odds Ratio Scale Log-Odds Scale Odds Ratio Scale Log-Odd Scale Odds Ratio Scale 
Variable B SE OR 95% CI B SE OR 95% CI B SE OR 95 % CI 
Intercept -1.097*** 0.274 0.33 0.19-0.57 -0.580* 0.261 0.56 0.33-0.93 -0.780** 0.265 0.46 0.27-0.77 
No. of 
Menu Items 
0.014*** 0.003 1.01 1.01-1.02 0.008** 0.003 1.01 1.00-1.01 0.011*** 0.003 1.01 1.00-1.02 
 
Notes. 1. B= coefficient, SE= standard error, OR= odds ratio, CI= confidence interval 
2. The outcome variable, restaurant group has 4 categories: Low-Risk, Moderate-Risk, High-Risk, and Closed. The Low-Risk was treated as the 
reference category. 
*p< .05, **p< .01, *** .001 
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Appendix L: Copyright Permission Letter 
 
Ministry of Technology,
Innovation and Citizens'
Services
Technology, Innovation,
Procurement and Supply
Intellectual Property Program
PO Box 9452 Stn Prov Govt
Victoria, BC  V8W 9V7
Copyright Permission Request Form
Request Date: 14 Feb 2017 Approval Date: 15 Feb 2017 File Number: 7200003460
Organization Requesting Copyright Permission
Pam Mandarino
Publication Information
Title: British Columbia Health Authorities map illustration
Intended Use: Non-commercial
Copyright Request
No. of Copies: N/A Excerpt: Entire map illustration
Proposed Use: Inclusion in thesis/dissertation
Permission/Instructions
SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF THE PROVINCE OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA (the "Province of British Columbia") hereby grants non-exclusive and non-assignable permission
to Pam Mandarino, of Port Coquitlam, British Columbia, who is a student at Walden University, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
USA (the "Requestor"), to use, reproduce and distribute Province of British Columbia map illustration entitled "British
Columbia Health Authorities" prepared by BC Stats in July 2008, a copy of which is found at 
http://www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/StatisticsBySubject/Geography/ReferenceMaps/Health.aspx (the "Material").    
It is understood that the Material will be reproduced and included in the Requestor's thesis/dissertation through Walden
University, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and that the thesis will be available to learners and scholars through ProQuest
and Walden University. 
It is further understood that the Material is being provided by the Province of British Columbia to the Requestor "as is",
without warranties or representations express or implied with respect to the Material.  
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